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Abstract 
 
  
  
  
v
 
This exploratory and qualitative investigation is used as a research strategy to 
indicate a preventative policing style for public violence in the Eastern Free State.  
The research’s integration of problem-solving methods may be used in instances 
where public violence is common and pre-empted. 
 
The study researched the policing of public expression against poor service 
delivery in a democratic South Africa after the adoption of a new Constitution.  
The Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment Model is applied by way of a 
service-oriented, preventative policing style involving the principles of the 
Community Policing Style. 
 
The dissertation argues that though the South African Police Service’s handling 
of public violence in the Eastern Free State, was reminiscent of the former public 
violence of political oppression, it should gradually move away from the military 
approach to a preferred community policing style and include relevant role 
players in using a systematic and service-orientated preventative policing style to 
address public violence. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
On 30 August 2004, South Africa’s national television showed incidents of 
community violence taking place in Harrismith.   On 13 September 2004 incidents 
of violence that took place in Warden in the Eastern Free State, were also shown 
on national television.  The violence was initiated by community concerns about 
reported poor service delivery from the local municipalities.  The South African 
Police Service was responsible for attending to the disruptive actions of the 
community and the violence which endangered the public.  The violence resulted 
in a number of criminal cases being opened which needed to be investigated and 
judicially processed.  A number of citizens and police members were injured or 
killed in this violence.  There was damage to the property of the South African 
Police Service, as well as to public and private property.     
 
The South African Police Service officials are obliged to ensure public safety in 
terms of the SAPS Act.   In the Constitutional court case, Carmichele v Minister 
of Safety and Security and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2002 (1) SARC 79(CC), the obligation was tested and found to be binding.   The 
community viewed this police action as a public order exercise closely 
resembling the action of the SAP Force during the years of political oppression.  
The action of the police was therefore contrary to the current policy of providing a 
service.   
 
During the debriefing of the police action and a discussion by the Free State 
Provincial Crime Combating Forum, concerns were raised about the following 
issues: the community’s perception of the police actions, reasons for the violence 
and it’s possible re-occurrence, and poor service delivery.  It has become evident 
that a proactive policing style needs to be promoted to accommodate freedom of 
expression, while maintaining law and order.  The Scanning, Analysis, Response, 
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and Assessment model for problem-oriented policing will be considered as a 
possible vehicle for application.   
 
In this chapter, the problem statement and objectives of the study will be 
presented.  The methodology of the data collection and data analysis will be 
discussed.   
 
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
When incidents of community violence in Harrismith, were shown on television, 
the visuals of the handling of the violence reminded South Africans of the years 
of political oppression and the manner in which violence was handled during the 
apartheid years.   A number of newspaper articles followed the broadcasting of 
the marches expressing community dissatisfaction about poor service delivery.  
The number of newspaper articles and general public outrage against poor 
service delivery were an indication of the level of public awareness and outrage.  
It followed that more public demonstrations took place in Bethlehem, Memel, 
Kestell, Warden, Winburg, Vrede, Paul Roux, Cocolan and Ficksburg in the 
Eastern Free State.  Ten years after democracy, questions are being asked as to 
whether the SAPS are both suitably equipped and able to correctly manage 
public expression in amidst violence.  It is further questioned as to whether the 
current practices of a service differ at all from those of the force during apartheid 
years.  
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Table 1.1 The number of cases investigated: injuries and damage to 
property and injuries as a result of the public violence in Harrismith and 
Warden.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 contains information which was verbally presented at  
the SAPS Free State Provincial Management meeting, 26/3/5/2 dated 2006-09-
13.   
 
According to Table 1.1, a member of the community lost his or her life and in 
total, twelve members of the community were injured.  The Police suffered two 
injuries and the estimated damage to Police and community property came to R 
421 000. 
 
Day and Murdoch (1993:84) completed  a locality study in the 1980’s which was  
defined by Walklate and Evans (1999:13) which referred to the term ‘community’, 
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as the relationship between people as a result of a common policy, local culture, 
politics, and a social system.  This collective noun for a number of people refers 
to, or results in, a community.   
 
The South African community’s perception of the South African Police Service 
has been negatively influenced.  This perception needs to be verified and 
evaluated so that measures to restore the image of the South African Police can 
be implemented.   Another issue which needs closer scrutiny is the contributing 
factors to the violence and how the resulting injuries, damage, police arrests, and 
investigations could have been prevented.” 
 
Masuku (2002:5) is of the opinion that the key to the prevention of violent crimes 
is the understanding of various individuals, social and environmental risk factors.   
The marches and public display of concern for poor service delivery and lack of 
infrastructure were by poor communities.  Masuku states that the police and 
community require “streetlights, open routes, well maintained public spaces in 
helping to prevent crime.”  According to Masuku crimes are influenced by 
overcrowding, poor housing design, and the lack of infrastructure.  According to 
the newspapers the community was marching because of the lack of housing and 
infrastructure.  Masuku reported on a crime prevention study for the Govan 
Mbeki municipality in Mpumalanga.  The study concluded that the residents from 
the informal settlements sited street lighting and bush clearing as two factors that  
would contribute to their personal safety. When these factors are separated and 
carefully analyzed, they will produce meaningful long-term solutions to the 
reasons for the marches and the ways to police the public demonstrations.  
 
One way of going about solving the problem of violence is to use the SARA 
model (Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2007).   The SARA model is a four-
stage problem-solving process which involves; scanning, analysis, response, and 
assessment.  Scanning relates to the identification of the problem.  To apply this 
model to the topic at hand, repeated calls for service delivery or repeated series 
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of similar incidents, such as the Harrismith incident, which was repeated at 
Warden, may be regarded as a problem.  The scanning part of the process 
initiates the problem-solving cycle and determines whether there have been more 
incidents of this nature.  The second stage of the SARA model is the analysis of 
the problem in an example, the identification of the cause of the problem in 
relation to the victim, the environment, or the offender.  In other words, what 
factors caused and supported the problem to persist in Harrismith and Warden?  
The third stage is to look at long-term, creative, tailor-made solutions to the 
problem.  Glensor (1999:140-141), lists a range of possible response options to 
different problems.  They range connecting with other government and private 
services, to use mediation and negotiation skills and to altering the physical 
environment so as to reduce opportunities for a re-occurring of the problem to re-
occur.   
 
Clark (1992:12-21) organizes the potential solutions into four groups, namely; 
totally eliminating the problem, reducing the seriousness of the damages and 
injuries, dealing with a problem more effectively and removing the problem from 
police consideration.  
 
The final phase of the SARA model relates to the evaluation of the overall 
effectiveness of the application of the model.  The completed assessment is 
necessary to evaluate the effort and will show an indication of the effectiveness 
of the applied SARA model.  The assessment of the effectiveness may be easy 
in this case, because if no incident of violence re-occurs, it can be accepted that 
the applied SARA model was successfully applied. 
 
The incidents in Harrismith and Warden involved community members who acted 
collectively.  They allegedly raised their concerns about poor service delivery, in 
a violent and criminal way.  Partnership and a problem-orientated policing style 
could be considered as a start to the crime prevention process.   Problem-
orientated policing has a distinctively proactive focus.    
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According to Clark (1992:12-21), there is a strong relationship between problem-
orientated policing and traditional crime prevention.   Problem-orientated policing 
requires an analysis of the cause of the problems: it promotes short-, medium-, 
and long-term initiatives and allows for a broader vision of creativity to emphasize 
the quality of the solution.  Both Community Policing and Sector Policing may 
serve as a mechanism to put the partnership and problem-orientated policing 
style in motion.   
 
A Community Police Forum, according to the South African Police Amendment 
Act, represents one entire Police Station area, while Sector Policing relates to a 
sub section of the police station areas.  This sub section is determined by 
considerations to geographical size, natural boundaries, homogeneous CAS 
blocks, resources available and business and residential areas.  Holtzhausen, 
(2004:22), states that the role of the community is to contribute to crime 
prevention action plans by alerting the sector commander on crime related issues 
in the sector.   
 
Maroga, (2003:1) states that sector policing encourages constant contact with 
members of the local communities.  Maroga stresses that the White Paper states 
that sector policing should be developed in collaboration with the municipal police 
and other relevant role players, to promote the facilitation of a co-operative 
consultation process for problem-solving.  It seems that in the Harrismith and 
Warden Cases, this consultation process either did not take place or failed and 
that this required the public order police to intervene.  There is some truth in the 
observation by Pillay, van der Merwe, and Smit (1999:54-55) when they state 
that the adoption of community policing has not brought about any drastic 
changes in the crime situation in South Africa.  In essence, it has placed the 
SAPS on a new path with regard to the manner in which they manage the crime 
situation, in order to build trust and confidence between the police and the 
community. 
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In the Free State, the South African Police Service management is keen to 
explore the reasons for the violence, in order to find solutions to ways to prevent 
a re-occurrence of the same or similar events and to seek a long-term solution to 
the lack of a co-operative consultation process as mentioned by Maroga. 
 
The research question in this study is whether acts of public violence would be 
better policed, through a service-oriented policing style. 
  
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The objective of this research is to establish the following: 
1.3.1 What gave rise to the public violence which required police intervention? 
1.3.2 What informed the subsequent police action?  
1.3.3 Who the role players were who enacted or committed the public violence; 
1.3.4 How the SAPS Public order unit reacted to the violence; and  
1.3.5 What preventative steps are deemed necessary to be taken by the  
 SAPS to prevent a re-occurrence of such an event.  
 
1.4 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Nel and Bezuidenhout (1995:25) refer to the fact that the police adopted a 
“doctrine of community policing” by introducing this police style in articles 
published in Servamus.   Community policing is a policing style which seeks to 
address the issue of policing by consent and requires police members to be 
sensitive to community needs.  The Police consequently changed from law 
enforcement to a service delivery institution (Nel and Bezuidenhout, 1997:54).  
The value of this research to the South African Police will be to establish how the 
police may change their approach from a public order approach to a service 
delivery approach by applying related policy according to the applicable Acts, 
Standing Orders and Regulations. 
The community has demanded a more sensitive approach to policing issues 
since 1996.  These demands have paved the way for the institution of a 
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community policing style that has changed the law-enforcement approach to a 
service delivery approach.   
 
The value of this research to the community is that it may add value to the 
transparency and service delivery process in the Free State community. 
 
The academic value of this study is that it will give some indication of the 
progress made towards democratic policing and service delivery in relation to 
community needs and the actual application of current policy or a lack thereof.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The incidents at Harrismith and Warden are regarded as two of the examples of 
poor service delivery from municipalities.  This study is exploratory in nature and 
was conducted in a qualitative paradigm, relating to the same origin, namely poor 
service delivery from the municipalities and culminating in the reaction of the 
SAPS towards the public order violations that resulted from it. 
   
1.5.1 Research approach and design 
 
This research was approached as an exploratory study.  Forty interviews, 
structured and unstructured, were conducted.  These have been listed in 
Addendum D.  The intended qualitative approach lessened the distance between 
the researcher and the researched issue, as opposed to quantitative research.  
The variables were largely unknown and the individual interviews, although time-
consuming, yielded rich information on the topic.  The researcher needed, for 
example, to obtain various interpretations of the reasons for the violence in order 
to determine the common themes.   
 
The interaction between the researcher and the respondents was one-on-one, so 
as to shorten the distance and interaction between the researcher and those 
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being researched.  The violence in the Eastern Free State, particularly in 
Harrismith, was serious, as a youth was shot dead by the South African Police 
Service.  While television and newspaper reporters were reporting on the 
Harrismith incident, the Warden community was recruiting residents of Warden to 
join a public march in support of a popular public opinion, which was alleged at 
the time to be about poor service delivery by the municipality.  This march also 
resulted in damage to private and public property.   
 
The reason for the two demonstrations of public violence by the residents of the 
two towns, which are in close proximity, was not established at the time.  It was 
rumored that the marches were organized to demonstrate a popular public 
opinion about the municipal services.  The one-on-one interviews resulted in an 
understanding of not only the reasons that informed the violence, but also a  
Gave first hand impressions of the underlying emotions involved.   
 
In terms of the axiological dimension of the qualitative research, the researcher 
was actively aware of her biases, of being marginalized and of the language and 
cultural differences involved.  The researcher is a white female whose first 
language is Afrikaans.  Forty interviews were conducted with twenty-three 
respondents being Sesotho speaking, three English speaking and fourteen 
Afrikaans speaking.  The researcher took into account that the respondents had 
difficulty in expressing themselves in English and used common English phrases 
and at times, Sesotho expressions.  The cultural differences between a 
Caucasian woman and African men, was also evident.  African men are more 
dominant in their culture.  This was particularly evident in the area where the 
interviews were conducted as it is a rural area of strong African.  This dilemma 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 1.6., which deals with the problems 
that complicated the study. 
 
The first theme identified the reasons given for the violence:  poor service 
delivery, a lack of consultation and poor communication, while the police 
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response was identified as the second theme for the research.  The third theme 
for the research was the proposed solutions offered by the respondents to the 
violence in the Eastern Free State.   
 
1.5.2 Method of data collection 
 
Interviews were conducted with 40 respondents; see Addendum D. Twenty-five 
South African Police Service members, who were in some way involved or 
deployed, in Harrismith and or Warden, were interviewed.  Eight more interviews 
were conducted with persons who took part in the march and with seven 
respondents who were affected by the violence in the Eastern Free State.  Public 
violence became a burning issue and commonly featured on national television in 
newspapers and in articles in journals and government reports.  There was also a 
number of service letters by South African Police Service members and reports 
by the deployed members to the Free State Provincial Police Service 
management available for analysis.  
 
 
1.5.2.1   Documentation and document analysis 
 
Documents such as newspaper cuttings, media statements and reports, 
documents, circulars and minutes of the South African Police Service and 
Provincial Government meetings and statements in dockets, were collected for 
assessment, integrated and collated and added as corroborated information.  
These are reflected in the reference list at the end of Chapter 6.   
 
Henning (2004:27) contends that the content analysis is the first step in 
establishing the context to a study in order to argue a case. It is vital to use as 
wide a variety of resources as possible.  This results in a more diverse view on 
the issue and contributes in various areas to influence and broaden the scope of 
possible solutions to the problem.   According to Hart (1998:111), a literature 
review also develops the analyst's competence.    If the South African Police 
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Service was the only source of information, the solution would be one-sided and 
the solutions limited to Police action only.  Members of the community were also 
interviewed to establish their views on what had given rise to the violence, how 
they experienced the police response and what their expectations were so as to 
ensure a balanced analysis and the participation of all the role players.  It was the 
researcher's responsibility to keep abreast of the topic of research on until the 
report was concluded.  It prevented the research from becoming outdated or 
irrelevant prior to its being published.  
                                                
1.5.2.2 Data collection technique 
 
To obtain empirical data for the study, the researcher was guided by involved  
South African Police Service personnel to identify key role players for interviews.  
The target population for this research was policemen, civilians and municipal 
officials, who were involved or who were present at the Harrismith and Warden 
marches.  The interviewed respondents also directed the researcher to people 
whom they thought would be able and willing to assist with relevant information.  
 
The non-probability sampling technique was used for reasons of convenience. 
 
The snowball sampling technique was informed by individual interviews of the 
general community, which served to inform whom to interview next to complete 
the picture.  It was the researcher's intention to apply the saturated sampling 
technique for the SAPS members who were deployed in Harrismith and Warden 
at the time.  Due to the fact that some SAPS members were transferred to 
KwaZulu Natal and others to Bloemfontein in the Free State, the sample was not 
a saturated sample but a convenience sample.  Another issue that added to the 
sample not being a saturated sample was that complications occurred with the 
recording of eight of the interviews.  The recordings failed due to hardware 
issues.  This resulted in the interviews of the first eight members of the Area 
Crime Combat Unit of Bloemfontein being discarded. 
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The sample constituted twenty five police members who were deployed or 
involved in Harrismith and Warden at the time.  Eight were community members, 
who took part in or were present at the march.  There were seven persons 
interviewed who were affected by the incidents in Harrismith and Warden. These 
seven persons were represented by a Community Police Forum chairperson, a 
Democratic Alliance Party political member and activist, an African National 
Congress Youth League member, a Democratic Alliance Councillor, a concerned 
resident and a former South African Police Captain.  The police captain 
terminated his services after he was charged for manslaughter due to actions at 
the Harrismith incident.  The researcher recorded the questions and answers of 
the respondents and made written notes during the interviews.  The audio tapes 
were transcribed and checked against the notes.  This data formed the basis of 
the analysis in Chapter 4. 
 
Appointments were made with individuals such as the CPF chairperson, Station 
commissioner, Commanders of the Area Crime Combat Unit (ACCU) and Council 
members of Harrismith and Warden.  Eleven of the identified respondents were 
members of the South African Police Service who were involved in the shooting 
of the youth in Harrismith.  Three of the respondents were prosecuted and the 
others were witnesses for the prosecution and the defense and were present for 
the court proceedings in Harrismith.  Although the public prosecutor was not 
agreeable, due to concerns that the interviewing process would interfere with the 
course of the law, the researcher was able to engage with some of the members 
of the public at the hearing. 
 
The Area Crime Combat Unit member’s interviews were conducted in split 
groups in Bloemfontein at their unit and the balance from Phuthaditjhaba and 
Bethlehem, at the Harrismith Police station.   
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It was not possible to interview the two Mayors of Harrismith and Warden, 
although every effort was made to engage them.  At the time of the interview, it 
seemed that there was too much controversy concerning the issues of service 
delivery and public and media sensitivity for the Mayors to comment on it.  The 
political interviews, interviews with the CPF members, SAPS members, privately 
involved role players, as well as the interview with the prosecuted South African 
Police Service Captain, were relatively easy to arrange.    
 
The purpose of the interviews was explained to the respondents.  They were 
further advised that they would be asked specific questions and that the 
interviews although confidential, were being recorded and transcribed.  They 
were also informed that the interviews were voluntary and that the prosecuting 
authorities heard about their participation in the interviews. The chain of events 
and the reliability of the information were taken into consideration.  The 
respondents gave their permission to be interviewed.  Their verbal consent was 
audio taped.  The recorded interviews were transcribed for analysis purposes 
and the relevant consent filed for future reference.  
 
The focus group for the interviews is listed on the interview schedule in 
Addendum D.   The questions posed to the respondents are listed in Addendum 
C.  Interviews were conducted with forty respondents, twenty five members of the 
South African Police Service, who were deployed at Harrismith and, or Warden, 
and eight persons who took part in the public marches and who witnessed the 
violence.  Seven persons, who were affected by the events in Harrismith and 
Warden agreed to be interviewed.  One member of the South African Police 
Service was interviewed about the Harrismith and Warden incident because he 
was deployed at both incidents.   
 
Twenty six interviews were conducted on the Harrismith incident and fourteen 
was conducted on the Warden incidents.    
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The aim of the interviews was to establish:  
- The attitudes and opinions the actions taken by the Public Order Police in 
relation to the public violence offences in Harrismith and Warden.  
- How the Public Order Police reaction was directed by Standing Orders, 
Acts and Policies. 
   
1.5.3 Data analysis 
 
The data was qualitatively analysed for different patterns or themes, utilising the 
8-step thematic analysis technique developed by Tesch (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).  
Three themes were identified, namely: the respondents cited reasons for the 
violence; the police response; and proposed solutions to the violence in the 
Eastern Free State.  
 
The first step in the data analysis process was to obtain an overview of the 
problems in the Eastern Free State.  All the transcribed interviews were read to 
obtain a holistic understanding of the information and viewpoints.   
 
The researcher then grouped the interviews together based on apparent themes 
or on a specific theme relating to the history of violence in South Africa, the 
political and social development and some predictions of the levels of municipal 
service delivery.  These issues assisted the researcher's insight into the 
respondents’ views, during the interviews.   
 
In the third step, the related themes from the interviews were marked in the 
margin, concerning the political, economic, and social reasons for the poor 
service delivery and the reasons for the violence and the resultant police 
responses.  The interviewer took into account that the respondents had 
essentially different interests and agendas regarding the violence and therefore 
these were taken into consideration in their responses.   The different opinions 
which emerged on the same topics were clustered together.  A list was made of 
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the reasons given for the violence that caused the police actions and the 
proposed solutions to the reasons for the violence and how the police should 
have reacted to it.  Once three major response groups (based on interest and 
involvement) had been identified through listing and colour coding the responses 
were compared and categorized.  The reasons for the violence were categorized 
according to the respondents’ views, as well as according to the listed categories 
of what caused the police actions and the proposed solutions to the reasons for 
the violence and the listed categories of how the police should have reacted.  
 
In the fourth step the reasons for the violence as offered, were split into specific 
groupings.  The groups were the reasons given for the violence by the 
community, the Community Police Forum members and the activists, and were 
separated from the reasons given by the SAPS members, which were also 
separated from the municipal officials, councillors and politicians from Harrismith 
and Warden.  The views of the respondents on how the SAPS responded to the 
violence were separately categorized along the lines of the three groups of 
respondents.   The first group of respondents was the SAPS members, the 
second was the involved marchers and activists, and the third was the municipal 
officials, councillors, and politicians of Harrismith and Warden.  The third 
category of views was on possible solutions proposed to the violence in the 
Eastern Free State, which were formulated by the three groups of respondents.  
Thus the respondents were formed into three groups.  Although the questions to 
the respondents were grouped, some themes emerged.  The responses had to 
be sought in the answers to the questions; namely what gave rise to the violence, 
how did the SAPS respond to the violence and what possible solutions to the 
violence were proposed?  The topics were then marked in case another group of 
respondents, a theme, or category emerged from them.  In this step, the 
researcher colour coded the grouped respondents and then alphabetically coded 
the answers to the three main themed questions:  what gave rise to the violence 
in the Eastern Free State, how did the SAPS respond to the violence and what 
possible solutions to the violence were proposed?   The supporting newspaper 
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articles, internet articles and the interviews were grouped according to the colour 
codes.  All of the responses from the three groups: the SAPS members who were 
deployed or involved; municipal officials, politicians and councillors; and the 
community police forum members, activists and persons who took part in the 
marches, were grouped together along themes such as:  
- What they thought had given rise to the violence; 
- What had informed the subsequent police action? 
- Who the role players had been who acted on the public violence; 
- How the South African Police Area Crime Combat Units had reacted to 
 the violence; and 
- Their views and approaches to the problem and the proposed solutions. 
 
In step five the most descriptive wordings of the reasons for poor service 
delivery, were identified and grouped together.  This was also done with the 
views on the police responses.  It became evident from the responses that police 
members had different views in their responses, to those of the members of the 
community, the municipal officials, the councillors and the politicians.    
 
Step six required the researcher to alphabetize each category.  The responses 
were therefore grouped under the three emerging questions, (what had given rise 
to the violence in the Eastern Free State, how had the SAPS responded and 
what the possible solutions to the violence are?).  The related data to the 
questions were grouped and coloured according to the identified three groups: 
SAPS members, community members (community police forum members and 
activists) and municipal officials (councillors and politicians).   
 
In step seven, data relating to the reasons for the violence contributed by the 
SAPS members were listed, followed by the information provided by the second 
identified group who were the ordinary citizens given their common background 
and popular opinions, (community, community police forum members and 
activists).  The views of the last group, the municipally involved persons, 
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(councillors and politicians), and who are responsible for the level of service 
delivery, were grouped together.  
 
The eighth step of Tesch’s process namely data analysis and recoding of existing 
data, was not required as the collected data was applicable to the three broad 
themes and were interpreted as such. 
 
1.5.4 Ethical considerations 
 
The ethical considerations that were observed are the ones listed by Welman 
and Kruger (1999:181) who caution that ethical considerations are relevant at 
three stages of a research project: 
 
The first stage is to acquire the consent of the interviewees to be interviewed.  
The interviewees are identified and contacted for an appointment.  On arrival, the 
researcher, while recording, explains the purpose of the interview and how it 
would be conducted and transcribed and asks permission for an interview with 
the respondent.  If the respondent consents to being interviewed, the researcher 
continues with the interview while recording the responses.  The respondent’s 
consent to being interviewed is therefore recorded on audio cassette and this is 
then transcribed. 
 
The second ethical consideration is to have the consent of the organization or 
bodies involved or implicated.  The researcher applied to the South African 
Police, Head of Strategic Research and to the Provincial Commissioner of the 
South African Police Service of the Free State Province, to conduct the research.  
Letters of consent are in Addendum E and F. 
 
The third consideration for the researcher is not to alter data.  Transcription were 
done by a third party and checked for accuracy.  Once analyzed and collated, 
data was checked to the original recordings for accuracy. 
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All direct quotations are in inverted commas and an effort was made not to 
commit plagiarism, when elaborating on certain ideas.  The researcher 
acknowledged the mentioned opinions of other authors and the sources used to 
inform her findings and listed the sources in the reference list following Chapter 
6.  
 
1.6 PROBLEMS THAT COMPLICATED THE STUDY 
 
There were a number of problems ranging from arranging appointments for 
interviews, language and cultural considerations, overcoming the disapproval of 
the prosecuting authority’s to interview state witnesses, to recording of the 
interviews.  
 
1.6.1 Appointments for the interviews 
 
The distance from Bloemfontein, where the researcher resides to Harrismith and 
Warden was about 330 km; a fair distance and therefore, required planning on 
the part of the researcher to avoid undue traveling costs, as well as a 
commitment on the part of the respondents to honor the arrangement.   
 
The commanders of the Harrismith South African Police Service members and 
the Phuthaditjhaba Area Crime Combat Unit members were contacted to arrange 
meetings with the identified members who were deployed in Harrismith at the 
time.  A criminal prosecution hearing of the SAPS members who were involved 
with the shooting of the youth who died was to take place on the same date, 
without the prior knowledge of the researcher.  The interviews were scheduled for 
the day of the hearing, because members would then not be deployed on special 
duties and were all available in the Harrismith court for the hearing.  The station 
commissioner of Harrismith and the commander of the ACCU members of 
Phuthaditjhaba assisted with the arrangements to meet with members involved.   
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Dates for the interviews were difficult to arrange and appointments for interviews 
had to be postponed until after the festive season, as only a few people were 
available.  It was also important to complete the interviews before the political 
campaigning started for the national elections, which were to take place on 1 
March 2006. 
 
Two of the SAPS respondents had been transferred since the incident and 
arrangements were made to meet one of these respondents at the court hearing.  
The individual had to travel 280 km to meet the researcher.   
 
1.6.2  Language and cultural considerations 
 
The researcher’s first and preferred language is Afrikaans, though the 
dissertation is written in English.  Very few of the respondents are English-
speaking.  Thirteen of the respondents preferred to speak Afrikaans; 22 spoke 
English, even though their first language is Sesotho and only three respondents 
were actually English-speaking.  The majority had to respond in a second 
language and sometimes found it difficult to understand the question.  
Consequently, the respondents were at times frustrated, because they could not 
express themselves fluently.    
 
The researcher  put the questions to the interviewed respondents in their first 
language, if they were Afrikaans or English speaking.  If their first language was 
Sesotho, then in their preferred second language.  She allowed a person to 
assist her when necessary.  
 
The researcher experienced difficulty in remaining incognito in the residential 
areas where so was conducting the interviews.  In the researcher opinion,  
because she was a caucasian female from a different culture.  She had to obtain 
permission from the men to interview the residents in their „charge“.  The African 
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men from the community were very dismissive and difficulty was had to persuade 
them to be interviewed.  The researcher had to explain the purpose of her 
movements in their residential area.  She was noticeably not a member of the 
community.   
 
1.6.3 Prosecuting authority’s disapproval of the interviews 
 
Since three South African Police Service members were being prosecuted for the 
death of the youth involved in the Harrismith incident, some of the respondents 
were at the hearing in Harrismith and agreed to be interviewed after they had 
appeared in court.  Fortunately, the court case started on Monday 30 January 
2006, after the festive season and long before the election campaigns.  The 
prosecuting authorities, however, did not approve of the arrangements and stated 
clearly that they regarded the interviews as interfering with the course of the law. 
 
On the day of the arranged interviews, the public prosecutor objected to the 
interviews stating that the interviews would disrupt the course of justice and 
advised the summoned witnesses not to agree to the interviews.  The interviewer 
then proceeded to the township and asked the local residents where to contact 
the different role players.  On their directions, the CPF chairperson was 
interviewed, who in turn arranged for the interviewer to interview the person who 
initiated the march.  This person in turn directed the interviewer to a councillor 
who had been involved.  The station commissioner at the police station in 
Harrismith assisted with the interviews of the police officers, explaining the 
purpose of the interviews and relaying the concerns raised by the public 
prosecutor.  Regardless of the concerns mentioned by the public prosecutor, a 
number of police members agreed to be interviewed.   
 
1.6.4 Recording of the interviews 
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The first eight recordings failed because they were recorded with a technically 
complicated machine which was able to download the recording directly onto a 
computer hard drive.  It was not possible to check the operation after the 
recorder and when an attempt was made transcribe the recording, it became 
evident that the recording had failed.  On closer examination of the successfully 
recorded interviews, it became evident that the South African Police members 
had rehearsed many of their responses.  They anticipated some of the questions 
asked during the criminal prosecution hearing of the police members who were 
charged with the death of the youth who was shot in Harrismith.  The researcher 
realized that she would not get more or different responses to those already 
received, because the analyzed data was saturated.  Re-interviewing the eight 
respondents was there for not warranted.  
  
1.6.5  Stereotyped responses 
 
The members of the Public Order Unit of Phuthaditjhaba work closely together 
daily.  They responded in much the same way to the interviewer’s questions.  
The court case started on 20 January 2006 and this time frame overlapped with 
the interviews of the respondents.  Therefore, their preparation for the hearing 
might have added to stereotypical responses which were empty and rhetoric.  In 
order to counter the rhetorical responses, the researcher interviewed members 
who were also deployed at Harrismith and Warden, but who did not mix with the 
Phuthaditjhaba members and who were not preparing for the court case.  Their 
responses were more informative and individual, not appearing to be rehearsed.  
 
1.7  Delimitation of the study 
 
In every research study, delimitations are needed in order to make the research 
project manageable.  In this study, the geographical parameters had to be clearly 
set, the timeframe closely defined and the concepts clarified.  This allowed for a 
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focused study that provides in-depth knowledge and understanding of the 
problem that has been researched.  
 
1.7.1 Geographical delimitations 
 
The researcher’s area of responsibility is the whole of the Free State Province of 
South Africa.  Although public violence occurred in 11 towns in the Free State, 
the researcher limited her scope to Harrismith and Warden.  This public violence 
was staged on a national road and the death of a youth by the hands of police 
members was national news.  The incidents in Harrismith and Warden were the 
first of 11 subsequent incidents in the researcher’s area of responsibility.  Two 
maps which indicate the geographical parameters of the study, are displayed in 
Addendums A and B. 
 
1.7.2 Time delimitation 
 
The research proposal was prepared over the period of August 2004 to 
November 2005.  January 2005 to June 2005 was spent mainly on researching 
relevant literature on the research problem, preparing a framework for the 
dissertation and writing the introduction to the dissertation.  July to December 
2005 was spent on examining the facts and researching related policy and 
legislation.  Arranging the interviews for the collection of data took place in 
January and some time in February 2006.  The trip to Harrismith and Warden 
and the recording of the interviews were done in February and March 2006, while 
transcription of the data took from April to the beginning of June 2006.  The 
interpretation and analysis of the research data were written from July to 
November 2006 and the dissertation was completed during December 2006 to 
March 2007. 
 
 
1.7.3 Conceptual delimitation/Key concepts  
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In this section, two key concepts will be defined; namely crime prevention and 
public order policing.  This will be done by referring to an official definition, as well 
as an academic definition, of each concept.  From these, an operational definition 
that will direct this study will be derived. 
 
1.7.3.1 Crime Prevention: 
 
When a definition is devised for crime prevention, it should attempt to state what 
the aims of crime prevention are, who is responsible for crime prevention, as well 
as how crime prevention should be carried out  The National Crime Prevention 
Institute (2001:1) states “Crime prevention is an elegantly simple and direct 
approach, that protects the potential victim from criminal attack, by anticipating 
the possibility of attack and eliminating or reducing the opportunity for it to occur 
and the possibility for personal harm or property loss, should it occur.”   
 
Koch, (1998:22) mentions various authors’ attempts at a definition of crime 
prevention, such as Tuck, who was of the opinion that it included all the formal 
criminal justice agencies, social, educational and moral training and policy to 
prevent crime, which could mean situational crime prevention. 
 
A practical, pro-active crime prevention approach involves the application of the 
‘crime triangle’.  The objective is to establish the contributing factors and to 
categorize the factors into three groups relating to the ‘victim’, the ‘perpetrator’, 
and the ‘environment’.  The argument is that if one or two of the factors can be 
successfully removed, theoretically, no crime can be committed.  A study and 
methodical analysis of a crime problem are required to establish a crime pattern 
analysis.  The police should involve relevant role players with their skills and 
resources to address the root cause of crime problems through partnership 
initiatives in a transparent way (Stevens: 2003). 
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An operational definition for crime prevention is: “A practical method of crime 
control which involves the analysis of the criminal opportunities to manage crime 
risks” (National Crime Prevention Institute, (2001:1)). It involves all the role 
players in the specific crime problem and requires effective communication 
between them which should be timorously carried out so as to identify potential 
problems.  
 
1.7.3.2 Public Order Policing 
 
In terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No 108 of 
1996) and the South African Police Strategic Plan (2004-2007:1), one of the 
objectives of the SAPS is to maintain public order.  The South African Police 
Service Code of Conduct states that “all Police Officers are to be committed to 
preventing action which may threaten the safety or security of any community 
and investigate criminal conduct, which has endangered the safety or security of 
the community and bringing the perpetrators thereof to justice.”     
 
The profile of the South African Police Service Operational Response Service 
(2004:1) shows the functions of the Operational Response Service as to: 
 
• Ensure public order 
• Initiate, co-ordinate and monitor intervention operations; 
• Ensure air support; 
• Ensure border police functions; and 
• Ensure proper management and utilization of all resources allocated to the 
immediate post environment in accordance with relevant directives and 
legislation. 
 
For the purposes of this study, public order policing is regarded as a re-active 
policing style, to prevent crime, maintain public order and prevent damage to 
property. 
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1.8 LAYOUT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction and overview of the research methodology.  
The nature and extent of the problem of public violence in the towns of Harrismith 
and Warden in the Eastern Free State are discussed in the second chapter.  
Chapter 3 covers the integrated approach to Public Order Policing and Crowd 
Management.  The questions are developed in Chapter 4.  The interpretation of 
the findings and the application of the SARA Model are found in Chapter 5 and 
the summary of the research issue, conclusion, and recommendations of the 
study in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM OF 
PUBLIC VIOLENCE IN HARRISMITH AND WARDEN IN THE EASTERN FREE 
STATE 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In South Africa the frequency of public violence around 1992 was an indication of 
the need for political change.   A Commission of Inquiry regarding the prevention 
of public violence was appointed in 1992 and Heymann (1992:50) reported on 
the principles and procedures developed by this Commission of Inquiry, to 
ensure that the “policing of demonstrations, even violent demonstrations, is 
carried out in a reasonable and, as far as possible, a peaceful manner”.  
Heymann (1992:51) agrees with the panel that demonstrations are a form of 
rightful public expression in a democratic society, also expressing concern that 
the right to prohibit a demonstration might be abused.  He cautioned that local 
authorities should only exercise extreme measures in “circumstances where the 
only practical way of avoiding bloodshed and destruction is the total prohibition of 
a particular demonstration.”  The fundamental right to demonstrate has been 
accepted; therefore, marches have become indicative of public expression. 
 
2.2 NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
On 30 August 2004, an incident of “public expression” was broadcast on the 
national television network of South Africa, (SABC 2 News 30 August 2004).  The 
film footage reminded South Africans of the manner in which violence had been 
dealt with during the apartheid years.   Ten years after democracy, people were 
asking themselves: “What has changed?  Is how the police SERVICE manage 
public violence (poor service delivery inspired) any different from the way the 
police FORCE of the past handled the public (politically inspired)?”  During the 
sharing of information with the Area Commissioner of the SAPS in the Eastern 
Free State,  the community indicated that it was dissatisfied with the following 
issues: poor service delivery by the Municipality, nepotism within the Municipality, 
insufficient water-taps to service the community, dirty water, a lack of recreational 
facilities in the township, no halls in which to host meetings, no libraries,  no 
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street lights, the bucket toilet system, no tar roads or poor road conditions in the 
township and councillors who should not be living in reconstruction and 
development program houses.  Furthermore, unemployment should be 
addressed, available stands should be developed and arrested people should be 
released (SAPS Circular 26/3/5 (2004)). 
 
Twenty-four children were hurt and 38 arrested in Harrismith (SABC 2 News, 30 
August 2004).  Violence started when youths barricaded the N3 road near 
Harrismith and 800 youths were dispersed by police members while throwing 
stones at the Police (SABC 2 News, 31 August 2004).  The youths protested 
against poor service delivery and “preferential treatment given to residents of 
Qwa Qwa by the local municipality at the expense of the also previously 
disadvantaged black residents of Harrismith who lived in Inthabazwe (SABC 2 
News, 31 August 2004).  Intabazwe is about 4 kilometres outside Harrismith.  
Harrismith’s residents are predominantly white. Because the Inthabazwe 
residents work in Harrismith they therefore feel that they are more deserving of 
the generated taxes than the Qwa Qwa residents, given their economic role.  
Another complaint was that the municipality was losing its focus on health, 
including HIV/Aids, (SABC 2 News, 1 September 2004).   
 
The Inthabazwe residents disrupted public and taxi transport to Harrsmith.  The 
chairperson of a Harrismith group called the Concerned Group, said that the 
situation was tense because the residents were not allowed to leave the township 
and all the taxis had been stopped, (Gifford 2004:1).  
 
South African Police Service members were deployed to address the disruptive 
actions.  A 17-year-old teenager, Teboho Mkhonza, allegedly died of internal 
bleeding after having been shot with rubber bullets fired by SAPS members.    A 
post mortem was held to establish the cause of death of the youth who died 
(SABC 2 News, 31 August 2004).  Most of the arrested youths were released on 
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R100, 00 bail each and the minors were released into their parent’s custody, 
(SABC 2 News, 1 September 2004).   
 
The premier of the Free State, Beatrice Maarshoff visited Harrismith and stated 
that she has received the residents of Inthabazwe’s complaints and a 
memorandum about the Reconstruction and Development program houses and 
the lack of employment opportunities.   
 
Some 200 youths continued their protests and called for the removal of the 
executive mayor, Balekile Mzangwa of Maluti-a-Phofung Municipality, (SABC 2 
News, 1 September 2004).  The continued protests lead to similar incidents of 
violence which occurred in the Zamani residential area in Memel and Mr. Peter 
Frewen of the DA was quoted as having said that “the locals are battling to gain 
access to services while the municipal managers are granted a substantial 
increase”  (SABC 2 News, 20 September 2004). 
 
The Warden incident followed the Harrismith incident. Twenty six persons 
appeared in court (SABC 2 News, 7 October 2005) on charges of public violence 
and taking part in an illegal march.  The police took action.  It was reported that 
the police fired rubber bullets and stun grenades to disperse a crowd who had 
blocked the road to the township.  Mr. Khotsoane, the provincial government 
Member of the Executive Council, after a visit to the Phumelela Municipality 
announced that: “It’s clear that there is poor service delivery and problems with 
basic services in the municipality.”  Mr. Khotsoane announced that a task team 
had been established to work with the municipality in addressing the situation 
(SABC 2 News, 6 October 2004).   
 
The police actions are tragically reminiscent of the past policing style, whilst the 
community is expressing dissatisfaction about basic services to which they have 
a right according to the South African Constitution of 1996.  
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2.2.1 Historical background of public order policing 
 
A review of the development of public order policing is essential in order to 
ascertain the progress, if any, made by the police, to ‘police’ public expression, 
demonstrations, marches, meetings and any resulting violence.  
 
The level of political violence in South Africa was high in 1992 (Human Rights 
Watch: 1993).  This was after the referendum had indicated that the majority of 
the population was in favour of continued negotiations to establish a democracy 
in South Africa.  
 
In 1992 the number and frequency of public demonstrations were an indication of 
the need for political change.  Heymann (1992:50) highlights that “a political 
response is a necessary precondition for democratic policing”.  Heymann agrees 
with the Goldstone Commission panel that “peaceful demonstrations are a form 
of democratic expression”, because people in a democratic society have the right 
to democratic expression.  Heymann also states that “this right should only be 
curtailed in exceptional circumstances” (1992:50). 
 
During April 1992, the Goldstone Commission was responsible for an inquiry 
regarding the prevention of public violence, because public expression was 
accompanied by high levels of violence.  In the second interim report by the 
Goldstone Commission of Inquiry (1992:15), it was reported that the causes of 
the violence were many and complicated.  The “economic, social and political 
imbalances amongst the people of South Africa” were cited as the consequences 
of racial discrimination and policies which resulted in violence.  The police and 
army were not seen as fair, objective and friendly institutions (SA Commission of 
Inquiry Second Interim Report, 1992:15). 
 
Political violence was also rife amongst Inkhatha Freedom Party members and in 
the largely underground African National Congress and its front organisations.  
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The police were hampered by a lack of government support, when the display or 
carrying of dangerous weapons in public was banned in1991.  The ban excluded 
the Zulu ‘cultural weapons’ despite numerous violent incidents involving those 
weapons.  As a result, the ban was defined but it was not enforced during public 
gatherings or marches (Human Rights Developments, 1993:3).  
 
“Human Rights Watch” (1993:3) and the previously mentioned Goldstone 
Commission Second Interim Report (1992:11) implied during a Goldstone 
hearing, that the South African Police Force was involved in the violent fighting.  
A witness alleged that hostel dwellers entered a township at night, assisted by 
the police and hacked and stabbed township residents.  The SAPS subsequently, 
in an effort to avoid further violence, “without negotiation and by force in a 
surprise action”, seized a number of weapons from the hostel dwellers 
(Waddington Report, 1992:13).  
 
The Goldstone Commission recommended that the Government place fences 
around the hostels, to provide security in the townships.  The SAPS was to 
prevent the township and hostel residents from carrying weapons when entering 
or leaving the hostels and complied with this agreement, but was faced with a 
highly politicised campaign of Inkatha members, carrying ‘cultural weapons’ such 
as spears and sticks.  The South African Government acknowledged the 
problems and allowed international involvement to resolve some of the issues.  A 
report by a special representative of the United Nations recommended that the 
National Peace Accord structures be strengthened in South Africa which resulted 
in United Nations monitors being present during public protests and 
demonstrations.  It was subsequently reported that the UN was instrumental in 
reducing violent incidents (Human Rights Developments, 1993:4). 
                                                       
In May 1992, the Goldstone Commission announced that a multi-national 
advisory panel would examine the policing of public demonstrations.  The panel 
made the following recommendations: 
 
  
  
  
32
1)  New training to police officers in public relations. 
2)   Training on the use of non-lethal equipment to control demonstrations. 
3)   Transferring authority to improve conditions at demonstrations from police 
 to local magistrates and appropriate criteria (Human Right Developments, 
 1993:4).  
 
This panel also sanctioned a review by Dr Peter Waddington of the Boipatong 
massacre in which he criticised the investigation as to have been ”woefully 
inadequate” and “incomplete” (Waddington, 1992: 43).  Significantly, it was also 
found that there were major shortcomings in the command and control of the 
SAP intervention and in the contingency planning.  In the Waddington report 
(1992:43), it is stated that the South African Police Force is an unaccountable 
police force, highlighting the “absence of suitable organisational structures to 
facilitate effective policing.”  
 
The following failures on the part of the SAP are listed in the Waddington report: 
 
• “Insufficient command and control of patrolling officers and response to 
incidents in the Boipatong area. 
• A lack of effective intelligence and resultant contingency planning. 
• Unstructured investigative procedures which inhibit the gathering of 
evidence. 
• The lack of committed community relations and awareness with all the 
relevant role players who could assist in both maintaining the peace 
and investigating crime.”   (Waddington, 1992:43). 
 
The Government’s failure to ensure accountability for security force violations of 
human rights remained a serious problem.  It also did not help the SAP image 
when it became evident that police officers were implicated in the violence.  The 
SAP members were often not suspended or put on trial and received lenient 
sentencing if convicted.  A provision of the SA Police Act of 1958 was repealed, 
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which prohibited the media from reporting on police actions under certain 
circumstances (Human Rights Watch, 1993:12). 
 
As in the protest marches of Harrismith and Warden, on 7 September 1992, 
during a large authorised protest march to a stadium in Bisho, the capital of the 
Ciskei, twenty-nine people were killed and hundreds were injured.  The march 
was organised by an alliance of the African National Congress, the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions and the South African National Congress.  The 
purpose of the march was to draw national and international attention to ”their 
demands for the creation of a climate of free political activity and an end to 
violence in the Ciskei” (Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation, 1992:2). 
 
According to the report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation (1992:9), approximately 1 200 trained marshals 
were responsible for maintaining crowd control, during this large authorised 
protest march to Bisho.  Although safety measures were taken to manage the 
protesting crowd, a group led by Kasrils moved out of the stadium in the direction 
of Jongilanga Crescent.  According to the report of the Commission of Public 
Violence (1992:16), the crowd was met by Ciskei soldiers who fired 185 rounds 
of ammunition and detonated four grenades.  Twenty-nine people were killed and 
hundreds were injured.   
 
In a review of the Bisho incident, the Commission of Public Violence (1992:29) 
made some recommendations, one being that South Africa should tolerate and 
allow complete freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly after the lifting 
of restrictions on free political activity by black political parties.  Political leaders 
should immediately and publicly abandon any political action that could 
potentially result in conflict and violence.   
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The Goldstone Commission subsequently concentrated its investigation on the 
South African National Defence Force, the SAP, the KwaZulu Police, Umkhonto 
we Sizwe and other paramilitary groups.  In order to reduce the potential for 
violence, the Minister of Justice appointed a committee to investigate the 
procedures to regulate mass demonstration.   The investigation of the forces 
resulted in the public being very suspicious of the government forces.  To add to 
the suspicion, the Government through legislation, was allowed to unconditionally 
exempt members of the security force from being prosecuted for offences they 
had committed, which included the most serious of human rights violations.  A 
large part of the repressive legislation remained.  Two consequences of the 
legislation were that the police were permitted to detain a person without trial for 
up to ten days and  The Public Security Act also permitted the Minister of Law 
and Order to declare an area  an “unrest area”.  It resulted in searches and 
seizures without warrants, the detention of suspects without trial for up to thirty 
days, indemnity against prosecution, imposed police curfews and imposed 
restrictions on the entry to and exit way of the mentioned unrest areas.   
 
According to the Report on Regulation of Gatherings and Marches (1993:10), a 
draft bill on the conduct of public demonstration was consolidated and the 
committee suggested that the draft bill be circulated for public cognisance and 
comment. 
 
During the first seven months of 1992, 49 areas were declared “unrest areas.”  
The Amnesty Law subsequently protected police officers from being prosecuted 
for human rights abuses.  The failure by the criminal justice system to prosecute 
unlawful police activity contributed to the public’s suspicion.  A peaceful climate 
was there for not possible as long as the people lacked confidence in the 
impartiality of the police.  The post-1994, new democratic South Africa, was 
preceded by many collective acts of public expression and demonstration (Report 
on Regulation of Gatherings and Marches, 1993:10).  The public demonstrations 
ranged from public marches, stay-away actions and presentations of 
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memorandums, to public gatherings and speeches, with many of these actions 
resulting in public violence. 
 
Prior to 1994, the South African Police Force, in terms of the SA Police Act of 
1958, 1994, was by law, responsible for public safety and therefore responsible 
for public peace.  In terms of the SA Police Act of 1958 they were bound by the 
law to keep the peace.  Their action, however, was not always regarded as a-
political and without bias; in fact, there were a number of investigations of 
unlawful conduct.  The public violence, deaths, injuries, acts of intimidation and 
resultant South African Police Force action all gave rise to public concern about 
the unrest before 1994, as well as the policing of these gatherings.  The general 
public regarded the South African Police Force with suspicion and the general 
perception was that the South African Police Force was not of the people, or for 
the people (Human Rights Watch, 1993:10.)  According to Heymann (1992:48), 
“apartheid was an undemocratic system of repression, enforced far too often with 
terrible violence by a police force that did not serve all or most South Africans.”  It 
followed that role players from the community, non governmental organizations 
and government departments had to be involved in the political demonstrations 
and marches and had to assist the police in ensuring safety.  The municipalities, 
which were keen to maintain services and to protect public property, were also 
actively involved in identifying safe routes for marches and in involving the traffic 
department and municipal police (Heymann, 1992:14). 
The municipal authorities involved party marshals and municipal officials to 
determine safe conditions for the demonstrations to take place.  The appointed 
marshals had a vested interest in expressing their civil rights (freedom of 
expression), in a safe environment.   
 
The concerns of the Goldstone Commission concerning police members abusing 
their powers and authority were addressed when the panel recommended 
monitoring by the community.  Elected community representatives involved in 
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policing through the community police forums reflected the needs of the 
community and complemented transformation, as well as transparency.   
 
Public order policing has as a result of the Goldstone recommendations, been 
monitored by more than the media; it has also been scrutinized by involved, 
democratically elected community members and the appointed MEC for Safety 
and Security in the provinces (Heymann, 1992:14).  The Community Policing 
philosophy was introduced to invite partners to address safety issues and to 
apply a problem-solving approach to policing matters.  An overview of community 
policing is discussed in Section 3.2.  This system contributed to transparency and 
a sense of involvement (Heymann, 1992:15).   
 
The South African police have been transformed from a Police Force to a Police 
Service, which is sensitive to the needs of the community.  The article by the 
Wood Royal Commission on Police Corruption (2002), reports on the 
occupational culture of the police, with reference also made to recommendations 
by the Goldstone Commission.   
 
Moreover, the Commission was commended for starting the new (post-apartheid 
South African) approach to public order policing, where the police are not 
regarded as the principal source of public order policing.  Following the recent 
events in the Eastern Free State, Area Crime Combating Units were established 
and reported in the media as the police abusing legislation while regulating 
marches.  The allegations drew attention to the current legislation in terms of the 
policing of marches (Watch cops at marches: COSATU, 2006). 
 
2.2.2 Current manifestation of the problem 
 
From 2004, the Eastern Free State experienced disruptive actions, marches and 
public demonstrations at some of its police stations.  The Area Commissioner 
gave instructions that at each station a visibility plan should be compiled where 
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problems had been experienced (SAPS Circular 26/3/5 2004).  The following 
stations were identified and plans were drafted in the case of violence related to 
Local Government:  Bethlehem, Memel, Kestell, Warden, Winburg, Vrede, Paul 
Roux, Clocolan and Ficksburg, as well as where taxi violence was anticipated in 
the last-mentioned town. 
 
2.2.2.1 Bethlehem 
 
According to Circular 26/3/5 of 2004, a number of events took place during the 
month of August 2004.  The non-governmental organisations, in close co-
operation with the Bohlokong Civic Association, allegedly consulted with the 
council to express their dissatisfaction with the service rendered by the local 
municipality in Bohlokong.  Some of their problems included the non-compliance 
of the municipal services to the requested to improvement of parks in Bohlokong 
or to the upgrading of car washes.  One other crucial dissatisfaction raised was 
the issue of houses that had allegedly been allocated to ANC members, instead 
of to Bohlokong Civic Association members.  They allegedly tried repeatedly to 
consult with the relevant people, but to no avail.  To express their concerns, they 
ultimately decided to take documents from the offices of the town councillors and 
they burnt the mayor’s car, which led to the arrest of some members.              
 
After the arrest of the above-mentioned people, the community of Ward Five was 
mobilised and engaged in public unrest.  They closed the roads with large stones 
and burned tyres in the roads, which led to the South African Police Service 
arresting more demonstrating group members.  The Bethlehem South African 
Police Service’s crime prevention component approached the aggrieved groups 
and requested a meeting with them to serve as a problem-solving opportunity 
between the council and the concerned groups.  The groups acceded to the 
request and the date for the meeting was set (Circular 26/3/5: 2004).   
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The very first meeting was held between the police and the concerned groups 
who mentioned everything that bothered them and this was recorded for scrutiny 
by municipal officials.  The meeting was convened to discuss all the problems 
raised by the community and an agreement was reached that a meeting be held 
between a municipal official and delegates from the groups.  The idea was to 
allay the groups’ fears by responding to their problems, as well as giving 
explanations of some of the duties of municipal officials.  Thus, the meeting was 
held and some problems discussed.  It lasted almost three hours and another 
date was set for 2004-11-29 for the finalisation of the remaining issues. 
 
2.2.2.2 Memel 
 
Memel forms part of Phumelela Local Municipality in the Eastern Free State.  On 
2004-09-19 members of Crime Intelligence reported a gathering in Zamani, a 
residential area in Harrismith (Circular 26/3/5: 2004). The Zamani residents 
expressed their concerns about the standard of the services rendered by the 
councillors of Phumelela Local Municipality, who are responsible for Harrismith 
and Memel.  However, there were no specific threats or actions planned.  At 
07:00 on 2004-09-20, the community from Zamani started to gather with some 
negotiations taking place between the demonstrators and members of the 
Harrismith Crime Intelligence Unit.  The group then continued to march towards 
Memel. 
 
At about 09:00, members of Bethlehem Area Crime Combating Unit arrived at the 
scene.  They stopped the protesters approximately eight hundred metres from 
Memel where negotiations started again, despite the fact that the group had no 
prominent leader.  During the negotiations, the group requested to meet the 
mayor and the councillors.  The former could not be found and a local councillor 
was the only person available.  The group then asked to meet with a specific 
councillor, demanding that he should address them in the Community Hall at 
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Zamani.  According to this person, he was advised by the mayor and the other 
councillors not to meet the community on his own. 
 
At about 09:50, the protestors started to return to Zamani Township.  On their 
way back, the crowd blocked the access to the township by stacking stones in 
the road.  Immediately after entering the township, they broke into smaller 
groups.  The groups started to break the toilets that were erected outside the 
houses in the Township and several streets became blocked with broken toilets.  
Protestors stacked toilets that were removed from the houses, as well as dust 
bins, at the councillors’ houses.  Area Crime Combating Unit members were 
guarding the house of the mayor from possible attacks.  The SAPS dispersed the 
crowd by firing 15 rubber bullets and one stun grenade; fortunately, nobody was 
injured.  The police identified the perpetrators who had set the tyres alight in the 
streets and instructions were given to arrest all the identified trouble-makers.  
While patrolling the township, it was discovered that two municipal buildings in 
the township were looted by unknown persons with furniture and documents 
inside those buildings being burnt in the street outside.  These buildings are used 
by the municipality as a service point where the community pays their rent and 
services.  Four people were arrested and charged with unlawful gathering and a 
further fourteen people arrested on public violence charges. 
 
According to Circular 26/3/5 of 2004, at about 20:30 on 2004-09-20, an unknown 
suspect approached the library, which had already been looted.   The person 
approached from behind the building and set the documents and books alight 
which were strewn on the floor from the previous incident.  The building was 
gutted after unsuccessful attempts by members of the Area Crime Combating 
Unit to extinguish the fire.  The Fire Brigade was not available, according to a 
member of the Brigade who was summoned.  The damage to the building and 
the contents was estimated at around thirty thousand rand and a case of public 
violence was opened at Memel, CAS 21/09/2004.  No arrest was made in this 
case. 
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On 2004-09-22 concerned group leaders applied to march.  The application was 
approved for the march to take place at 10:00 on 2004-09-24.  At 10:00 on 2004-
09-24, the concerned group of Zamani and the community of Zamani marched 
from the township to the municipal offices in town.  The concerned group leader 
and the Rates and Taxes Association leader, handed the memoranda to the 
mayor.  The mayor told the community that he was prepared to work with the 
concerned group leaders to address their grievances.  Approximately a thousand 
people took part in the march.  The community then returned to the location 
without any incidenct and dispersed peacefully at 14:00. 
 
At 06:30 on Monday, 2004-09-27, it was announced that there would be a 
meeting at Zamani Hall at 17:00 on the same date. The Community was 
requested to attend.  The concerned group requested that the police should not 
attend the meeting, because they feared that violence would follow.  Two 
councillors were present to address the community, but the meeting was 
interrupted by the youth. Stones were thrown at the car of Councillor Zwane with 
the damage estimated at fifteen thousand rand.  Memel CAS 05/09/2004, 
malicious damage to property was to be investigated.  On Wednesday, 2004-09-
29 at 14:00, the mayor and community leader met to discuss and prioritise the 
needs of the community of Zamani.  The police monitored the situation and there 
were no incidents of violence. 
 
On 2004-10-09, the Zamani Community was addressed by the delegation from 
the office of the President and also from the Provincial Administration concerning 
the memorandum of grievances handed over to the mayor on 24 September 
2004. 
 
On 2004-10-27, the concerned groups held a meeting with the community.  It 
was reported that a march had been planned to take place on 2004-10-28.  
SAPS members engaged the concerned groups on 2004-10-28, but it appeared 
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that the concerned groups knew nothing about the march.  No incident was 
reported and no march took place.  At about 17:00 on 2004-11-04, the concerned 
group from Zamani held a meeting.  According to information received, the aim of 
the meeting was to prevent municipal employees of Zamani from going to work. 
The stay-away actions were to support the content of the memoranda handed to 
the office of the MEC Benny Kotsoane.  Despite this, the stay-away was not well 
supported.  The municipal services were not disrupted and most employees went 
to work and no incidents were reported.  
 
The new court date was 2004-12-01 (Circular 26/3/5: 2004) and the bail 
conditions of the persons who were arrested, were as follows: 
The arrested persons were warned that they should not be found at any 
gathering in terms of Gathering Act 205/1993.   
 
2.2.2.3 Kestell 
 
According to Circular 26/3/5 of 2004, disruptive action started in the 
predominantly black residential area of Tlholong in Kestell at about 04:00 on 
Monday 2004-11-08.  The group of concerned community members danced and 
marched along the main road from Tlholong to Phahameng.  When they were 
approached, they demanded that the councillor avail himself to address them 
concerning their grievances.  The councillor did not address the concerned 
group, because his safety could not be guaranteed and he was moved back to 
his home for safety.  The two main roads to Tlholong were closed with stones 
and burning tyres by the concerned group. 
 
The crowd was dispersed by the Area Crime Combating Unit members firing with 
twelve bore guns, batons and 7, 62 millimetre bullets.  The concerned groups 
retaliated, attacking the police members and their vehicles by throwing stones.  
The concerned group set fire to buildings and stoned one Crime Intelligence 
Gathering Unit vehicle.  The buildings that were damaged were the old clinic 
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building that was not in use, the police satellite station, as well as the community 
hall at Tlholong.  The damage to the above-mentioned buildings was estimated to 
be around three million rand.  The following case was registered: Kestell CAS 
16/11/2004, public violence, unlawful gathering and malicious damage to 
property.  Twenty-nine people were arrested, three of them, minors; one of them, 
slightly injured.  At about 22:30, on 2004-11-08, the municipal office was also set 
alight.  The scene was visited by the station commissioner and the estimated 
damage was calculated at one hundred thousand rand. 
 
On Tuesday, 2004-11-09, another suspect was detained; which brought the total 
number of detainees to thirty with another case of arson being registered.  On 
2004-11-10 all the detainees were brought before the court. Three minors were 
released on free bail, while the rest were released on two hundred rand bail 
each. 
 
Meetings were held with councillors, Jabu Khumalo and Mozangwa concerning 
the matter.  They told the SAPS that they had sent council vehicles from 
Phuthaditjhaba to Kestell to collect the leaders of the concerned community as 
they wished to meet with them.  The leaders, however, did not turn up at the 
agreed points to be collected to resolve the matter (Circular 26/3/5: 2004).s 
 
2.2.2.4 Warden 
 
At 04:00 on 2004-09-15, according to Circular 26/3/5 of 2004, the concerned 
group members closed the roads with sewerage buckets and burning tyres.   The 
places that were targeted were Iphondle Secondary School and Warden Public 
School.  Mr. Thithi Mokebe, the Municipal Manager, refused to meet with the 
community, without giving reasons.  A meeting was held on the same day at 
13:00 and according to the Circular, the meeting was fruitless.  Mr. Tjhetane told 
the community that the Premier would be visiting Warden on 16 September 2004.  
The crowd became disagreeable and the Area Crime Combating Unit escorted 
the councillors out of the Hall.  On the same day, members of the concerned 
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group declared a stay-away and all the entrance routes were blocked and tyres 
were burnt.  The Area Crime Combating Unit persuaded the group to go back to 
the Community Hall where they compiled and presented a memorandum to Mr 
Mahlaba who received the memorandum on behalf of the premier. 
 
At 03:00 on 2004-10-06, tyres were set alight near Iphondle Secondary School.  
A group of people were armed with sticks and sjamboks.  The entrance routes to 
Ezenzeleni were blocked again and the Area Crime Combating Unit dispersed 
the crowd when they threw stones at the Police.  Twenty-four people were 
arrested for public violence, as per CAS 27/10/2004 and two people were 
arrested for arson as per CAS 30/10/2004.  
 
At 08:00 on 2004-10-25, the concerned group, together with the Taxpayers 
Association, gathered at the entrance of Ezenzeleni.  It was a lawful march and a 
memorandum was handed to the station commissioner of Warden, at the City 
Hall.  The memorandum was faxed to the office of the premier.  Thereafter, the 
march dispersed peacefully (Circular 26/3/5: 2004).   
 
2.2.2.5 Winburg 
 
According to Circular 26/3/5 of 2004 at 09:00, on Wednesday 2004-11-10, a 
shopping centre belonging to an individual was set alight and a case, CAS 
23/11/2004 for Public Violence, was registered.  This was an isolated incident 
and the owner left Winburg.  On Wednesday, 2004-11-17 at 11:00 and Thursday 
2004-11-18 at 18:00 meetings was held between the concerned residents of 
Makheketla and the Local Council concerning service delivery problems at 
Winburg.  The concerned residents of Makeleketla are a non-political group 
under leadership of Mr Alfred Lund, of the PAC.  In CAS 23/11/2004, four 
suspects appeared in court on charges relating to arson, on 08/12/2004 (Circular 
26/3/5: 2004). 
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2.2.2.6 Vrede 
 
On 2004-09-14, according to Circular 26/3/5 of 2004, about 70 concerned group 
members, mostly youths, began to block the streets in Thembalihle, citing their 
action as being against poor services by the local municipality.  They marched to 
the police station and demanded to be transported to the Vrede municipal offices 
to see the mayor, Mr.Letawana.  They were advised to write a letter, requesting 
such a meeting. This was done and they indicated that they wanted to meet the 
mayor, councillors and officials. 
 
At about 13:00, nearly 50 concerned group members blocked other streets, threw 
dustbins around and burnt tyres.  Two front wheels of a tractor belonging to the 
municipality were deflated in the process.  A meeting was held and about 150 
people attended.  The youth raised nearly all the same issues as previously 
mentioned demanding the immediate resignation of the mayor, officials, and 
councillors.  Two cases of public violence were opened, following the throwing of 
the dustbins and burning of the tires, as per Vrede, CAS number 62/09/2004 and 
63/09/2004.  On 2004-09-15, the station commissioner met with the leaders of 
the concerned youth with the purpose of helping the youth with the correct 
procedure of having a lawful protest march.  The youth indicated that they would 
march on 22 September 2004.  On 2004-09-15 an application for a protest march 
was drafted and given to the municipal manager who approved it on 2004-09-16.  
A Section 4 meeting in terms of the Regulations of Gatherings Act of 1993 was 
held on 2004-09-16 in preparation for the planned protest march. 
 
On 2004-09-22, the planned march took place.  Assistant Commissioner Nkuna 
accepted the memorandum on behalf of the premier.  On 2004-09-30, delegates 
from the Provincial Government (Mr. Mahlaba, Mr. Masekoane, Mr. London, and 
others) held a meeting with the concerned group and the Tax Payers 
Association.  During this meeting, a resolution was taken to establish a task team 
comprising of all stakeholders. 
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On 2004-10-08, the MEC met the concerned group and the Tax Payers 
Association members from Phumelela Municipality.  On 2004-10-29, the 
concerned youth applied for a protest march for 4 November 2004.  On 2004-11-
01 an approval letter for the planned protest march was received from Mr. Thithi.  
A Section 4 meeting was held on 2004-11-03, at which the youth indicated that 
they would march to the town hall on 9 November 2004 at 10:00 and hand over 
their memorandum to somebody.  The protest march took place on the 2004-11-
04 and the memorandum was faxed to the premier’s office. 
 
At about 10:00 on 2004-11-10, a group of about 30 youths converged on 
Thembalihle Community Hall.  Mr. Mahlaba from the Provincial Department of 
Local Government and Housing office arrived whilst the meeting was taking place 
and attempted to arrange a meeting with the councillors.  The attempt failed, 
because the mayor, Mr. Letawana did not answer his cellular phone.  Mr. 
Motaung was subsequently contacted and he said that the mayor was the only 
person who had the authority to instruct the councillors to address the 
community.  He informed Henry and Kholaeza about a meeting which had been 
arranged at Phumelela, for stakeholders, in Vrede at 14:00 on 2004-11-12. 
Henry and Kholaeza returned to the community.  At about 13:00, 300 community 
members decided to march to the municipal offices in town. They were stopped 
near the municipal offices in Thembalihle by Area Crime Combating Unit 
personnel.  The group moved back to Thembalihle.  While SAPS members (Area 
Crime Combating Unit, Visible Policing, and Crime Intelligence members) were 
patrolling Thembalihle, it was discovered that the same group which gathered 
near the Thembalihle municipal offices, went to Evungwini Secondary School.  
They demanded that Mr. Motaung (a councillor), address the community.  The 
Area Crime Combating Unit controlled the group.  An attempt was made to burn 
a municipal tractor from Thembalihle.  The Police arrived in time and only the 
front tyre was deflated.  While Area Crime Combating Unit members were waiting 
for the municipality to make safety arrangements for the tractor to be moved to 
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their premises, protesters began to throw stones and burn tyres.   Members of 
the Police fired forty-nine bullets and seven protestors suffered minor injuries, 
while another person suffered serious injuries.  
 
Six protesters were arrested on charges of public violence, as per Vrede CAS 
50/11/2004.  Some vehicles were damaged and stoned, while the windscreen of 
a Vrede SAPS vehicle was damaged.  
 
On 2004-11-11 some of the streets in Thembalihle were closed for traffic.  Huge 
stones were placed in the streets.  Crime prevention members discovered fire 
damage at the clinic.  It seemed as if paraffin bombs had been thrown through 
the windows.   
 
According to information, petrol bombs were made at Vumile`s coal yard and 
some suspects were arrested.   On 2004-09-14 at about 16:20 a meeting was 
held as demanded by the youths.  Around one hundred and fifty people attended, 
where they also made similar demands as previously mentioned, pertaining to a 
shortage of sports facilities, street lights, and poor quality of water, etc.  They 
also demanded the immediate resignation of the mayor, officials and councillors.   
The meeting dispersed at 17:20, after six protesters had been arrested for public 
violence.  
 
On Friday 2004-11-12, a number of people was arrested by Area Crime 
Combating Unit members, as they were suspected of having burnt the municipal 
tractor at the municipal office in Thembalihle.  On 2004-11-17 information was 
received from the mayor of Phumelela Municipality, Mr. Letaoana, that the MEC 
of Local Government and Housing, Mr. B.  Kotsoane would be in Vrede on 
Thursday 2004-11-18, Circular 26/3/5 (2004) to meet with concerned residents.  
 
2.2.2.7 Paul Roux 
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On 2004-10-19, the Leaders of the Concerned Residents of FTN approached the 
station commissioner about a march which they wanted to arrange.  Forms were 
given to them to complete. The internal march would be held on 2004-12-28 from 
14:00 until 17:00. At 12:00 on 2004-10-27 a Section 4 meeting in terms of the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act of 1993 was held.   The march took place on 2004-
10-28 from 14:00 until 17:00, without any problems, Circular 26/3/5 (2004). 
 
2.2.2.8 Clocolan 
 
According to the Circular 26/3/5 of 2004, on 23 September 2004, the ANC Youth 
league held a march in Clocolan to express their dissatisfaction with the 
councillor of Ward 11 and the lack of service delivery in this ward.  A 
memorandum was handed to the speaker of the Sesotho Local Municipality, Mr 
Thamae.  On 1 November 2004 a request was received from SANCO to hold a 
march on 6 November 2004 to hand a memorandum to the premier of the Free 
State Province, Ms. Beatrice Maarshoff.  SANCO postponed the intended march 
to 13 November 2004.  Another Section 4 meeting was organized to be held on 5 
November 2004.  The meeting was postponed to 10 November 2004, to obtain 
clarity whether the premier would be attending.  On 10 November 2004 SANCO 
received a letter from the office of the premier.  SANCO decided to suspend the 
march and first explore other avenues to resolve their problems.  The 
chairperson of SANCO, Mr. T. Tsoeu passed various letters on to the SAPS, 
expressing their dissatisfaction about poor service delivery from the Municipality.  
There was a reply from the Sesotho Municipality, stating that they were 
considering SANCO’s request for a meeting.  
 
SANCO were dissatisfied with the Sesotho Municipality and councillors for not 
responding to their requests.  The youth of Hlohlolwane were not satisfied, since 
there was no feedback from the Municipality regarding their grievances. They felt 
that their problems were not looked into and wanted to take action. They tried to 
have meetings with the Municipal Management, but the Municipal Management 
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refused.  They decided to host a march to hand their memorandum to the 
speaker. Another Section 4 meeting was scheduled for 2004/11/19 at 10:00 at 
Clocolan SAPS. 
 
2.2.2.9 Ficksburg 
 
On 5 September 2008 transport services were temporarily interrupted when the 
Melodita Taxi Association prevented the Morning Star Taxies from transporting 
passengers as the taxi rank had been legally closed by the Provincial Transport 
Department. Morning Star alleged that the rank was temporarily closed and that 
the notice had expired, according to their legal representation.  Mr Lekgema of 
the Traffic Department was contacted regarding this matter.  It was established 
that the order for the closing of taxi rank was for three months.  The Department 
had issued another letter on 2004-09-10 for a further three months and it was 
renewed again.   The matter was cleared up and no further conflict was reported, 
Circular 26/3/5 (2004). 
 
The previously mentioned community actions are symptoms of the community’s 
active participation, in the transformation process.  The community is expressing 
their disappointment, about poor service delivery, after a lot of legislation has 
been passed to enhance the quality of life of the average citizen since 1994.  The 
underpinning implementation policy and administrative processes of this 
legislation seem to be challenging to public servants and disappointing to the 
community.    
 
 
2.3 POLICIES AND ACTS PERTAINING TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 
PUBLIC VIOLENCE AND POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The South African Police Service members are to act in accordance with a 
number of policies, acts and regulations, regulating gatherings, negotiating 
conflict and controlling perpetrators and offenders.    
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It is important to measure police responses against the standards and objectives 
prescribed in the Standing Order (General) 262: Crowd Management during 
gatherings and demonstrations, Regulations of Gatherings Act of 1993, the South 
African Police Service Act, and the Criminal Procedure Act No 51, Section 49, to 
assess whether the police either meet or fail in their responsibility to ensure 
respect for the protection of the rights and freedom of the individuals within their 
jurisdiction.   
 
The most common form of public violence is the “unregulated and disruptive 
activities of crowds” (Role of the Investigative Function in South African Policing 
(2005:2).  In instances as mentioned the roles and responsibilities of the police 
are to prevent crime, protect life and property, “insofar as the activities of the 
people in crowds impact on other people both within and outside the crowd.”   
 
De Wet and du Plessis (2005) reported in a newspaper article on an incident 
which took place in Hennenman, where a crowd expressed their anger about 
poor service delivery.  The week before, the President was quoted to have said 
during his state of the nation speech, that violent demonstrators “will be met with 
the full force of the law,” (Terreblanche, 2005:7).     
 
The question follows: What is the challenge facing the South African Police 
Service?  During the demonstration, the angry crowd started to throw stones at 
the mayor’s vehicle and at the police and their vehicles.  The police replied to the 
stone-throwing with fifteen rubber bullets.  The community then had a meeting to 
discuss the actions of the police.    
 
2.3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
 
Chapter two, the Bill of Rights of the Constitution provides a legal framework, 
which ensures the most basic Human Rights, such as the freedom of religion, 
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belief and opinion and the right to freedom of expression, assembly, 
demonstration, picket and petition as well as freedom of association and political 
rights, human dignity and freedom and security of the person are recognised. 
There are however, limitations to these rights.  When the safety of others is 
compromised and property is damaged, the police are responsible for keeping 
order and preventing any actions that compromise safety as well as damage to 
property.   
 
2.3.1.1 The Constitution and the right to basic needs, Chapter 2 
Section 27 
 
This section in the Constitution guarantees the right to sufficient food, water, and 
social security.  Municipalities are to provide the most basic needs to the 
community, which are at least 50kws of electricity, 6kl of water, access roads, 
sanitation and cleaning services.  To meet these responsibilities, the 
municipalities, according to Du Plessis (2003:17), may source the service to 
appropriate partners to render the above-mentioned services to satisfy the 
community’s basic needs.   
 
2.3.1.2 The Constitution and the protection of the right and freedom of  
 
individuals, Chapter 2, Section 12 (1) (c) 
 
The intention of this section of the Constitution is to guarantee personal safety 
against any form of violence, regardless of where the violence originates from, 
either privately or of public violence.  
 
2.3.1.3 The Constitution and Public Administration, Chapter 10, 
Section 195 (1)(a) (b) (c) and (d) 
 
Chapter 10, section 195, subsections (1) (f) and (g) provide basic values and 
principles governing public administration, stating that “public administration must 
be accountable” and “transparency must be fostered by providing the public with 
timely, accessible and Area Crime Combating Unit information.” 
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2.3.1.4 The Constitution and freedom of expression, Chapter 2, 
Section 16 
  
Sub-section (2) (a) stipulates that these previously mentioned “values and 
principles” apply to administration in every sphere of government.  ”Any one who 
has a concern about service delivery may make recourse to the Constitution to 
establish these rights.” 
 
2.3.1.5 The Constitution and assembly, demonstration, picket and 
petition, Chapter 2, Section 17 
 
The Constitution promotes the way for peaceful assembly, demonstration and 
picketing while protecting the rights and freedom of individuals.  While 
maintaining public order, police officials are to take into account that chapter 2, 
section 17, sub-section (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 
of 1996 stipulates that “every one has the right to freedom of expression.”  
Although freedom of expression is essential in a democracy, people disagree on 
what kind of expression should be protected and what should be allowed or 
restricted.  According to MCAT-Mason, O’ Brien and Greene (1991:29), some 
people are of the opinion that speech should be controlled when it causes 
violence by inciting riots, calling on people to revolt, is racist or bigoted, or 
undermines the government. 
 
While everyone has this right, it is not extended to the incitement of imminent 
violence.  Section 17 also provides for everyone to have the right to “peacefully 
and unarmed assemble to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions”.  In 
terms of this section, it is against the law to force others to join in against their 
will.  The SAPS charged a number of the protestors on sedition charges, when 
they protested against poor service delivery in Harrismith. The newspaper article 
“Government wants to “criminalize” protesters” (2005), reported on Cosatu’s 
 
  
  
  
52
views that the Governments’ reaction was to severe. Cosatu sympathized with 
the “poorest section of our population” and insisted that people campaigning for 
rights which the government has promised, should not be charged for 
contravening lesser laws. Cosatu suggested that the government should rather 
investigate the levels of service delivery than investigate the people who live in 
poor conditions and who are demanding “basic services and legitimate rights.” 
 
According to Snyman (2002:319) the definition for Public Violence is the 
“unlawful and intentional commission, together with a number of people, of an act 
or acts which assume serious dimensions and which are intended forcibly to 
disturb public peace and tranquility or to invade the rights of others.” 
 
The elements of this crime, amongst others, include the intention to disturb public 
peace and order by violent means, but also to infringe the rights of others, while 
the safety and security of persons other than the participants is threatened, i.e. 
as previously mentioned in paragraph (2.3.1.5), to barricade the entrance of 
Happy Valley, near Blackheath.  It is difficult to categorize a specific criminal act 
to be an act of public violence, since the different actions overlap.  According to 
Snyman (2002:320), these criminal actions include “assault, malicious injury to 
property, arson and robbery” and violent resistance to the police by a mob (while 
the police are acting lawfully), forcible coercion by strikers of other workers.  A 
suspect is not charged with these crimes, because of the dangerous dimensions 
of these acts, they are charged with public violence.  Public violence, like 
sedition, cannot be committed by a single person acting on his or her own.   
 
2.3.1.6 The Constitution and limitations to rights, Chapter 2, Section 
36 (1) and (2) 
 
This Act provides a limitation or circumscription clause.  It is used by the courts to 
determine whether government infringes on the fundamental rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution and if the infringements are justifiable and 
therefore constitutional.  This Act comes into play where a fundamental right has 
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been infringed.  The rights enshrined in the Constitution are not absolute and the 
way these rights are limited is determined by the limitation clause. Nel and 
Bezuidenhout (1995:108) cite a good example, in that they highlight the fact that 
the Constitution reads, “Every person shall have the right to life.”  Legislation 
however, limits this right, because it provides lawful conditions “for the death 
penalty, abortion, and euthanasia making the right to life less than absolute.” 
According to Kruger and Currin (1994:134), to limit any fundamental right “entails 
a complicated and comprehensive set of tests.”   The two main principles to test 
against are reasonableness and justifiability, on the one hand and not “negating 
the essential content of the right” on the other hand.   Reasonableness is an 
objective test, and it bears relation to the principle of proportionality.  Justifiability 
“must be read in context with an open and democratic society, which is based on 
freedom and equality.”   To give meaning to ‘justifiable’ in its context, the court 
will first have to give content to the meaning of freedom and equality, being the 
foundation of an open and democratic society.”   
 
2.3.1.7 The Constitution and limitation of rights, Chapter 2, Section 37 
(1) and (2)  
 
The result of the prescription of this Section is that the right in the “Bill of Rights” 
may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including: 
(a) The nature of the right; 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) The nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) Less restriction means to achieve the purpose. Sub-Section (2) provides 
that “no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights”, except as 
provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution.  
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2.3.1.8 The Constitution and Security Services, Chapter 11, Section 
119 and Section 205  
 
In terms of Section 199 the South African Police Service is one of the three 
security services established in terms of the Constitution.  In terms of Section 
205, the main functions of the South African Police Service (SAPS), are to 
prevent crime, combat crime, investigate crime, maintain public order, protect 
and secure the inhabitants of South Africa and their property and to uphold and 
enforce the law.    
 
2.3.1.9 The Constitution and the stating of emergency, Chapter 2 
Section 37 (1), (a) and (b) 
 
The constitutional stating of an emergency may be declared if public order is 
under grave threat and ordinary law enforcement can no longer deal with the 
situation.  The State President may proclaim a state of emergency.  The Public 
Safety Act 3 of 1953 covers a wide spectrum of possible threats which may 
threaten public safety requiring the declaration.  
 
The public awareness rate on issues of human rights in South Africa is relatively 
high.  In an article by Mokopanele (2005), Chichi Selepe, the SAMWU 
spokesman, was reported to have stated that he did not know why the police 
arrested the striking workers, during a wage strike.  It is evident that the public 
maintain that they have the right to express themselves, but they are not aware 
of the limitations to these rights or wish to ignore them. Subsequently Selepe 
stated that he was not sure if their three-day strike would be suspended, because 
of police interference.  Police action is perceived as hampering the democratic 
right to public expression.  In an attempt to counter this perception, police officers 
are raising the awareness of the public on how to legally and lawfully 
demonstrate. 
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The public seems to execute their democratic rights to such an extent that even 
the President commented on the impact of it on democracy. Quintal and Mtyala 
(2005:1), reported on the comments made by President Mbeki, after the protests 
in the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Free State and Mpumalanga. The President 
during his budget vote in parliament said that the protestors were “apparently 
driven by feelings among the poor that so far, the democratic order has failed 
them”   According to Quintal and Mtyala (2005:1), it was also apparent that when 
the protestors expressed their expectations, they were met with rubber bullets 
fired by the SAPS and the President was of the view that it was not an immediate 
threat to democracy. 
 
The South African Police Service is subsequently under public pressure to 
observe the law.  In a newspaper article covering a public demonstration and 
public order operation, the station commissioner of Phomolong invited the public 
to lodge complaints if they had any, about the action of the police.  The 
complaints would be investigated by the Independent Complaints Directorate (De 
Wet 2005:3). This is clearly an attempt to allow public expression and meet 
public expectation within the boundaries of the law.  
 
All the members of the South African Police were instructed to attend a workshop 
on the new Constitution of 1996, as a well as workshop on cultural diversity, 
issues of service delivery and transparency.  Issues of human rights, equity, 
victim empowerment and general accountability to the public were stressed.  The 
concern is that “Police officials who are described as law enforcement officials, 
sometimes break the law designed to protect human rights when enforcing other 
laws”, (Crawshaw, Devlin and Williamson 1998:23).  It is therefore imperative that 
they know the law very well.    
 
2.3.2 South African Police Service Act, 1995 Act no. 68, Chapter 6, Section 
17 
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The Police Act directs the National Commissioner to establish and maintain a 
national public order policing unit.  The National Police Commissioner has the 
authority to deploy the national public order police unit in any province on request 
of a Provincial Commissioner to render support in the relevant province.  The 
National Commissioner will take into account factors which may influence the 
maintenance of public order and which may require such deployment.  A public 
order police unit which is deployed in this manner, is subject to the directions of 
the Provincial Commissioner concerned.   The President may also direct the 
National Commissioner to deploy the National Public Order Police Unit when 
such intervention is required to maintain public order and the Provincial 
Commissioner concerned, is unable to restore it.  
 
2.3.3 Regulation of Gathering Act of 1993, Section 205 (3) and (5)  
 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act of 1993, prescribes that “every person has the 
right to assemble with other persons and to express his views on any matter 
freely in public and to enjoy the protection of the state while doing so and 
whereas the exercise of such right shall take place peacefully and with due 
regard to the rights to others”.  
 
Sub-section (3) however states the conditions with which the convener of the 
gatherings has to comply.  These conditions pertain to the required written notice, 
the required attending marshals, the route, and time of the demonstration.  
Participants should not carry dangerous weapons.  No one is allowed to incite 
hatred or cause violence.  Demonstrators are not allowed to disguise their 
identity and the demonstration is not to interfere with emergency services or 
block public access.  
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The Act prescribes what the notice should contain and how the notice should be 
approved, as well as the responsibilities when a police member receives 
information regarding the proposed gathering. 
 
Sub-section (5) provides conditions under which gatherings may be prevented 
and prohibited.  If there is any threat that a planned gathering will result in serious 
disruption of any traffic, injury to participants or other persons or extensive 
damage to property and it is brought to the attention of the responsible officer 
under oath, who then has to meet with all the relevant role-players in order to 
consider the prohibition of the gathering. 
 
If all the requirements of the Act are not met, the gathering is not necessarily 
illegal.  A police official may only disperse a gathering if it has been declared 
prohibited or if a South African Police Service inspector or someone of higher 
rank has reasonable grounds to believe that danger to persons and property, due 
to the gathering, cannot be prevented by other means prescribed in the Act if the 
gathering were to proceed. 
 
2.3.4 South African Police Service Act No. 68 of 1995, Chapter 7, Section 
18 to 23 
 
The South African Police Service is instructed to adopt a community police 
orientated crime prevention style and to establish partnerships with the 
community and the police to promote communication and co-operation to 
improve service delivery, transparency and accountability, while promoting joint 
problem identifying.  The Act prescribes the establishment and functioning of 
community police boards.  
 
2.3.5 Criminal Procedure Act No 51, Section 49  
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The Act provides the legal framework for the use of force in affecting an arrest.  
The Act defines an “arrester” to be any person “authorized under this Act to 
arrest or to assist in arresting a suspect.” A “suspect” is defined to mean “any 
person in respect of whom an arrester has or had a reasonable suspicion that 
such a person is committing or has committed an offence.” 
 
The Act, states further in paragraph (2)  that “if any arrester attempts to arrest a 
suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or flees, or ....it is clear that an 
attempt to arrest him or her is being made and the suspect cannot be arrested 
without the use of force, the arrester may, in order to effect the arrest, use such 
force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances to 
overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing; provided that the 
arrester is justified in terms of this section in using deadly force that is intended  
or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a suspect, only if he or she 
believes on reasonable grounds: 
 
 
(a) that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the 
 arrester, any person lawfully assisting the arrester or any other person 
 from imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm; 
 
(b) that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or 
 future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or that the 
 offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of a forcible 
 and serious nature and  
(c) Involve the use of life-threatening violence or a strong likelihood that it will 
 cause grievous bodily harm. 
 
It is unfortunate that Police members have to react instantly, considering complex 
legislation, on the scene, while delayed scrutiny and consideration of the 
implementation of legislation, are argued at length after the incident.  
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2.3.6 Standing Order (General) 262 Crowd management during gatherings 
and demonstrations 
 
The purpose of the Standing Order is to regulate crowd management within 
democratic principles of the Constitution and acceptable international standards.  
It prescribes the procedures to be followed to exercise freedom of speech.  The 
Order obliges the South African Police Service to “play a proactive role in 
identifying and diffusing possible conflict”, through Community Policing Forums.  
The order prescribes that a list of authorised members designated in terms of 
section 2(2) (a) of the Act, to help with the arrangements, must be available at 
the Area Commissioner’s office and be displayed in the Community Service 
Centre.   The authorised member has the responsibility and duties to: 
 
(a) Represent the Service during consultations.  
(b) Maintain good relationships  
(c) Arrange and negotiate the extent of security forces to be deployed 
(d) Inform the responsible officer of the organised and unforeseen gatherings  
(e) Record keeping of plans, reports for three years 
(f) Attend the debriefing  
(g) Request conditions or prohibitions, and 
(h) Brief all members performing duties at a gathering or demonstration 
 regarding the content of the notice in accordance with the Act. 
 
Key to this procedure is that a threat assessment needs to be done to decide the 
level of the threat and “the most suitable component to manage the proposed 
event.”   A joint operational centre must be established and a commander of the 
joint operational centre must take command of the centre.  The joint operational 
centre is required to prepare a written operational plan and to submit the plan to 
the Area Commissioner and to implement an effective information-gathering 
system.  The information is used to decide the application of resources. 
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The Order provides guidance for the briefing of members to be deployed.  The 
operational commander must brief the members personally and communicate 
“the objectives of the operation clearly too all members deployed for the event” 
and the operation must “be defined in detail”.   The operational commander must 
“instruct all commanders or section leaders to furnish detailed written plans on 
their specific tasks.  A name list is to be compiled of all members present when a 
briefing is given”.   
 
Sub-paragraph (11) prescribes the use of force during the execution of the 
operation.  The use of force must be avoided at all costs and procedures are 
given when negotiation fails.  “If force is unavoidable, minimum force must be 
applied to accomplish the goal.”  The “degree of force must be proportional to the 
seriousness of the situation and the threat posed”.  The force must be reasonable 
and it must be discontinued once the objective has been achieved.  The use of 
37 mm stoppers, firearms and sharp ammunition including bird shot and 
buckshot is prohibited.  The use of rubber bullets is restricted.  Shotgun batons 
may only be used to disperse a crowd in extreme circumstances, when a less 
forceful method proves ineffective.  
 
Members may not act individually.  Force may only be used on the command of 
the commander of the joint operational centre.  All visible members must be 
trained in the management of crowds.  This order does not affect the principles of 
self-defence of common law.  According to sub-paragraph (12) an operational 
diary has to be completed to ensure a detailed record of activities.  A recorded 
debriefing is prescribed in Sub-paragraph (13), to determine whether the 
operation was effective and communication adequate.  “A thorough evaluation 
must be conducted and, if possible, video coverage must be shown”.   Trainers 
must attend the debriefings to rectify improper conduct and mistakes and good 
practices must be identified as part of a learning process.  Sub-paragraph 14 
gives guidance to a member who first arrives at an unforeseen gathering, 
requiring the member to preserve the peace and to contact the operational 
centre.    
 
  
  
  
61
 
2.3.7 Peterson v the Minister of Safety and Security, 2005 A 624 
 
A young boy was shot when the South African Police Service was confiscating 
abalone and the crowd resisted the confiscation of the illegally harvested 
abalone.  The applicant, the boy’s mother, claimed from the police, alleging that 
the police owed her son a duty to ensure that no harm befell him.  The court 
dismissed the appellant’s claim but the judgment was significant and provided 
guidance to the police.  The judgment emphasized that police action has to be 
consistent with the Bill of Rights and that they (the police) have to exercise their 
powers “strictly within the prescribed bounds.”  Their actions must “benefit the 
society as a whole” and there must be complementary obligations which have 
been imposed by the constitution, while the fundamental rights of individual 
members of the community are also protected.   
 
Public Order Police members are constantly challenged to preserve public order 
while observing the rights of individuals.  The judgment emphasizes that there is 
a decision to be taken as to what is of greater importantance: the SAPS’s 
constitutional obligations or the proper performance of their duties. When 
assessing what is more important, accountability must serve as a point of 
departure. The judge admitted that the police have to make quick decisions in an 
emergency situation.  Most important is that Judge Pikis in the case of 
Andronicon and Another v Cyprus (1998) 25 EHRR 491 at 565 with this judgment 
said:  “The state has the added duty of planning as well as controlling the 
operation so as to limit the circumstances in which force is used, and if force is 
unavoidable, to minimize its effects”.  Finally this judgment underpins the whole 
argument that all possible preventative crime prevention measures must be 
explored and implemented involving all the role-players, using all available skills 
and resources.  The objective is to avoid the occurrence of a situation which 
could require the SAPS to make an instant decision between their constitutional 
obligations and proper performance of their duties.     
 
  
  
  
62
 
2.4. THE EXTENT OF POOR SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE EASTERN FREE 
STATE  
 
The public violence that is the focus of this study seems to be related to public 
expectations of the standard of municipal services, as well as the roles and 
responsibilities of municipalities, while the police seem to be under increasing 
pressure to maintain public order.  There also seems to be an increased 
intolerance of the police by the public.  Thompson, (2005:1) paints a picture of a 
crowd expressing their dissatisfaction with municipal services.  While a public 
order policeman collapses with stress and a heart attack and while policemen try 
to resuscitate their colleague, the crowd meet the policemen’s concerns with 
animosity and “heartfelt cheers”.   
 
There were Area Crime Combat Units featured in the media during the events in 
the Harrismith and Warden in the Eastern Free which drew attention to the 
current legislation regulating the policing of marches (Watch cops at marches: 
COSATU, 2006).  “Government wants to criminalise protestors”, says COSATU 
(2005) who also painted a picture of government reaction being too severe.  Area 
Crime Combat Units were also followed by the media who said that “the 
authorities were abusing legislation to regulate marches” (Watch cops at 
marches: COSATU, 2006). 
 
2.4.1 Municipality’s responsibilities and roles 
 
Du Plessis (2003:7) states that the role of municipalities is to deliver the most 
basic needs to the community as determined by the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, which are at least 50kWh electricity, 6kl water,  available access 
roads, sanitation and refuse removal services.  To meet these responsibilities, 
the municipalities, according to Du Plessis, may outsource the services to 
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appropriate partners to render the above-mentioned services to satisfy the 
community’s basic needs.  
 
Various newspapers reported on poor service delivery, yet President Mbeki has 
been quoted as saying that all the public protests, marches, damage to public 
property and strikes are not a threat to democracy (Quintal and Mtyala, 2005:2).   
The Local Government Municipal Finance Act of 2003 Chapter 12, Article 121 
(1), (2) and (3) requires the municipality to prepare and adopt annual reports.  
The purpose of the report as set out in sub-section (2) is to provide a record of 
activities, to report on performance in relation to expenditure and to promote the 
Municipality’s accountability to the community.  It is this accountability and 
reporting to the community which seems to have been the reason for the violence 
in the Eastern Free State.  Article 119 of the same Act requires municipalities to 
ensure the competency of municipal supply chain management.  Sub-section (2) 
instructs a municipal entity to provide training to officials to achieve the required 
competency level.  Sub-section (3) gives the opportunity to municipalities to 
request training assistance from the National Treasury.   
 
Article 69 (1) (2) and (3) of the Local Government Municipal Act of 2003 
prescribes that a municipal accounting officer should ensure that the approved 
budget is implemented and the expenditure is properly monitored.  Sub-section 
(3), requires the accounting officer to draft a budget implementation plan, as well 
as a service delivery implementation plan.  Municipalities should therefore be in 
position to account to the community on the progress of service delivery, as well 
as the expenditure and/or an adjusted budget in accordance with sub-section (2).   
 
Article 78 91)(b) and (d) states that all the senior managers of municipalities have 
a responsibility towards financial management.  Amongst other responsibilities, 
they are to ensure that the expenditure and the application of resources are 
done, "effectively, efficiently, economically and transparently".  This article should 
address the issue of service delivery, which is accountable, if properly applied.   
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Article 97 (a) (i), addresses the issue of revenue collection and the effective 
management and accounting of revenue.  The Local Government Municipal 
Systems Act 32 of 2000, Chapter 6, Section 42, promotes mechanisms stated in 
Chapter 4, to obligate a municipality to involve the local community in 
participating in the "development, implementation and review of the municipality’s 
performance”.  The section gives the opportunity to the community to "participate 
in the setting of appropriate key performance indicators and performance targets 
for the Municipality".  
 
2.4.2 Challenges to municipalities  
 
Since 1994, some changes have been made to legislation to meet the demands 
of basic service delivery.  According to Bosch and Mbedzi (2002:32), the 
changes required a structured implementation.  The municipalities however, were 
not able to successfully complete the required rationalisation process, because 
they were not clearly assisted with guidelines on municipal powers and functions. 
Following the failed rationalisation process, the municipalities were further 
challenged to function with outdated procedures and processes which did not 
provide for the new legislation.  Bosch and Mbedzi also contend that 
municipalities have not been able to cope with the issue of lack of payment for 
services by consumers.  The lack of payment for services forced some 
municipalities to use funding that was required for development, to be used for 
maintenance.  Where development funding could not be used for maintenance, 
the municipalities relied on National Government to assist with maintenance on 
existing infrastructure. 
 
 A lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities between municipalities and 
Provincial and National Government did not serve the development or 
maintenance of infrastructure.  The issue of free basic service delivery burdened 
existing development and maintenance funding further, as did the rising cost of 
water and electricity.  Municipalities should link their budget to government’s 
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strategic objectives and the different Integrated Development Plans.  They should 
focus on the importance of budget reforms that are required for transformation 
and service delivery.  If municipalities do take on these challenges, they can be 
assisted by Price Waterhouse Coopers who has developed a product called 
“Excelsior Improvement Programme” which Reich (2002:35) states, is designed 
to “link strategies to outcomes through a systematic and transparent process”.   
 
2.4.3  Related issues that complicate municipal services  
In the Free State, as in the rest of the country, many different issues such as 
nepotism, a lack of training and expertise, corruption and fraud, complicate the 
quality of service delivery by the municipalities.    
 
2.4.3.1 The role of nepotism in the appointment of municipal officials 
 
There is evidence that many appointments made are as result of nepotism.  
President Mbeki raised the issue of nepotism and was quoted by Phillips (2005:2) 
to have warned municipal authorities not to make appointments based on 
emotional ties (as in the sympathetic case of being comrades or relatives).  
Competent people should be appointed who can satisfactorily fulfill the job 
requirements.  
 
According to de Bruin (2005:2), comments made by the President, after the 
Cabinet Legotla during July 2005, were criticized by Professor Werner Lybrand.  
He was quoted to be of the view that well-trained and able people are not 
appointed, because of their political association.  The Professor re-affirmed the 
issue of appointments as being determined by relations and political affiliation.  
The appointment of incompetent people has resulted in poor service delivery; yet, 
according to Lybrand, there are competent people who are not appointed.  
Expensive consultants and experts are then employed from abroad to assist, 
train, and develop the poorly performing municipalities. 
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2.4.3.2 The lack of training of municipal officials and its impact on 
accountability 
 
Another serious concern that was raised, which also impacts negatively on 
service delivery, is the lack of training and expertise which is covered by Versluis 
(2005:2), who reported on poor financial management by municipalities.  The 
Free State Legislature assigned a committee to question various senior officials 
of the different Free State municipalities on the financial management of the 
municipalities.  The reports from the municipalities resulted in the chairman, Mr 
Abrie Oosthuizen expressing his disappointment about the poor work (Versluis, 
2005:1).  Ms Anna Buthelezi was quoted to have said that according to reports, 
nearly all areas of municipal financial management could not be explained to the 
committee’s satisfaction, (Versluis, 2005:1).  The chairperson expressed the view 
that the municipalities were not well-prepared to answer the questions posed by 
the committee.  Versluis also quoted the chairperson as having said that there 
were numerous things that were wrong in the municipalities and that the situation 
was unacceptable (2005:2). 
 
According to Steyn (2005), Minister Sydney Mufamadi announced that a unit 
would be established to “improve their capacity for service delivery.”  The 
Minister suggested that “capacity building” or training is an ongoing task.  This 
“trouble shooting unit” would be established to identify areas where training, skills 
development, and capacity building are required and would address those needs. 
  
2.4.3.3  The impact of the lack of expertise on service delivery 
 
Joubert (2005:2) quotes President Mbeki as saying that the ongoing violence in 
the Free State is the result of poor service delivery, due to a lack of expertise on 
the part of municipal officials.  According to the article, President Mbeki said that 
there are insufficient qualified officials in the rural municipalities.  
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In an attempt to address the lack of expertise, a survey was conducted on the 
status of municipal service delivery.  The survey revealed that there are severe 
backlogs that still exist in thirty-five of the sixty local municipalities in KwaZulu-
Natal.  Ten million rand was availed to these municipalities to help speed up 
service delivery and to develop capacity “so that they can manage their own 
strategic planning process internally, as well as other performance related 
management processes” (Madlala, B : 2002). 
 
Benjamin (2005), states that it is unlikely that services will be improved in the 
immediate future.  A survey by the Auditor General has stated that “only 8% of 
government workers qualified as ‘highly skilled’ while 90% were either low- or 
‘semi-skilled’” 
 
Attempts to overcome the shortage of expertise include plans to second experts 
to 136 municipalities; to recruit retired skilled professionals and to recruit 
engineers from India to speed up the delivery of basic amenities (Benjamin, 
2005). 
 
Evidence of a lack of expertise can be seen when the National Treasury report of 
early 2005 is analyzed.  According to Joffe (2005), only R2 billion of a R12 billion 
capital budget was spent by South Africa’s nine provinces.  It was reported that 
many of the Eastern Free State’s local authorities struggled to spend their capital 
budgets.  
 
The largest amount of the operating budget, namely 30%, is paid towards 
salaries.  A concern raised by Joffe is that the average pay packet of a senior 
municipal manager is R419 979, but expertise has been proven to be poor. 
 
2.4.3.4 The effect of the incorrect application of the Affirmative Action 
Policy 
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Since 1990, many government departments have been downsized and skilled 
professionals have taken early retirement because of affirmative action 
(Benjamin, 2005).  The premature and early retirement exodus has resulted in 
municipalities now seriously lacking appropriate technical training and 
professional development plans and highly skilled staff, who were mostly white.  
The Government announced, through the Public Service and Administration 
Minister, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, on 3 November 2005, an initiative to “plug 
gaps in the skills-strapped public service.”  The initiative is intended to address, 
amongst other things, the shortage of skills in areas of financial management, 
engineering, teaching, health, and information technology which have been lost 
(SA head-hunt skills in India, 2005-11-03). 
 
2.4.3.5 The effect of corruption and fraud 
 
Various members of the public have been voicing their concerns about the 
corruption of municipal officials.  These allegations have proven to be true when 
the Scorpions recently arrested six senior members of the Mangaung 
Municipality.  They were arrested for alleged fraud and corruption, involving many 
millions of rand.  Witnesses do not want to be identified and the community has 
lost faith in municipal officials.  They fear being victimized and they fear for their 
lives (Six Mangaung officials were probed for fraud, 2005:4). 
 
2.4.3.6 The effect of poor debt collection by municipalities 
 
Municipalities are to provide, amongst other services, electricity, water, roads and 
infrastructure which require complex financial management.  A number of 
municipalities are unable to collect outstanding debt.  “The average debt 
collection period in 2004/2005 for the 23 large municipalities was 136 days” 
(Ensor, 2005).  The non-collection of debt leaves the municipalities unable to 
deliver services effectively.  “The total debt of 23 of the country’s largest 
municipalities rose in the year ending March 2005 by R1,9 billion to R19,2 billion 
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which the auditor general described as a ‘phenomenal amount of money’” 
(Ensor,2005).  Local authorities are unable to afford services and infrastructure 
investment, which leads to public protest and marches. 
 
2.4.3.7 The effect of poor performance by municipal managers 
 
According to Oelofse (2006), the Department of Provincial and Local Government 
has started a process to improve the performance of Municipal Managers.  Very 
high salaries are paid to these managers in relation to the open market salaries. 
Minister Mufamadi said “Now there will be a direct relation between what 
managers do and what the community expects of them".  The Minister also said 
that a process has been started to develop legislation to regulate the 
performance of municipal managers to perform in the “basic service delivery and 
infrastructure municipal transformation and development, financial viability, 
economic development and good governance” areas.   
 
Poor municipal services are deemed to be the reason for the residents of 
Harrismith and Warden having taking to the streets and having expressed their 
dissatisfaction about, amongst other things; dirty water, no recreation facilities, no 
street lights, the bucket sanitary system, no proper roads and insufficient water 
outlets.   
   
2.5 ENVIRONMENTAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EASTERN FREE STATE 
 
It is essential to have an understanding of the environment of the Eastern Free 
State to appreciate the context in which the public demonstrations, which 
required police public order actions, unfolded. 
 
2.5.1 Urban and rural imperatives:  
 
According to the 2001 Census, the Free State area is 129 480 square km which 
amounts to 10, 6% of the total area of South Africa.  The Free State population 
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was recorded to have been 2 706 775, which comes to 6.4% of the national 
population.  The Eastern Free State is mainly a rural area where formal fruit 
farming and informal farming (agricultural activities), as well as tourism, are the 
main sources of employment.  There is great social diversity both in race and 
culture.  The Eastern Free State borders Lesotho. The Free State had a Gross 
Geographic Product (G.P.) of R44.1 billion in 2001 Government is the largest 
contributor to Gross Geographic Product at 15%, followed by mining (13.6%) and 
then agriculture at 9%.  According to the 2001 Census quoting the Labor Force 
Survey figures of September 2001, 33,7% of the Free State population is 
employed, 25,5% is unemployed and 40,8% is not economically active.   
 
The poverty profile of the Free State recorded and estimated 66% living in 
poverty the “ third highest poverty rate in the country” (World Bank Reports on 
Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa, 1995).  It is estimated that 75% of the 
poor live in the rural areas.  There is a vast rural area named Qwa Qwa, in the 
Eastern Free State, where families are not economically active.  In this area 
schools are far apart, small and over-crowded.  Since there are very limited job 
opportunities and most families survive only through informal farming for 
domestic use, they cannot afford to educate their children.  The pass rate at 
senior certificate level was 50% in 2000 and the illiteracy rate is 85%, the highest 
in the country. The lack of education impacts negatively on job opportunities and 
resultant income to pay for services.  
 
Many of the families do not own a house or a vehicle and do not have any 
income except for government grants for the elderly or for orphaned children.  
The infrastructure meets, to a degree, the demands of the farming and tourist 
industry.  It has the main N1 road (Gauteng - Cape), N3 road (Gauteng - Kwa 
Zulu-Natal) and N5 road (Bloemfontein - Maseru) passing through it, as well as 
the main railway lines from East London and the Cape to Gauteng.   
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The Qwa Qwa area in the Eastern Free State shows very limited evidence of 
town planning, due to informal settlements which crowd the area and it lacks 
good infrastructure such as access roads, housing, water, functioning sanitation 
and electricity.  There are not enough schools, libraries, clinics, and police 
stations (Free State Development Plan: 2002-2005). 
 
2.5.2 The prevalence of HIV/AIDS  
 
Heunis and van Rensburg (2005) give a possible indication of the Aids infection 
rate in the Free State.  In 2002, the Aids infection was estimated at 16,7% of the 
total Free State population, representing a figure of 486 672 persons infected out 
of a total of 2 914 201.  In 2003, the Department of Health estimated that 31 111 
( 6%) of the infected population could be in need of anti-retroviral treatment. 
 
In the Eastern Free State in particular, an assessment of infected persons is 
available at facilities in Tseki, Namahadi and Tsiame clinics in the Thabo 
Mofutsanyana district and treatment is available at the Mofumahadi Manapo 
Mopeli Regional hospital.  The purpose of these services is to support a research 
project on the question of effective, efficient and equal rollout of anti-retroviral 
treatment, by the Centre of Health Systems Research and Development 
(University of the Free State and the Free State Department of Health).  The 
combating of AIDS infection requires enhanced service delivery from clinics.  
Poor service delivery at clinics has contributed to disappointment and 
dissatisfaction and the expression of these concerns through marches, followed 
by public violence, in both Harrismith and Warden.   
 
2.5.3 Population per police ratio 
 
As municipalities are expected to plan ahead to deliver a satisfactory service to 
the community, so the South African Police is also challenged to maintain 
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anticipated service levels by recruiting and training the required number of 
officials in relation to the race and number of residents who require their services. 
 
Table 2.1 Table of the comparative race ratio expressed in percentage of 
the Free State population 
(Statistics: Census 2001) (Free State Development Plan: 2002-2005.) 
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the Free State Province provided for the above-mentioned race ratio of citizens.  
In the Eastern Free State there are 32 stations and the majority of the stations 
are rural police stations.  The average police station in the Free State serves an 
average of 1210 square kilometres.  When a complainant requires service, the 
complainant either reports the matter by phone or has to travel a distance of 
more than 30 km on average, to lodge the complaint.  The majority of station 
commissioners do not have enough vehicles to deliver a quality service to a 
relatively poor African, rural area, where infra-structure is scarce. 
 
In Addenda A and B, maps are included that reflect the geographical location of 
Harrismith and Warden.  A funnel approach is used in the order in which the 
maps appear.  The map in Addendum A represents the whole Free State 
Province.  The legend in the right hand corner shows the relation of the Free 
State Province to South Africa.  Addendum B shows the Northern and Eastern 
Free State areas and the relation between some of the towns where public 
violence occurred displayed; such as Bethlehem, Clocolan, Memel, Kestell, 
Warden, Harrismith, Vrede and Ficksburg (Addenda A and B). 
 
2.5.4 Police personnel profile of police in the Free State 
 
Throughout the country, crime prevention is focused on the implementation of 
sector policing in a community police style.  The point of departure regarding 
Sector Policing is, at a local level, to identify hot spots and the root causes of 
crime.  The intention of Sector Policing is to divide the areas of operation into 
smaller areas to improve effectiveness and to enhance efficiency.  The 
deployment in smaller areas of police members involving the community is 
deemed "to better cooperation between the police and the communities at local 
level to address specific crimes" (Maroga, 2003).  Below, is a table reflecting the 
rank, race and gender of South African Police members deployed in the Free 
State Province. 
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Table 2.2 The South African Police Service as per gender, race and rank, 
in the Free State Province 
(Source : PERSAL, 2006) 
 
2.6 POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH MUNICIPALITIES FUNCTIONS 
 
The process leading to the 1994 political transformation was, in many instances, 
an ideal political process.  Pessimists were surprised that the change was not 
accompanied by violence and optimists believed that there would be no obvious 
problems.  This was during the term of President Nelson Mandela; a time of 
anticipation and idealism.  In the term of President Mbeki, the realism set in.  The 
idealism had to be put into practice and intensive consultation followed to reform 
transformation legislation.  In due time, the country became entangled in the 
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mechanics of writing and underpinning implementation policy, to meet the 
anticipated quality of life.  South African society is not a stable one and more and 
more society dictates the system, rather than the system dictating society.  This 
is an indication of a system now in crisis after starting with all the anticipated 
change such as democratic accountability; sustainable provision of services; the 
promotion of economic and social development; the promotion of community 
involvement in the safety and health environments and in local government.   
Nearly 900 laws were written to mirror the euphoria.   
 
The reality however, is showing itself as decaying.  This decay explains the 
political decay which is the opposite of the transformation ideal.  The election has 
contributed to the unstable nature of our society.  Voting is one way of ensuring 
change, in the sense that more promises were made by politicians adding to the 
anticipation, while the reality is that even in the corporate environment the 
success rate of transformation is calculated at between a mere 30% and 40%.  It 
is even more difficult for government, because government is more complex; 
more politically entangled, has more processes and has to cater for more 
diversity.   
 
Transformation requires an immense amount of social engineering and when 
social engineering takes place, society is involved and people participate.  This 
participation can be one of two scenarios, radical and revolutionary or total 
passivity.  Of the two scenarios, total passivity is more dangerous, because 
nothing happens, whereas there is power during a revolution, providing some 
dynamics, which takes the process forward (Duvenhage: 2005).    
 
There were 843 municipalities during the so-called “apartheid years” before 1994.  
The municipalities were rationalised to 284 after 1994.  This process took place 
before proper economic viability was considered.  The more financially sound 
municipalities, mainly ‘white municipalities’, served as a centre for the induction 
of poorer mainly ‘black municipalities’.  The municipalities are not only 
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responsible for basic service delivery, such as sanitation, but they also have to 
meet development needs.  They have drafted integrated development plans for 
this purpose.  The incorporated municipalities benefited from this arrangement, 
but it became evident that sound economic development principles were absent 
in this new structure of municipalities, because poor administration was not able 
to deliver basic services.  The community expects the municipalities to deliver 
basic services, as well as make progress on integrated development plans.   
 
One hundred and thirty-six of the 284 newly established municipalities are 
considered to be in crisis and have been consolidated under one project, 
because of the poor performance of the incorporated municipalities  (Free State 
Development Plan: 2002-2005.) 
 
The Department of Provincial and Local Environment provided the following 
statistics: 203 of 284 municipalities are not able to provide sanitation to 60% of 
the residents.  155 Municipalities cannot provide water to 80% of the residents.   
One hundred and twenty-two municipalities are not able to provide a refuse 
removal service to residents and 122 municipalities are not able to provide 
electricity to 60% of residents.  One hundred and sixteen municipalities are 
unable to provide houses to 60% of residents and 42 municipalities are unable to 
deliver 50% of the required services which they need to provide.   The financial 
debt of municipalities was 23, 7 billion rand in the financial year 1999/2000.  This 
debt grew to 31, 8 billion rand in 2001/2002 and to a further 35, 9 billion rand in 
2002/2003.  Currently this amount is more that 40 billion rand for municipalities.  
The increase of this debt has doubled in the past five years, while the central 
government’s financial subsidy to municipalities grew by 20% annually.  (Free 
State Development Plan: 2002-2005). 
 
This situation has given rise to a number of problems which are referred to as the 
“September revolution”, when the community of Harrismith expressed its 
dissatisfaction with poor service delivery in a very explosive way.  A ‘revolution’ is 
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described in literature, as an explosion of political participation.  When the local 
authorities were unable to resolve the issues with the community, who then 
resorted to public violence, the “praetorian forces” of the South African Police 
were called on to restore the peace.   The South African Police Service reaction 
reminded many people of the 1980s, with their approach to crowd management.   
 
Democracy requires a stable governing environment.  An indication of system 
failure occurs when a government is unable to deliver a service and security 
services are called on to stabilise the political environment.  The “politics of 
structure” refers to a government which governs through structures.   “The 
politics of survival” refers to a situation when structures collapse and individuals 
are responsible for their own survival.   It is followed by the adoption of alternative 
structures; sometimes Mafia-like structures (Duvenhage: 2005). 
 
There are a number of phases of system failure.   The first phase is the perfectly 
stable system which is more an ideal phase than the reality.  The system 
functions and sometimes experiences system stress: it does have problems, but 
the system manages to overcome the problems.  The second phase occurs when 
a system is in crisis and sometimes loses direction: and at times has to change 
gears, but it does not leave the road.  The system disintegration or phase of 
collapse is recognised by the system’s complete failure.  It shows evidence of 
revolution and the development of a totally new system.   This new system can, 
however, also be caught up in disequilibrium (Duvenhage: 2005).  The political 
system of the Free State is not functioning in the system stress phase: it is 
functioning in the dynamic equilibrium and at times it turns into the disequilibrium, 
possibly close to the system collapse phase.   Municipalities where the system 
has been operating well are Bultfontein, Parys, Koffiefontein, Ladybrand and 
Reitz (Duvenhage: 2005). 
 
What gives rise to the instability in the Eastern Free State?  There seem to be 
four possible reasons.  There is internal conflict within the governing African 
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National Congress party.   Secondly the African National Congress is failing to be 
legitimate.  A third reason is poor service delivery and the fourth is unfulfilled 
anticipation due to economical growth.  
 
The internal conflict is dynamic and changes overnight, and weekly.   In the 
northern area of the Free State, Ace Magasule rules the party with the most 
popular politics.  The greater ANC group rules the southern part of the Free 
State.  It is called the “Govender structure”.  These two competing factions are 
permanently in conflict with one another.   In the northern area Ace Magasule 
appoints whoever he chooses, based on political loyalty.  There is evidence of 
corruption and these appointments seem to be made in a climate of survival.  
Corruption is not limited to political appointments.  When appointments are made 
without considering competency, but political affiliation, service delivery suffers 
(Duvenhage: 2006). 
 
An organisation is regarded as legitimate, because it has, through a process of 
procedures acquired value and stability.  An organisation’s elements of support, 
functional ability, and its ability to adapt and to create new structures to deliver a 
service, are measurable.  It has functioning support between components.  Newly 
rationalised units, without entrenched and supporting administrative processes, 
are prone to political administration.  This is not only common to the Free State, 
but is generic throughout the country.  Failing to be legitimate is the second 
reason for conflict and instability (Duvenhage: 2006). 
 
The economic growth in South Africa is estimated to be between four and five 
percent.  The interest rate is low, but even with the low interest rate the 
Government is not able to distribute this economic growth through the system to 
the less advantaged.  The government has to explain the backlog of housing and 
services to frustrated voters, who are waiting for the delivery of the politicians’ 
promises.   There is evidence in literature, that strong economic growth has 
preceded unstable and violent governance.  There was strong economic growth 
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in the late sixties and seventies, followed by the inevitable economic slump, 
because such growth could not be maintained.  The population also anticipated 
sharing in this growth and prosperity and when this economic and political 
prosperity was not experienced by all, the Soweto uprising resulted, followed 
soon after by the declaration of “a state of emergency.”  Another “state of 
emergency” was declared in the eighties after a good economic climate.  
Economic growth, on its own, is not responsible for conflict or violence; it 
sometimes serves as a trigger for conflict and violence, along with the other three 
reasons for conflict and violence, relating to governance (Duvenhage: 2006).      
 
2.7 SUMMARY 
 
In Peterson v the Minister of Safety and Security, 2005 A 624, a young boy was 
shot, while the South African Police Service was confiscating illegally harvested 
abalone and the crowd resisted.   The applicant, the boy’s mother alleged that 
the police owed her son a duty to ensure that no harm befell him. The court 
dismissed the appellant’s claim, but the judgment was significant and provided 
guidance to the police.  The judgment emphasized that police action has to be 
consistent with the Bill of Rights and the police have to exercise their powers 
“strictly within the prescribed bounds.”  Their actions must “benefit the society as 
a whole” and must complement obligations, which have been imposed by the 
constitution, while the fundamental rights of individual members of the community 
are also protected.  Public Order Police members are constantly challenged to 
preserve public order while observing the rights of individuals.  The judgment 
emphasizes that there is a decision to be taken as to what is more important: the 
SAPS’s obligation by legislation, or “the proper performance of their duties.”  
When assessing what is more important, accountability must serve as the point 
of departure. The judge admitted that the police have to make quick decisions in 
an emergency situation.  Most important is that Judge Pikis said, in the case of 
Andronicon and Another v Cyprus (1998) 25 EHRR 491 at 565 said in his 
judgment that:  “The state has the added duty of planning as well as controlling 
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the operation so as to limit the circumstances in which force is used, and if force 
is unavoidable, to minimize its effects”.  
 
Finally this judgment underpins the whole argument that all possible crime 
prevention measures must be explored and implemented, involving all the role- 
players and using all available skills and resources.  The objective is to avoid the 
occurrence of situations which could require the SAPS to make instant decisions 
and priorities between constitutional obligations and the proper performance of 
their duties.  The violence pertaining to the Eastern Free State resulted in three 
policemen from Harrismith being prosecuted for the death of a youth resulting 
from the police members firing on a marching crowd which threatened to move 
onto the N3 road between Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal.  The judge dismissed the 
case against the members stating that they had acted in an emergency.   
 
Political change since 1994 has required idealism to be put into transformation.  
There were numerous marches and incidents of public violence accompanying 
the political transformation of South Africa.  The Goldstone investigations, 
amongst others, directed the new police direction in South Africa to be of a more 
community oriented policing style.  
 
The South African Constitution paved the way for new legislation, to ensure 
South African’s right to freedom of expression.  Eight hundred and forty three 
municipalities have been rationalised to two hundred and eight four municipalities 
since 1994.  The rationalisation of the municipalities required a new 
administrative process, unfortunately hampered by a lack of skills, training and 
expertise.  Nepotism and the incorrect application of the affirmative action policy, 
as well as internal conflict, bribery and corruption has resulted in poor service 
delivery, and collectively, it served as a trigger to public violence in the Eastern 
Free State.  
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CHAPTER 3: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO PUBLIC ORDER 
POLICING AND CROWD MANAGEMENT  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The significance of understanding the unlawful intentions of a crowd and how to 
give the same priority to the facilitation of a crowd’s lawful intentions are 
important considerations.  
 
Crowd management and public order policing remain a problem to policing 
agencies worldwide.  The SARA model of problem-solving is often used by law 
enforcement as a convenient model to apply in order to find new guidelines for 
public order policing.  It forces people to fully explore the underlying dynamics, 
before they start inventing solutions.  In this chapter, the relationship between 
community policing and the SARA model for problem-solving will be explored. 
This will be done with a view to derive a suitable proactive policing approach 
towards public order policing.  
 
3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
 
The South African Police Service has adopted a community policing style to 
crime prevention with the establishment of community policing forums and 
boards, as prescribed by the South African Police Act No 68 of 1995.  The Act 
instructed the South African Police service to adopt and implement this crime 
prevention style and to establish local community police forums and area boards.  
 
3.2.1 Historical perspective on Community Policing 
 
Due to the ongoing violence and political change, the South African Police Force 
was challenged in its policing style before 1990 during and after the apartheid’s 
years.   The police were seen as a one-sided force of the government “protecting 
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the security of the state” against “political protest”.  The police have converted 
from a “force” to a “service” and have subsequently changed their policing style 
so as to be accountable to the community (Nel, & Bezuidenhout 1995:21-24).  
According to Hansen (2000:47).  The South African Government ensured 
community participation through the provision of the South African Police Service 
Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995) which provided legislation for the establishment of 
Community Police Forums and Boards.  Hansen states that the purpose of the 
Forums and Boards is to promote consultation and the conveying of “policing 
needs” as well as providing an evaluation opportunity for the police service.  The 
result of functioning Community Police Forums and Boards is to ensure civilian 
oversight and to contribute to efficient policing. 
  
3.2.2 The development of Community Policing in South Africa 
 
South African society was accustomed to the Public Order Police units of the 
South African Police Service being deployed in the townships.  Their main focus 
was public order and daily crime prevention duties suffered as a result. According 
to Pillay, van der Merwe, and Smit (1999:54), “political opportunism and the 
irrational degradation of ordinary citizens at the hands of criminals”, added to the 
South African public’s distrust of the police.  To resolve the poor relations 
between the community and the police, community policing was instituted. 
 
The South African Police Force is referred to as “colonial policing” before 1994 by 
Nel and Bezuidenhout (1995:24), because it was part of a control mechanism 
imposed on the indigenous people of the land, and above all, law and order. The 
political conflict between blacks and whites required policing and since the police 
force mainly protected the interests of the “white government”, the police were 
perceived to be oppressors.   
 
The National Peace accord and the newly adopted Constitution in 1996 became 
the legal framework for the moral values of South Africa.  The legitimacy of the 
 
  
  
  
83
police was compromised and to promote accountability to the community, the 
police were forced to adopt new values of open-mindedness, objectivity and 
fairness. 
 
The restructuring of the police was part of the project of political transition: 
superficial changes would have been seen as “cosmetic changes”, thus a shift in 
policing philosophy was required.  The conditions set in the interim Constitution, 
in Section 221, provided the way for the establishment of local forums and their 
functioning.  The forums were to promote co-operation between the SAPS and 
the community, monitor the effectiveness and efficiency, advise the South African 
Police Service on policing needs, evaluate the service provided by the police, 
and request enquiries into policing matters (Nel and Bezuidenhout 1995:21-27).   
The forums were consulted to assist with the essential step-by-step approach to 
finding the underlying, root cause of a problem, rather than simply addressing the 
symptoms.   
 
By identifying the offender, the victim and the location, of a crime, the police 
should attempt to eliminate one of the three elements, because in theory, a crime 
cannot be committed if one of the three elements is absent.  Added to the crime 
prevention approach, public violence cannot be prevented without considering 
the community.  Different Governments approach the public differently. 
 
Recent public protests against election results in Ethiopia were the result of the 
community complaints of “massive ruling party fraud in the election.”  Shooting 
followed weeks of rising tension over preliminary results from the parliamentary 
election during May 2005.  On the day that the election results were announced, 
more than 100 people were injured and at least 22 of those who died had not 
participated in the demonstrations. The government defended the security forces, 
stating that their action was necessary to prevent the looting and destruction of 
property (Ethiopian police kill 23 demonstrators, 2005). The Ethiopian 
government statement leaves the question as to the value of human life versus 
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property and their commitment to peaceful consultation and negotiation.  In stark 
contrast to the Ethiopian Government, the Canadian policing Style was shaped 
by the colonial policing models of the Royal Irish Constabulary.  The initial police 
forces were militarized temporary forces.  The Mounted Police Forces followed 
by the mounted constabulary and the British Columbia Constabulary formed in 
1858 were formed mainly to preserve the peace and to prevent riots near public 
workers, protests against the rebellion and the protection of the construction of 
the Canadian Pacific railroads.   
 
It is very noticeable that contrary to the Ethiopian Police, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police promotes the use of less lethal weapons such as ‘baton rounds’ 
to promote legitimacy and consensus in the community they serve (King 
2001:73).   This policing style keeps the community involved and fosters a 
community sensitive policing style.  There seems to be a shift in focus of some 
UK police forces.  According to Hall (1998:225), the “orientation of the service 
provided by the police has, over recent years, been increasingly focused upon 
the measurable achievement of operational effectiveness and efficiency.”  Hall 
questions the measurement of effectiveness and efficiency and his approach to 
this measurement is to judge acceptable and unacceptable behavior.  He admits 
that there “exists a multiplicity of public views with regard to desirable and 
possible levels of order.”   The diversity and plurality of the community resulted in 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
 
Closer to home in South Africa, members of the former South African Police 
Force  were never brought to justice for incidents relating to conduct during public 
violence and riots. Four hundred and fifty one people were reported killed in the 
1976 demonstrations (Bruce, 2005). Tragic incidents similar to them, followed in 
Langa in 1985, Sebokeng in 1990 and in Bisho in 1992.   
 
The South African Police Service has shifted its focus since 1994.  An 
Independent Complaints Directorate has since been established.  The 
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Directorate has been responsible for investigating police members involved in 
killings.  The South African Police Service style has also changed since the 
appointment of the Directorate and according to Bruce (2005), “riot police are 
retrained to focus on crowd management rather than repressing popular protest.”  
Legislation was also amended by means of the regulation of the Act of 1993, 
governing the holding and policing of demonstrations. “It is important to 
recognize,” says Bruce “that the recent wave of protest has resulted in one 
death,” when in the last decade the SAPS “has been involved in the policing of 
thousands of demonstrations where no lives have been lost, or injured.  Teboho 
Mkhonza was killed outside Harrismith on 30 August 2004, and this death has 
resulted in the “Independent Complaint Directorate investigation in three 
policemen standing trial for murder.”   
 
The inconsistency of expectation requires a greater measure of regulations and 
order for police functionality.  Professionalism and a common standard are 
achieved through “training, the experience, and delegation of legal powers.”  
Policing order is difficult to regulate without legislation, regulations, and orders. 
Hall argues that without it, it can be interpreted that the police have flexibility 
which allows for re-interpretation of concepts of order in the light of prevailing 
social morals.  Hansen (2000:57), states that the implementation of the new 
policing policies must fall within the framework of the Constitution.  It is against 
this backdrop, according to Hansen, that police managers are to implement and 
evaluate their effectiveness and combine policing theories and strategies such as 
community policing and the SARA model in support of problem oriented policing 
challenges. 
 
The major objective of community policing is to “establish active partnerships 
between the police and the community at local level”.   These partnerships are 
then jointly responsible for establishing crime trends, considering service delivery 
levels and jointly formulating and implementing solutions.   According to Stevens 
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(2003), the community policing philosophy is essential to support Public Order 
Policing.  
 
3.2.3. The link between Community Policing and the Scanning, Analysis, 
Response and Assessment Model 
 
Stevens (2003) states that problem-solving is a “key element in many community 
strategies”.  Over the past few years, the South African Police style has been 
expanded to involve an initial overview of the offence.  This is followed by an in-
depth analysis of the conditions and circumstances of the offence, while possible 
responses are considered involving external role players and resources such as 
the community, with the effectiveness of the responses also being assessed.  It is 
Stevens’s (2003) opinion that the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response and 
Assessment) model “is the conceptual model of problem-solving”. 
 
The advantages of the SARA model are many.  Firstly, it provides an opportunity 
to consult with different role players.  Secondly, the consultation process puts in 
motion the community policing concept of partnership policing.  Thirdly, it 
provides a multi-agency approach to crime prevention.  The same advantages 
are apparent when the SAPS and the community apply the four stages of local 
crime prevention strategy, as described by Nel (2000:37), in relation to 
community-based crime prevention. The theory of the SARA model and the 
community-based crime prevention style, provide practical measures for the 
SAPS to involve stakeholders and to actively find solutions to the identified crime-
related problems.  The advantages of a multi-disciplinary approach to crime 
problems are, that it is most responsive to local needs, involves partners that 
might otherwise be excluded, maximises participation and provides access to 
exclusive skills and resources (Nel, 2000:33). 
 
The first step to a crime prevention strategy is proposed in this study to promote 
community involvement.  The Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment 
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Model are proposed because it provides a methodical proactive crime prevention 
strategy process.  The SAPS is deemed to benefit from the community policing 
style because the community is involved in scanning and completing a safety 
audit, while identifying crime related problems.  The second step is to analyse the 
identified problem and through community involvement, develop a crime 
prevention strategy along the crime triangle theory.  The theory is aimed at 
eliminating one, two or all three of the elements of the crime triangle.  The third 
step of the SARA model is to execute the agreed response, according to the 
crime prevention strategy, involving all the relevant role-players in their mandated 
roles and responsibilities.  It is important to involve all the role players to assess 
the outcome of the developed strategy.   
 
Table 3.1 The similar objectives of the applied SARA Model and the 
Community-Based Crime Prevention Style 
 
  
Source: (Nel, (2000:37) and Townsley and Pease (2001). 
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During the assessment, the role-players need to establish whether the problem 
was correctly identified whether all the role-players were involved and whether all 
the role- players implement and manage the best crime prevention strategy to 
eliminate one, two or all the elements of the crime triangle so as to address the 
root cause of the problems and not merely the symptoms of the problem.  If it 
seems from the assessment that the strategy has failed, the SARA model must 
be applied again. 
 
3.3. THE SCANNING, ANALYSIS, RESPONSE AND ASSESSMENT MODEL 
 
Townsley and Pease (2001) are of the opinion that the model provides a versatile 
process which should be well documented to review the process, to compare the 
problem-solving process and to provide a way for police officials to combine 
different events into groups to identify problems. Two or more incidents which are 
similar in one or more ways constitute a crime, a fear or a disorder problem in a 
community.  A problem in the SARA model is not an isolated or individual 
incident and a persistent problem results in a pattern (“SPD community policing 
SARA Model” [online]).  
 
Observant police officers identify isolated incidents and when a pattern is 
established, a problem is constituted (“Balanced and restorative” [online]).   
Information from police records, from staff, police and local government research 
and planning divisions, information from national organisations and associations, 
crime statistics and letters from the public, are all used to find patterns which 
could constitute a problem.  When a strategy is being developed for a problem, 
the problem must be specific.  The more specific the problem or hypothesis of the 
problem, the greater the likelihood of creating a strategy that makes a real 
difference to the problem.  Townsley and Pease (2001), state that it is more 
effective to group incidents together and to find an effective way to deal with a 
group of incidents, than to react to separate incidents. 
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According to Townsley and Pease, (2001), some problems are chronic and some 
are spikes, brief but intense activities of a specific nature or recurrent low-level 
problems that are only apparent over a long time period of time.  When the 
problem is identified, Townsley and Pease recommend that it may be focussed 
by describing the problem in ways that highlight the offensive behaviour.  If the 
offensive behaviour is mentioned in the problem statement, the problem is more 
descriptive and the problem becomes more focussed which will help to direct the 
deployment of resources.  The same position is taken in the article “Balanced 
and restorative justice” [online], where it is stated that the more specific the 
problem, the better the strategy and more effectively the SARA model may  be 
applied to make a difference.  When the problem has been well stated and the 
consequences of the problem well-established, the scanning phase also provides 
the scope to prioritise the problem. 
 
There are four components to the SARA model with all the components being 
equally important.  Townsley and Pease, (2001), advise that the first step to 
applying the SARA model is to be sure about the four phases of the model and to 
avoid the common problem of blurring the phases.  The four phases are called 
scanning, analysis, response and assessment.        
 
3.3.1 Scanning (preliminary review of information) 
 
Scanning is the first phase of the four phases.  Briefly, it refers to a descriptive 
exploration of the problem.  It is the only preliminary review of information which 
confirms that there are related or recurring incidents that constitute a problem, a 
crime or disorder.  The incidents might have been noticed by an observant officer 
or through the reviewing of police information. 
 
The scanning process is the first step in narrowing the problem down to its lowest 
common denominator (“Implementing Innovations in Juvenile Justice in 
Michigan” [online]). During the scanning process the length of time that the 
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problem has occurred is established.  Offensive behaviour will always be an 
action.  
 
Gaines, Glensor and Peak (2004) summarise the following as issues for 
consideration when establishing a problem: behaviours, location, persons 
(individuals) and time analyses, while Robin (2000:44), adds a category of 
people.  Behaviours, according to the mentioned source, relate to the repeat 
offender who commits specific crimes such as burglaries and motor vehicle theft.  
They may be symptoms of the same problem, which need to be prioritised and 
one or more can be selected for examination.  Given that problems can be 
prioritised, the scanning phase is also the phase during which it should be 
confirmed that there is actually a problem. 
 
One of the examples that explain the scanning phase is supplied by Townsley 
and Pease (2001).  They use the example of a motor vehicle which would not 
start.  The question was if the ‘vehicle’ was the problem, or was the problem ‘the 
vehicle not starting’.  Since the vehicle did not start, the engine did not turn, no 
lights came on when the key was turned and the starter motor made no sound.  
These were signs of the ‘problem’ and an indication of the vehicle not starting.  
The motor vehicle is not the ‘problem’, nor the lights not coming on and all the 
other signs.  What constitutes the ‘problem’ is that the vehicle is not ‘performing’.  
The problem therefore is that “the vehicle cannot be started’. 
 
3.3.2 Analyses (to understand the events that preceded the problems) 
 
The analysis of the problem is the process which takes place when the problem 
is identified, in order to understand the events and conditions that preceded and 
accompanied the problem, so that a response suited to the problem could be 
customised.  Robin (2000:44) is of the opinion that no intelligent solution or 
response can be formulated to a problem if a proper analysis of the problem has 
not been made.  It is suggested that the main source of data must be closely 
examined as a starting point for the ordered collection and review of the 
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information.  The collection of data or gathering of information, police records, 
interviews, telephone reports or complaint surveys, crime patterns and literature 
searches, could be used to establish a problem.  Robin (2000:44) also suggests 
that the information should be grouped according to location, common behaviour 
or common offender, to establish if there were preceding events or similarities 
which constitute a problem. 
 
By understanding and grouping the problems, a greater likelihood exists of 
identifying a response which would make a real difference (Balanced and 
Restorative Justice Michigan [online]).  According to the article “Making South 
Africa Safe: a manual for community based crime prevention” (2000:4), the 
purpose of this phase is to establish to “the highest degree of confidence what 
factors produce offensive behaviour”.  It is suggested that the focus of the 
analysis should be on what is referred to as the “Problem Analysis Triangle”. 
 
Figure 3.1 “Problem Analysis Triangle” 
 
 
 
               Victim                                                Offender 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Environment 
Source: Nel (2000:4) 
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All three of the crime triangle elements need to be present for a crime to be 
committed.   While all three perspectives require close examination; it is most 
important to establish how they interrelate to result in the particular problem. 
 
The challenge is in the analysis phase, to find the causes of the problem and to 
address these, instead of finding a response to the symptoms  Robin (2000:44) 
gives an example of mentally ill persons, who after being de-institutionalised, 
behaved violently.  The mentally ill were not the problem; their behaviour was.  
After careful analysis, it was established that they failed to use their prescribed 
medication.  A programme of care was instituted to ensure that they took their 
medication.  As a result of their efforts the number of violent incidents decreased.  
This example shows that the obvious problem of violent behaviour was the result 
of an underlying problem which was the failure to use the prescribed medication.  
By understanding the conditions that preceded the violent behaviour, a 
customised response was developed to prevent the violent behaviour. 
 
Robin (2000:44) concludes that, while applying the problem-solving approach 
and identifying possible responses during the analysis phase, it should be 
stressed that changing the environment should first be attempted, rather than 
trying to change people’s anti-social behaviour.  The example posted was the 
problem of youth who used to make a noise in a public area in front of a tavern.  
Instead of trying to change their behaviour in public (making a noise), the officers 
requested the tavern owner to avail the back yard of the tavern, where they could 
be as noisy as they wished and not bother anyone.  The problem was solved but 
during the analysis, while considering a number of responses, the responses 
were not focussed on the offence (which would have been close to being 
impossible to change), but rather changing the location (environment of the 
offensive behaviour). 
 
Police officers are to respond to individual complaints or problems.  When a 
number of problems are identified and grouped during the analysed i.e. the 
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causes of the problem and a pattern established for the causes, then the causes 
must be addressed.  When complaints are received from the same address, they 
need to be clustered.  It is likely that the cause of the complaints is the same.  
During the research, the problem is related to the Crime Analysis triangle.  
Townsley and Pease (2001) advise that police officers should research the 
problem thoroughly with all three elements in mind.  When a victim is repeatedly 
targeted, there could  be a collective number of reasons e.g. the victim could be a 
particularly soft target (old person); the victim might live in a particularly crime-
conducive environment (with poor security); the victim could be an attractive 
target due to lots of available cash.  Together these circumstances make for a 
very easy target and the victim is singled out by a particular offender.  
 
If the problem is well-researched in all three elements, including the relationship 
between the elements, a well-informed response can be formulated as to the 
best element or elements to eliminate.  If one or more of the elements are 
absent, then no crime can take place and the problem is solved.    
 
Police officers respond to complaints and only after having responded a few 
times to a complaint is a pattern identified.  Often, during the analysis of the 
problem, it becomes evident that the initial response treated the symptoms of the 
problem, but not the root cause.  By closely examining the problems and the 
different responses and their resultant impact a benchmark can be formulated of 
the responses (Robin, 2000:46). 
 
3.3.3 Response 
 
Brainstorming of new interventions is very important in this phase.  Police officers 
frequently respond to the symptoms of a problem.  They do not make an effort to 
explore the root cause of the problem before responding.   
 
When responses to problems are considered, it is imperative not to react to the 
symptom of the problem, unless the symptom is so undesirable that it cannot be 
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avoided. Nevertheless, in the long term, solutions to the root cause must be the 
ultimate goal (Lab and Das 2003:10).   Research on what other communities with 
similar problems do, is recommended.   
 
When alternatives are considered, the article “Implementing Innovations in 
Juvenile Justice in Michigan” agrees that, “it is best not to focus on the offender”. 
Offenders, once addressed, are often substituted with new offenders and there is 
little success with their rehabilitation. 
 
Changing the environment might be less challenging and victim awareness or 
community involvement to address the victim has shown to be possible and more 
worthwhile.  It is also important not to restrict the response by addressing only 
one of the three sides of the Crime Triangle. Possible responses to consider 
should address at least two sides of the Crime Triangle.  It is essential to be 
creative when considering potential responses to problems. 
 
When a response is considered, the objective of the response is to eliminate or 
reduce the problem or to reduce the harm which was created by the problem, 
while finding ways of dealing with the problem in an effective way (Hess and 
Miller 1998:94).  According to Hess and Miller (1998:94), some law enforcement 
officers would argue that the response is best handled by the law enforcers, but 
many of the responses might not be within the mandate of the law enforcement 
agency. 
 
3.3.4 Assessment of the response is evaluated 
 
During the assessment phase, the effectiveness of a response is evaluated.  The 
evaluation can be a mere observation or a very involved process of analysis.  An 
example cited by Gaines, Glensor and Peak (2004:390) of a very simple 
assessment, involved an unsafe park which had been avoided by families.  The 
park was cleaned and mowed, more recreation facilities erected and loitering 
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individuals were removed.  An assessment proofed that the intervention was 
positive.  More families were using the park which served as a simple indicator 
for the assessment and the action taken had been effective.  
 
According to the article ”Implementing Innovations in Juvenile Justice in 
Michigan”, it is clear that an assessment does not mean to judge the outcomes 
on the “simple basis of pass or fail”.  Some ways of collecting data, to establish a 
baseline to use when comparing data pre- and post - the application of the SARA 
model, is to either photograph or video tape visual evidence or to record 
interviews or to take quantitative and qualitative measures.  According to Lyons 
(2000), however “specific assessment measures depend on the problem being 
addressed”.     
 
Robin (2000:46) states that assessment can be promoted.  There are different 
ways of assessing whether a SARA model has been successfully applied.  In the 
case of graffiti, the absence of new graffiti can be an indication of the problem 
having been resolved.  A comparison of pre- and post-calls for service or the 
expressed satisfaction of residents could also be an indication of successful 
response to a problem.   
 
When the assessment of a problem shows that the problem has not been 
resolved, the problem must again be scanned and analyzed and possible 
responses must again be implemented.  An assessment must again be 
completed and if the outcome is not satisfactory, the phases must be repeated. 
 
3.4 SUMMARY 
 
This step-by-step approach to finding the underlying, root cause of a problem 
does not only address the symptom of the problem it also provides an opportunity 
to engage all the relevant role-players to add expertise and resources to address 
the problem.  The systematic approach sets a standard because of the 
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established step-by-step approach, namely the scanning, analysis, response, 
and assessment steps.   This problem-solving approach involving all relevant 
role-players removes the crime prevention initiative from a military-only approach 
and is in keeping with a service-orientated preventative policing approach and is 
complementary to democracy in South Africa.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
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Four themes emerged from the interviews and data. The first theme concerns the 
reasons for the violence in Harrismith and Warden.  This was reminiscent of the 
concerns raised by all South Africans who were politically, economically and 
socially disadvantaged before 1994.  Surprisingly, these concerns were also 
shared by the affluent members of the society.  
 
The second theme is the views of the twenty five of the forty respondents on 
what caused the police reaction.   In Harrismith, the South African Police Service 
members fired at the marchers and killed a youth.  In Warden, although there 
was extensive damage to property, there was no excessive force used by the 
SAPS.   
 
The third theme which emerged, focus on the role-players and the extent of their 
involvement. There was a distinction between the respondents who believed that 
improved service delivery would prevent future violence and the respondents 
who were politically involved. The respondents who were politically involved said 
that even if the services were improved, it might not prevent future violence. 
 
The majority of respondents were merely concerned about poor service delivery.  
The councillors and organizers of the marches in Harrismith and Warden were 
very concerned about the reasons for the poor service delivery and sited a 
number of things that needed to be changed to prevent future violence.  They 
offered some advice on the management of future potential violence.   
 
The last theme, discussed the proposed solutions to the violence.  Although the 
violence was attributed to poor service delivery but the respondents had different 
views as to why their organized expression of their democratic right to freedom of 
speech turned violent.  
 
4.2 THE REASONS FOR THE VIOLENCE IN HARRISMITH AND WARDEN 
 
  
  
  
98
 
In this theme, the various reasons offered by the interviewees, as factors that 
contributed to the violence and that gave rise to the violent action are discussed.  
It is a known fact, that every action is underpinned by a specific motivation and 
an explanation for it is discussed.   Although the reason for a specific action can 
only be deduced after the event, that reason has subconsciously and often 
consciously, given rise to the action.  Actions can often be better understood, if 
the reasons for them are clarified.  The reason for an action however, does not 
imply that it justifies the action.  The violence in Harrismith and Warden reminded 
the public, of the violence and police brutality that preceded the new democratic 
South Africa.  Serious concerns were raised about how the SAPS responded.  It 
appeared that excessive force was applied to control and contains an approved 
expression of the democratic right to freedom of speech.   
 
The questions asked were formulated to establish what prompted the march.  
What preceded the march? Why the community thought that a march was 
necessary?  They were also aimed at establishing whether there was a notice to 
the local authorities of their intention to stage a march. Was the march 
authorized, what was the police involvement and how did the situation occur?   
This theme gives an indication as to why the people got together, where they 
gathered and why, as well as who was there and what happened.  
 
The interviewer’s reported that the people of both Harrismith and Warden were 
displeased about the poor service delivery from their municipalities.  Numerous 
attempts were made to engage the councillors and the mayors of the two towns 
to ascertain why there had been so little progress made to provide basic needs, 
such as sewerage, water, and electricity.  They were also concerned as to the 
poor maintenance and the development of local infrastructure.  
 
A formal notice was given to the two different authorities of their intent to stage a 
protest march.  In Harrismith, the notice was not responded to.  This resulted in a 
 
  
  
  
99
‘sit-in’ action, when the community sat in the municipal building, where the 
mayor’s office is situated.   The ‘sit-in’ action prompted the mayor to promise to 
meet a delegation, but when the agreed time came he was nowhere to be found.  
He did not answer his cell phone.  The concerned community members, led by 
the organiser of the Harrismith march, agreed that as in the case of the previous 
attempts to engage the local and the provincial authorities in a legal way, their 
concerns would not be heard.  It was then agreed to disrupt the traffic on the N3 
national road in an attempt to draw the attention of the national government.   
 
In Harrismith an in-depth interview with the organiser of the march and two 
councillors confirmed that the Municipal Council of Maluti-A-Phofung did not 
adhere to the Municipal Systems Act.  Not all the personnel were appointed and 
they agreed that there was a lack of knowledge in research and planning skills.  
Municipal Structures Acts prescribes the reporting of progress and meetings.  
This was not adhered to according to a councillor who was interviewed.  The 
poor reporting on financial matters are also in violation with the Municipal 
Finance Act.  According to the interviewed DA councillor of Harrismith it was 
reported that he was over ruled by the speaker of the Harrismith council at a 
recent meeting, although he followed the required protocol prescribed by the 
Standard Rules and Orders governing the orderly functioning of the Council and 
the Municipality.   
 
They confirmed that there was a great number of defaulting customers of both 
taxes and services, but there was also a lack of expertise to administer the 
defaulting payers. The DA councillor said that the Council’s operating plan 
needed to be amended and the emergency and disaster management budget 
reduced by eighty percent to accommodate the lack of income from defaulting 
payers.  This cut was the result of a culture of non-compliance of payment for 
services which added to the effect of poor administration and the failure to 
effectively collect debt.   
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One councillor seriously questioned the integrity of the elected councillors.  He 
stated that of equal concern was that paying customers were not receiving the 
professional services that they were paying for and neither were they able to 
make any enquiries or requests to the municipal authorities. 
 
The respondents also stated that incompetence seemed to be rewarded rather 
than challenged and that party politics did not complement the process when the 
issue was raised in an open debate at council meetings.  According to protocol 
and the Standard Rules and Orders governing the orderly functioning of the 
Municipal Council, the Mayor has to report according to the agenda on the 
minutes of the previous meeting.  When a councillor asked for feedback on an 
issue that had been recorded, he was not answered. When he again referred 
correctly to the issue, by saying, “On a point of information,” which is allowed 
once for clarity, and the correct procedure, the speaker chose not to follow the 
protocol and allow feedback.   The enquiring councillor left the council meeting to 
show his dissatisfaction.  It was reported that certain ANC members 
congratulated the opposing party for leaving, as it highlighted and demonstrated 
the lack of accountability by the council and the poor application of the Standard 
Rules and Orders governing the orderly functioning of the Council and the 
Municipality. Although they did not publicly support the walk out due to party 
politics they said to him: “Note, you know the system.” 
 
Incompetence of budgeting process by Harrismith’s municipality required the 
additional appointment and services, of Price Waterhouse at a cost to the local 
rates and tax payers.  This budget had to be published for scrutiny and redress.  
The budget and annual expenditures required feedback to the community and to 
the provincial government, but there was no-one sufficiently competent to 
compile the budget or to give the required feedback.  
 
The respondents in Warden also said that there was a lack of accountability on 
the part of the mayor.  This was displayed, according to the respondents, by his 
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appointment of incompetent staff.   They were unhappy about the salaries that 
were paid to people who were not able to do the job.  The roads were in poor 
condition.  According to the Warden SAPS intelligence officer, the road 
maintenance equipment was sent to another municipality in Qwa Qwa, a 
previously disadvantaged municipality.  No attempts were being made to resolve 
the poor road conditions in Warden.  Another respondent reported that as the 
road maintenance equipment was in Qwa Qwa, an affluent member of the 
community offered to do maintenance on the road, free of charge yet the 
councillors failed to negotiate a deal with the person.   
 
The Warden political activist from the Democratic Alliance Party who was 
interviewed said that the incompetence in Warden is the result of the affirmative 
action appointments of formerly disadvantaged persons.  This resulted in poor 
electrical maintenance.  Shop owners suffered the loss of fresh produce and 
stock due to power failures.  The person responsible for electrical maintenance 
switched off the whole power grid and not only that part of the grid that required 
maintenance.  Emergency arrangements were needed to store frozen foods, at 
great financial loss to the shopkeepers.   
 
A respondent and DA councillor said that some officials display poor work ethics.  
They were paid to work, but they did not turn up for work and no-one seemed to 
worry about their absence or make an effort to counter the loss.  Concerns of the 
community were never taken seriously and no-one investigated the allegations 
and gave any feedback to the community.   
 
According to a respondent from Warden, she suspected that there was a 
conspiracy between the councillors and members of the South African Police, 
because property had been stolen from the council and no case was reported or 
investigated.   
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The organiser of the Warden demonstration said that some councillors were 
dishonest and corrupt.  They owned low income houses in different towns, 
through their connections.  Poor administration resulted in their not being able to 
be charged.  He supported this allegation with a report from a chartered 
accountant in Bloemfontein, KPMG Chartered Accountants.  According to this 
report, a certain person was granted a subsidy for a house with number 1262, but 
he had no title deed for the property and could not claim it.  This person said that 
because of this title deed, he also did not qualify for any other subsidy, to get any 
other property.  The municipality listed the property number 1262 as the property 
of another person.  On inspection of the actual property, neither one of the parties 
was residing at the house.  The house was being rented from some one who was 
not either one of the two mentioned persons.  The question now was: who gets 
the rent, and how?  Further enquiries resulted in tracing one of the persons, who 
said that he did not have a house and had no deed either.  He also claimed that 
he had no deed to prove that he was the owner of the house.   
 
A memorandum was prepared on all the discrepancies and forwarded to the 
Minister of Local Government in November 2005.  The provincial authorities gave 
instruction to a chartered accountant in Bloemfontein, KPMG Chartered 
Accountants, to prepare a report on the discrepancies raised.  Copies of the 
report on some of their findings indicated that as many as twenty houses which 
had not yet been built, were being subsidized from the authority’s budget, and 
assigned residents were required to pay varied additional amounts for the 
properties.  The residents, who paid for these houses, never received them and 
were staying with family.  The questions raised by the residents which the council 
failed to answer were; were the authorities’ subsidized amount of money and the 
residents’ money rolled over to the next financial year?   Would they still be given 
the houses?  Why were they charged varied amounts in addition to the 
subsidized amounts of money for the houses?  Why were the houses not built?  
Would they be refunded?”   
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Some of the interviewers mentioned nepotism as a reason for corruption.  They 
reported that the wife of a police official, who was also the sister of the mayor, 
lived with her husband in a government house assigned to police officers.  The 
community was unhappy because she was able to secure an RDP house 
intended for the poor or unemployed.  She was later found to be letting the 
property to supplement her income.  Neither the local authority nor the police 
questioned the state of affairs, adding to the community’s belief that the two 
parties were collectively corrupt and guilty of nepotism.   
 
The Community Police Forum Chairman of Harrismith said, “I don’t know how I 
can put it but the reasoning was, there were people who tried several times, to 
talk to the relevant people about the lack of toilets, road conditions and poor 
infrastructure and nothing happened, while at other places they are fighting.  It is 
not a question of certain people competing for leadership, or whatever, but people 
out there are the ones that are not doing anything or, informing the community 
about the different developments that are going to happen and are happening, so 
we have a problem with our leadership. That’s why you will see a lot of places 
coming up with strike action, because of that.  People are not informing and not 
making people aware of the developments that are coming”. Some reference was 
also made by the organiser of the march in Harrismith to political ambitions as 
reasons for the demonstrations.  He said, “I swear there is friction.  They are also 
using the very same persons to position their people and to influence the 
structure.  They are getting totally new people to where those people come from; 
it doesn’t matter where you stand.  You see, if I am getting the mayor to speak to 
me, or not.”  He also said that houses were built and awarded just before local 
elections so as to ensure support for the party and certain officials. 
 
According to the organizers of the Harrismith and Warden marches, both 
communities had applied to the Municipal Authorities to arrange a march.  The 
application by the community of Harrismith was not given any response, despite 
the fact that they had even held a ‘sit-in action.  In the case of the Warden 
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application, following Harrismith’s very violent and public display of concern, 
consultation did take place, and the march was approved.  There was some 
damage to public property, but there were no serious injuries or deaths. 
 
The concerns about service delivery could have been resolved if the local 
authorities of Harrismith and Warden were experienced administrators and were 
able to collect debt successfully to pay for the services.  The ongoing corruption 
and fraud allegations against the mayors, the appointments of unskilled officials 
and the lack of consultation and accountability to the tax payers, collectively 
amounted to the grievances of the community. Service delivery was a concern to 
all members of the community, both poor and affluent.  They had made a number 
of attempts to bring their concerns to the attention of the local authorities and the 
provincial government.  The respondents cited the lack of consultation and effort 
on the part of the mayors of Harrismith and Warden as the reason for the 
demonstrations.   The organiser of the march in Harrismith said that if the mayors 
had made an attempt to meet with them and to address their concerns, they 
would not have attempted to attract the attention of the national government or 
demanded to see the President, Mr. Mbeki.  
 
4.3 THE DIFFERENT REASONS WHICH WERE OFFERED FOR THE 
POLICE REACTION 
 
In this section, the various reasons that were offered by the interviewees, as 
factors that contributed to the police reaction will be discussed.  With reaction, the 
reverse action and response or reciprocal action is referred to and is being 
investigated and reported on.   Before the march the community was the initiating 
party when they gave notice of their intention to stage a march.  The community 
behaved in a manner that warranted a response from the SAPS.  This response 
was in answer to the actions and behavior of the community and had to be 
matching in ‘weight’.  The community demonstrated unacceptable behavior not 
within legal parameters and norms and as such, required a SAPS response. This 
response has been annotated as the ‘SAPS reaction’.  It was behavior needed to 
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counter or manage that of the initiating party, in this case, the community.  During 
the interviews, questions were asked to establish the reactions of the police.  How 
were the police’s actions perceived by the community?  What was the sequence 
of events that resulted in the specific counter reaction of the SAPS?  What was 
the counter-reaction of the SAPS? 
 
Demonstrations and marches were common in South Africa before the 1994 
election and so was the term ‘public order policing’.  Since 1994 a greater 
awareness of democratic rights and freedom of expression moved the police to 
adopt a more negotiating and consultative style in answer to public expression. 
The Goldstone Commission made a number of suggestions to improve the 
policing style termed ‘public order policing’.  Legislation was passed to promote a 
safer, less confrontational policing style, termed ‘crowd management’.   
 
An application in terms of the Public Gatherings Act is now required to organize a 
legal demonstration.  If the notice is accepted, the authorities and the 
demonstrators might agree on a number of issues to promote a manageable and 
peaceful march or demonstration.  Therefore, the style of the police is now to 
“manage the crowd” and not to “order the public” as was the case prior to 1994, 
when violent demonstrations were very common.  One possible reason for the 
level of violence in Harrismith and Warden was explained by one respondent 
saying, “You are not yourself: you are part of a crowd”. 
 
There seems to have been a different approach to the crowd in Harrismith than to 
the crowd in Warden.  In both cases the police were aware in advance of the 
community’s intention to stage a public protest.  In the case of Harrismith, there 
was an application made to the municipality to stage a march, and ‘sit-in’ action, 
to demonstrate the community’s intention to consult with the municipal authorities, 
councillors and the mayor.  On failing to get a response, the community planned a 
march for the Monday.  Information officers advised the station commissioner of 
the community’s intention to stage a march on the Monday.  According to the 
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Harrismith Crime Prevention Officer the police officers were ordered to be on duty 
at six o’clock on the Monday.  According to the officer, no contingency plan was 
prepared.  The CIAC member confirmed that they did not prepare for the 
eventuality of the crowd going to the N3 because they did not have information of 
this intention.  The inspector of the Area Crime Combating Unit information 
management said that they had received a notice in time but had not acted in 
time.  On arriving at the demonstration on the Monday a crowd of approximately 
one hundred and fifty people met the police.    The organisers of the march were 
known to the crime prevention head who met with them.  The crime prevention 
head from the Harrismith SAPS and the organiser of the march made 
arrangements with the mayor to meet a delegation at eleven o’clock. The mayor 
failed to appear at 11 o’clock which resulted in the furious crowd throwing stones 
and hurling insults at the police.  The organiser of the march said that the 
marchers then agreed to proceed in the direction of the N3 with the intention of 
disrupting the national road traffic to attract national attention.   
 
They proceeded to schools where they enlisted schoolchildren to join the march.  
The crime prevention head said that the marchers involved young children as a 
deliberate strategy to avoid prosecution.  According to the crime prevention head, 
their numbers grew to approximately 2 000 people. The police strength was 22 
members at the time, which included the nine Area Crime Combating Unit 
members of Phuthaditjhaba.  The crime prevention head consulted with the 
organiser of the march and tried to come to an agreement, but the angry crowd 
forcefully prevented the organiser from negotiating with the crime prevention 
officer.  The Area Crime Combating Unit with nine members from Bethlehem 
arrived, after which the command was first transferred from the Harrismith crime 
prevention head to the captain of the Area Crime Combating Unit, due to the 
difference in their core training and responsibilities.  
 
While the captain of the Area Crime Combating Unit was in charge, the crowd 
moved from the residential area to the N3 national road.  Members of crime 
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prevention went back to the station to arm themselves with shotguns since they 
had only side arms on them and the only ammunition available to them was 
number five ammunition for the shotguns.  Police vehicles were parked to form a 
barrier with the Area Crime Combating Unit members and crime prevention 
members.  They were lined up to prevent the crowd from moving on to the N3 
and to stop them from disrupting the traffic and behaving in a disorderly manner.   
The Area Crime Combating Unit commander, a superintendent, arrived and took 
command from the captain, who briefed him on the situation.  The captain, when 
interviewed, said the crowd proceeded to set the grass alight on either side of the 
vehicles and the police members had to fall back and extinguish the fire.  
Someone in the crowd fastened a rope on to a tyre and lit the tyre.   He then lifted 
the tyre and proceeded to swing it in a circle amongst the chanting crowd.  The 
superintendent commanded the members to fire a stun grenade and to fall back.  
At that time the crowd moved around the lined-up officers on the sides and 
moved onto the N3 road.  They endangered their own lives and those of the 
oncoming road users.  The superintendent commanded the officers to fire on the 
crowd.  The crowd dispersed and ran towards the Intabazwe residential area.  A 
number of people were injured and one youth died as a result.  It seems that he 
was fatally wounded by a number five round, fired from a shotgun by one of the 
members of the crime prevention unit.  These rounds are not permitted to be 
used and it was not clear why no other rounds were available at the Harrismith 
police station.  The members who fired the rounds claimed that they were not 
aware of the prohibition on firing of these rounds.   An investigation and criminal 
prosecution was instituted and the members were charged with culpable 
homicide.  On 13 July 2006, they were found not guilty.  The court ruled that they 
had acted out of necessity and emergency. (Van Wyk: 2006).   
 
When the crime prevention head of Harrismith was asked about the consultation 
process and possible preventative measures or ways to have redirected the 
march, he replied that the demonstrators did not want any negotiation after the 
mayor failed to appear.  He said that he was consulting with the organiser of the 
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demonstration, when he was forcefully removed.  The crime prevention head said 
of the demonstrators, “They deprived me and then I failed to do anything”.  On 
the issue of why the members of crime prevention used the number five 
ammunition, one of the charged members, formerly from crime prevention who 
was charged with murder said “Opleiding, dit is wat die polisie manne nodig 
gehad het” (Training, that is what the police members needed).  
 
According to the station commissioner of Warden, the community of Warden 
applied to the municipal authorities to stage a peaceful march.  A concerned 
resident said that the affluent members, as well as the previously disadvantaged 
residents, marched from the bridge in the location to the Warden town hall where 
they proceeded to hand over a memorandum to the station commissioner, 
because neither the mayor nor any one of the council was there.  Failing to 
receive the memorandum on the part of the municipality sparked further unrest.  
The station commissioner organised a formal meeting between the concerned 
residents and the involved role-players.  According to an inspector of Warden 
Crime prevention the concerned residents were in two political groups, 
represented by the predominantly ANC and the DA supporters.  That meeting and 
a number of meetings thereafter did not resolve the problems.  The concerned 
residents then took the tractor and the already overfull tank of sewerage and 
dumped the sewerage next to the bridge on their way into the residential area.  
This sparked more unhappiness from the people using the road to get to work in 
Warden.  The station commissioner was informed by information officers of Area 
Crime Combating Unit, about the demonstrators’ intentions to prevent pedestrian 
and vehicle movement between the location and the town.  The captain went to 
the scene of the demonstration, where the road was already obstructed with 
stones placed in the road.  He asked the demonstrators about their intentions and 
they tried to convince him that their intentions were peaceful.  He was not 
convinced and requested the assistance of the area commissioner who 
dispatched the Area Crime Combating Unit.  The station commissioner was 
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relieved from command by the Crime Combating Unit commander, a 
superintendent. 
 
The demonstrators demanded that he withdraw the Area Crime Combating Unit, 
but he refused and gave them 20 minutes to disperse.  The crowd did not 
disperse and the station commissioner requested the area commissioner and his 
deputy to go with him, to the leaders of the demonstration in a armoured vehicle. 
According to the station commissioner, the leader of the demonstration and the 
area commissioner and his deputy agreed to a meeting at two o’clock in the town 
hall. The intention was to have the required representatives at the meeting, which 
included the Area Commissioner and a representative of the MEC of Local 
Government and the Premier of the Free State Province. A meeting took place 
where representatives of the local municipality of Warden, the district of Pumela 
and the province were present.  A committee was established chaired by a 
representative from the Provincial Government to address the issues raised by 
the community. 
 
The Harrismith demonstrators showed no concern for possible conflict or the 
levels of violence, while the Warden crowd made it very clear to the station 
commissioner that their intentions were peaceful.  He is quoted as saying, “They 
are not violent any more, but they hope that the SAPS of Warden can handle the 
situation”.  The station commissioner said that they had asked that the Area 
Crime Combating Unit be withdrawn.  The police of Warden, in keeping with an 
instruction from the area commissioner, made an effort to only arm members with 
tonfas and shields.  The station commissioner gave explicit instructions to 
members, not to arm themselves with shotguns.   
 
The two station commissioners of Harrismith and Warden, had very different 
approaches to the demonstrators actions.  The station commissioner of 
Harrismith did not go to the scene and did not make any attempt to negotiate with 
the concerned residents.  There was also no reference to any attempts being 
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made to involve the Community Police Forum.   The station commissioner of 
Warden involved members of the Community Police Forum and made a personal 
attempt to negotiate with the demonstrators in that he received their 
memorandum which was intended for the mayor.   
 
The Harrismith municipal council ignored the notice from the community of their 
intention to gather in public, whereas the Warden council approved the 
application.  There was a different approach from Warden’s demonstrators 
concerning the expression of their dissatisfaction about the poor service delivery, 
from that of the demonstrators of Harrismith.  The Warden demonstrators made 
an effort to have their application for gathering and demonstrating approved.  In 
the case of the Warden community’s demonstration, it was multiracial and 
participation was from different political parties. 
 
4.4 THE INVOLVED ROLE-PLAYERS AND THE EXTENT OF THEIR 
INVOLVEMENT 
 
In this section, the various involved persons and the extent of their involvement 
are discussed.  This discussion centres on those parties that participated in the 
events and their specific actions.  There were a number of persons party to the 
situation, but only a select number of these persons played a role.   Who were the 
“involved” persons or parties?  Their actions and the extent of these are 
described as their “involvement.” The violence in Harrismith and Warden involved 
a number of different people comprising concerned citizens, councillors, SAPS 
members, Community Police Forum members etc.  Their participation differed 
due to varying responsibilities or reasons.   Questions were put to them to 
establish their participation and involvement.   
 
During the Harrismith violence only the Area Crime Combating Unit Head was 
present to negotiate with the demonstrators after the mayor had failed to keep his 
appointment.  The national television network broadcast the events in Harrismith.   
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The community and the South African Police Service, of Harrismith were present 
and according to their responses were the main role players in the violent events.  
According to the crime prevention officers, the information officers advised the 
station commissioner of the community members’ intentions to gather and 
demonstrate against poor service delivery.  Many of the respondents said that the 
local authority and the councillors’ lack of involvement and communication gave 
rise to the community’s unhappiness.  No respondent confirmed any efforts of any 
role-player to serve as a mediator.  According to the chairperson of the Harrismith 
Community Police Forum, the CPF was not used as a platform to negotiate.  The 
local authorities made no effort to engage the community, not even after the ‘sit-
in’ action or after receiving a notice of intention to arrange a march.  The station 
commissioner reportedly alerted the crime prevention officer of a possible 
demonstration, followed through on operational arrangements, but did not make 
an effort to engage the mayor or the local authorities.  The crime prevention head 
and the commanders of the Area Crime Combating Units of Phuthaditjhaba and 
Bethlehem tried to negotiate with the organizers of the demonstration.  The crowd 
however prevented the negotiations after the mayor failed to meet with the 
community at eleven o’clock.   
 
According to the Harrismith crime prevention head, young children were 
deliberately recruited to join the demonstrations.  The recruitment of children from 
schools to participate in the demonstration complicated the police members’ 
response because the arrest and prosecution of juveniles was involved.  He said 
that some of the perpetrators used the children as decoys and were hiding behind 
them.  The crime prevention head of Harrismith said the following about the 
involvement of small children; “Ja, so usually what they are doing, they take these 
small kids, in fact and then they go after a small kid, so that you can’t, because it 
is small kids.  OK, we don’t arrest and if you want to arrest them, they are running 
and you can’t arrest these small kids.” 
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The events in Warden occurred after the event in Harrismith, with a similar event 
in Vrede.  According to the Warden Station commissioner, the role-players from 
Warden were the concerned residents and they were in two groups, the ANC and 
the DA supporters.  The information officers of the police informed the station 
commissioner of Warden of the intentions of the community to demonstrate.   This 
was after they had completed a peaceful march and handed a memorandum to 
him.  The local authorities did not make an effort to entertain their concerns or to 
receive the memorandum.  The station commissioner of Warden reported that he 
involved representatives of the ANC, DA and DA political alliance parties, to hear 
what was going on.  Early the next morning, according to him, he went to see two 
councillors, two whose names escaped him.   
 
The station commissioner said the mayor agreed to meet with the concerned 
residents at nine o’clock, but then at eight o’clock he said that he had other 
commitments.  This resulted in the people starting to march to the police station, 
resulting in the Area Crime Combating Unit being deployed to stop them.  The 
marchers agreed to go to the town hall to meet with the councillors.  They waited 
until after two o’clock, when the municipal manager arrived.  A number of 
meetings were postponed after that and then the incident occurred.  The organiser 
of the march complimented the area commissioner on his involvement, saying that 
the area commissioner involved the Scorpions and investigating officers.  He said 
that the area commissioner had taken their memorandum and arranged a meeting 
that same day.  He was of the opinion that the police positively affected the 
attitude of the crowd.  The meeting referred to was the meeting which the area 
commissioner, his deputy and the station commissioner had agreed to arrange, 
and which they requested all the stakeholders to participate in. This resulted in 
members of the provincial government establishing a committee which was 
responsible for an investigation of the concerns of the community in order, to 
address them and to give feedback to the community. 
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The role-players participation in the two events was similar.  Their involvement, 
considering their responsibilities, related to their accountability.  Some were 
involved and some not involved in the events, either by their actions or by their 
lack of action.  A greater number of different role-players was involved in the 
Warden event compared to the event in Harrismith.  The involvement of the 
national television agency contributed to a greater awareness and more 
consultation. 
 
The role-players in the events in the Free State were mainly the persons 
concerned about the services that should have been provided by the authorities 
and the South African Police.  According to the respondents the lack of action and 
communication on the part of other role-players and service providers resulted in 
the violence.  According to the respondents, not all the role players were involved 
and were prepared to be consulted and accountable to the community. 
 
 
4.5 THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS OFFERED BY THE RESPONDENCE TO 
THE VIOLENCE  
 
The respondents during their interviews mentioned potential solutions to the 
problems at hand:  “things to be done” or behavior to be practiced that was 
suggested for consideration to end the violence.  The respondents answered 
questions on how they would have done things differently to avoid violence.  They 
indicated who they thought should have been involved; who should have done 
what, when and how.  The solutions or methods for solving the problems were 
derived from their approach, which was to avoid the violence. 
 
There was a natural tendency for the respondents to group their solutions 
according to their participation and experience of the events.  The first set of 
proposals relates to the actual prevention of the march and highlights the value of 
negotiation and consultation.  The second set of proposals relates to the 
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prevention of the initial issues raised concerning service delivery and the third set 
of proposals relates to the policing of the march.   
 
The chairperson of the Community Police Forum of Harrismith said that the 
Community Police Forum was not involved as a partner to promote a platform for 
communication, negotiation, and conciliation.  When a mayor or prominent person 
does not honor an arrangement to meet with the community, the police should 
stay calm and not compromise any negotiations. The organiser of the march 
questioned the police’s sensitivity, stating that officials must pre-empt the 
demonstrators’ intentions in order to promote pro-active policing.  The Harrismith 
information officer said that there was no information from the intelligence officers 
to inform a contingency plan.   
 
A crime prevention officer also said that there, no contingency plan had been 
compiled. 
 
 
Police members and Community Police Forum members suggested that the 
Community Police Forum should be used as a platform for negotiations when 
violence is anticipated.  They expressed the advantages of negotiations between 
the local authority, the Community Police Forum and the SAPS.  The information 
officers said that if notice had been given of the intention to host a march, violence 
could have been prevented.  All relevant role players should together have 
negotiated  terms and conditions for a safe demonstration. . 
 
The most common solution cited by nearly all the respondents was that a constant 
flow of information and communication is required by the community on  progress 
being made.  The municipal authorities should keep appointments with the 
community and answer their questions.  Politicians should promote healthy 
politics.  The respondents said that as long as action is not taken against 
 
  
  
  
115
municipal officials and politicians for poor performance, nepotism, corruption and 
fraud, the violence could re-occur.   
 
Some respondents stated that affirmative action legislation should be repealed 
and competent people should be appointed.  They thought that the use of 
consultants was unfair, because officials were rewarded for incompetence.  A 
preventative measure suggested by a councillor is that municipal authorities 
should comply with legislation, such as the Municipal Systems Act, the Municipal 
Structures Act and also follow the Standard Rules and Regulations Orders.  Fully 
functional structures to support municipal officials, was also mentioned to improve 
service delivery.  
 
There were respondents who suggested that job creation would contribute to a 
sense of well-being and would enable people to pay for services.  One respondent 
suggested that tollgates be instituted in close proximity to small towns, which could 
be bypassed free of charge if the traveler chose to travel through the town.  This 
suggestion would benefit the rejuvenation of the small rural towns, through the 
influx of motorists.   
 
Most of the respondents said that poor service delivery was the reason for the 
violence.  When asked what could be done differently to avoid future violence their 
focus was on being heard, rather that suggesting ideas to improve the levels of 
service delivery.  Respondents from the police were more inclined to make 
suggestions on policing actions.  Service delivery was the most mentioned reason 
for the demonstration, but to prevent the violence, most of the respondents 
suggested that their concerns should be heard and respected by the local 
authorities. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
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The perception formed from reports by the media (newspapers and national 
television) is that poor service delivery was the initial reason for the violence in the 
Eastern Free State.  The recurring violence was the result of the communities’ 
frustration because the authorities did not react to their efforts to consult and 
negotiate and did not meet their expressed concerns to their satisfaction.  The 
actual display of a popular public opinion was not a surprise to the SAPS because 
information officers anticipated some sort of mass action relating to the various 
applications by the public to organize a public gathering. The handing over of a 
memorandum to the authorities was also a dear indication that there was a 
problem.  
 
Consultation and communication between the role-players would have promoted 
transparency and would have promoted a common understanding of the 
challenging problems, as well as the credible concerns.  The community, after 
consultation, communication, and efforts to resolve the problems might still have 
wanted to stage a public display of collective concern.  The current legislation 
provides terms and conditions to stage a legitimate public gathering.  A remark by 
one of the respondents however, demonstrates the prevailing psychological 
condition amongst the gathered crowd.  “They think they do not have to listen to 
us.” 
 
The police respondents charged with the responsibility of maintaining public law 
and order and ensuring safety and security, proposed different solutions to the 
ongoing violence in Eastern Free State.  Nearly all the respondents proposed 
consultation and communication.  From all the responses it is evident that there 
was an anticipated problem with no one willing to resolve it.  There was governing 
legislation in place allowing and providing a legal framework to resolve the 
problems but because the community acted unlawfully, a police response was 
required.  The community’s actions exceeded the lawful level of violence, to which 
the police’s response was not unlawful, although resulting in the death of a youth. 
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South Africa’s history of violent public demonstration has resulted in many injuries 
and deaths, as in the case of the recent violence in Ghana.  The South African 
and Canadian Governments attempts to change the policing style to suit 
indigenous people, has resulted in public participation, public scrutiny and 
information sharing.  The police in both countries have attempted to reflect the 
culture and gender of the community they serve. 
 
In view of the reasons quoted for the violence, the participation of the role-players 
and the solutions cited for the violence, the application of the SARA model 
provides a methodical process for reducing the impact of crime and problems of 
disorder in the community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: INTERPRETATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The violence that took place in the Eastern Free State is an ongoing concern for 
the authorities and poses a constant challenge to the South Africa Police Service.  
While freedom of expression is a Constitutional right, it is not an unconditional right 
and the SAPS is charged to maintain law and order and to protect the public and 
property.  The SARA model of problem-solving could motivate the SAPS to rise to 
the challenge of expanding their capacity, of monitoring possible threats and of 
involving more partners to prevent violence.  The SAPS will be required to 
complete an initial overview or assessment of the offence to establish what 
common factors were involved in the violence that erupted.  The initial threat 
identification has to be followed by an in-depth analysis of the reasons, conditions 
and circumstances which contributed to the offences.    
 
5.2 THE SCANNING PHASE 
 
The first phase of the SARA model confirms whether there is indeed a problem or 
not.  The scanning involves an attempt to collect information from public opinion, 
newspaper reports, case reports, television broadcasts, sector police managers, 
and Community Police Forums on the violence that took place.  How the violence 
took place, when, where and who was involved, are the questions to be asked.  
 
At Harrismith the community arranged an illegal ‘sit-in’ at the municipal offices to 
force the mayor to meet with them.  The police were responsible for their removal 
from the municipal offices.  This incident, according to the interviews is the result 
of their need to consult with the Municipal Authority, the SAPS, and the CPF.  
Twenty-four children were injured and one young boy died, while 38 arrests were 
made during the march in Harrismith.  On 31 August 2004 SABC 2 reported the 
incident on national television.  The youth protested against poor service delivery 
and the preferential treatment of previously disadvantaged Qwa Qwa residents, at 
the expense of the Inthabazwe residents.  Traveling in the area was difficult 
because the taxi service was discontinued.  On 2 September 2004, SABC 2 news 
reported that the youths demanded the removal of the executive mayor.  Similar 
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incidents of violence followed in Memel and in Warden. Twenty six persons 
appeared in court on charges of public violence and taking part in an illegal march.  
The SAPS area commissioner of the Eastern Free State informed by similar 
incidents in Memel, Kestell, Vrede, Paul Roux, Clocolan, Ficksburg, and Warden 
identified a common trend, threat, and problem.  The common trend, the 
community’s intention to host a march, served as an early warning sign to 
information officers of the Area Crime Combating Unit, who informed the station 
commissioner of Warden.  At the time, it was said that the reason for the march 
was to demonstrate their dissatisfaction about poor service delivery.  The Warden 
station commissioner alerted relevant role-players such as councillors of the 
Warden local authority, political party representatives, business representatives 
and the SAPS Area Management, who arranged to meet in the town hall.  The 
actions of the station commissioner were in keeping with the scanning phase of 
the SARA model, which means that he identified a trend and responded.  
 
The police were aware of ongoing attempts by the community to engage the 
municipality.  When the communities in the Eastern Free State started to voice 
their dissatisfaction about poor service delivery, they reverted to what was 
historically an effective way to bring about change.  They demanded their 
Constitutional right to basic needs, (South Africa 1996: Sec 27), in keeping with 
the right to assembly, demonstration, picketing, and petitioning (South Africa 1996, 
Section 205).   
 
Having completed the scanning process to assess the problem, the contributing 
factors need to be established.  The question is why then did they march and why 
did it in end in violence?   The violence according to the media and interviews with 
the respondents was related to the poor performance of the municipalities.   The 
responsibilities of the municipalities are to supply 50 kWh of electricity, 6kl of 
water, access roads, sanitation, and cleaning services.  The designated municipal 
officer, in accordance with the Local Government Municipal Finance Act, is also 
required to ensure competency of the municipal supply chain management to 
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manage revenue and expenditure properly as well as to manage revenue 
collection.    
 
The municipalities were not able to deliver on these responsibilities for a number 
of reasons.  According to Phillips (2005:2), the President, Mr. Mbeki raised one of 
the reasons, nepotism, as a concern.  A unit was to be established on the 
instruction of the National Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Mr. 
Mufamadi to develop capacity for service delivery (Steyn, 2005).  A recent survey 
revealed that there were severe backlogs in the service delivery of municipalities 
and the premature retirement of mostly whites left municipalities with a shortage of 
skills in areas of financial management, engineering and information technology.  
They were replaced with affirmative action appointees, (SA head-hunt skills in 
India (2005-11-03)). Corruption in the Free State was evident when six members 
of the Mangaung municipality were convicted for fraud, (Six Mangaung officials 
were probed for fraud 2005:4).   
 
According to the 2001 Census the environment is also a challenge to the 
municipalities.  As per to the national census the area is 129 480 square km and 
mostly rural (Phillips, 2005:2).  The 2001 Census also revealed that 25, 5 % of the 
population is unemployed and an estimated 66% is living in poverty.  There is an 
estimated 16, 7 % AIDS infection rate and this requires more service delivery from 
clinics which they are unable to deliver (Heunis and van Rensburg, 2005).   Eight 
hundred and forty-three municipalities were rationalized to two hundred and eighty 
four municipalities after the 1994 elections (Lebone, 2006).  According to the 
interview with Professor Andre Duvenhage (2006), 136 of the 284 newly 
established municipalities are considered to be in crisis and are now consolidated 
under one project because of their poor performance.  Sound economic 
development principles are absent in this new arrangement and because of poor 
administration and environmental challenges they are unable to deliver on 
politicians’ promises.  
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According to Duvenhage (2006), politicians have been promising the voters more 
houses and services; yet even with low interest rates and some economic growth, 
the government is not able to distribute the economic growth through the system 
to the less advantaged.  The findings of the Goldstone Commission shaped 
policing when they recommended that the police are trained in public relations and 
that they use non-lethal equipment to control demonstrations.  Furthermore, the 
Commission advised that local magistrates be involved in improving conditions in 
demonstrations (Human Rights Developments, 2004:4).  The Police have changed 
from a ‘force’ to a ‘service’ and as a result have changed their policing style so as 
to be accountable to the community (Nel, & Bezuidenhout, 1995:21).  The 
subsequent Regulations of Gatherings Act 1993, Section 205 (3) (5) states the 
conditions with which the convener of a gathering has to comply.  The participants 
should not carry dangerous weapons, incite hatred resulting in violence, or disrupt 
any traffic.  The Act states that a written notice is required with the particulars of 
the marshals attending the route and the time of the demonstration. 
 
The statement offered to an information officer of the Area Crime Combating Unit, 
on the Harrismith violence was, “I was told that the people did apply to do a proper 
march in an approved way, but when they demanded to see the mayor, the mayor 
failed to turn up.”    The Area Crime Combating Unit intelligence officer’s response 
was “That is not correct.  Yes, they did march several times to an extent, but they 
did not get a proper response and they tried to do a sit-in.”  It seems as if there 
was no scanning taking place.  No-one made an attempt to put this information 
together to make a presentation to identify and involve role- players to establish 
partnerships. In Warden the station commissioner, when he was informed about 
the community’s intention to launch mass action, replied that “I called all the 
groups involved the municipality and all those concerned.  In other words these 
concerned groups were divided into two groups, if I can recall.”  The station 
commissioner of Harrismith, in his interview, said that there was no application for 
the march.  He said the march started spontaneously.  He stated: “Crime 
prevention is soontoe en probeer om die ding onder beheer te bring, toe ek hoor 
daarvan toe het ons basies die leiers probeer uitmekaar kry.  Ons het toe ́n 
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vergadering gehou en het met hulle ooreengekom dat hulle die mense onder 
bedwang bring en ons sal die burgermeeser help om die mense toe te spreek.“  
(The crime prevention unit went out and tried to bring the situation under control. 
When I heard about it, we basically tried to get the leaders away from each other.  
We then had a meeting and agreed with them that they would control the people 
while they assisted the mayor to address the people).   
 
Since this notice was not accepted by the local authority and responded to 
according to the Act, the marchers went on to participate in an illegal march, not 
meeting some required safety conditions.  They also threatened the safety of the 
N3 road users according to the Area Crime Combating Unit commander in 
Harrismith.  There was distrust between the relevant role-players and a 
respondent even suspected a conspiracy between members of the police and the 
councillors because property of the municipality was stolen, but no case was 
investigated.  This notice could have served as an early warning sign to police 
officers of possible action which might result in violence.  The violence was not 
pre-empted and resulted in the required safety measures not being enforced.   
Reference was also made by the organizers of the march to political ambitions as 
reasons for the demonstrations.  From the above, it is evident that the following 
shortcomings occurred in the manner in which the SAPS managed the process 
prior to as well as the actual violence: 
- Coordination of policing functions 
The intelligence members of the SAPS were aware of the Harrismith 
community’s, wishes to speak to the mayor.  The information was relayed 
to the station, but the assigned Community Policing member with the CPF 
chairperson did not call CPF meeting.  The SAPS intelligence members did 
not involve the crime prevention officers and the area crime combating 
members who together should have performed their core function of 
completing an eventuality plan.   
 
- Sharing of information with the other role players in the areas in Harrismith. 
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Although the information officers in Harrismith were aware of the concerns 
of the community, together with the station commissioner and the 
chairperson of the Community Police Forum they had limited success in 
involving the council members they were to convince them to have a 
meeting with the concerned residents.  The communication to the crime 
prevention officers was also limited, as the crime prevention head was only 
informed on the Saturday night, in order to prepare the members for a 
parade on the Sunday morning.  According to the interviewed members, 
they were ill informed about the possible risk factors and there was no draft 
eventuality plan.  
 
Availability of resources  
There were not enough area crime combat unit members involved with the 
Harrismith incident to prevent damage to property and violence. The   
commander of the ACCU requested back up from the Harrismith station 
commissioner.  The station commissioner and the crime prevention head 
did not call a meeting to coordinate functions and resources. A captain from 
the crime prevention unit confirmed that he returned to the station, from the 
scene to collect fire arms and ammunition.  It was however not the 
prescribed ammunition it being all there was.  There had been no planning 
of prior arrangements for alternative ammunition.  
 
- Communication to the public 
The mayor failed to communicate with the residents and did not keep his 
appointment with them to address their concerns.   The organizers of the 
demonstration then did not have enough support for their intended 
demonstration and had to recruit children from the schools to partake in the 
demonstrations.  The Harrismith station commissioner and Harrismith 
chairman of the CPF failed to meet in advance with the demonstrators to 
explain the mayor’s position. The crime prevention head tried to negotiate 
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with the demonstrators on the day of the demonstration when it was too 
late.  
 
5.3 THE ANALYSIS PHASE 
 
The SARA model requires an analysis of the problem after the problem has been 
identified during the scanning phase.  The analysis is to follow data collection from 
the literature searches, police records, interviews with the media and relevant role-
players, complaints surveys, crime pattern analysis, and the grouping of 
information.  The information grouped along the “Problem Analysis Triangle” will 
effectively group information along the categories related to the “victim, the 
offender and the environment”.   The analysis of the problems in the Eastern Free 
State is the process from when the violence was identified, to understanding the 
events and conditions that preceded and accompanied the violence, in order to 
customize a response to prevent the violence. 
 
The obvious problem of violent behavior, is the result of an underlying problem.  
By understanding the conditions that preceded the violent behavior, a customized 
response can be developed to prevent it.  A thorough analysis is required to 
confirm the suspected reasons for the violence.  It was alleged that poor 
performance on the part of the municipality was the trigger to the violence.  What 
gave rise to the poor services?  All three of the Crime Triangle elements should be 
present for a crime to be committed and by understanding and grouping these 
elements, the greater the likelihood becomes of identifying a response that will 
make a real difference.  The initial application of the “Crime Triangle” may be 
demonstrated in the following diagram from Nel, (2000:4). South African 
Community and environmental conditions as a result of poor services 
 
Figure 5.1 Applied Crime triangle  
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              (Offender)               (Victim) 
     SAPS preserving public order          Crowd, who marched 
 
 
 
(Environment) 
 
Poor service and lack of basic needs, such as water, sewerage removal and 
available housing, were identified and grouped during the analysis phase.  The 
problems included the crowd who expressed their intention to march, with or 
without approval of the authorities, the authorities’ evident lack of commitment and 
involvement, and the SAPS, who were to preserve public order and prevent crime, 
yet their involvement resulted in a boy being killed. 
 
The environmental element of the Crime Triangle was established when the 
Premier of the Free State visited the Eastern Free State after having received 
numerous complaints and a public outcry in the media about poor service delivery.  
Mr. Peter Frewen of the DA was quoted as having said that “the locals are battling 
to gain access to services, while the municipal managers are granted a substantial 
increase”, (SABC 2 news, 20 September 2004).  The violence in the Eastern Free 
State was headline news in many newspapers.  The reason for the violence, 
according to indicators in the newspapers, SABC 2 news on, 7 October 2004 and 
radio Lesedi on 7 October 2004 was poor service delivery.  The municipalities 
failed to deliver the required standard of service. 
 
The poor service delivery was reported by to be the result of nepotism (Phillips, 
2005:2), a lack of training and expertise (Versluis, 2005:1), affirmative action 
appointments (Benjamin, 2005), corruption, as well as fraud (Six Mangaung 
officials were probed for fraud, 2005:4) and poor debt collection (Ensor, 2005).   
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The interviews with the marchers also confirmed that the main reason for their 
dissatisfaction was poor service delivery.   
 
The Eastern Free State is an area where there are expectations from the ruling 
ANC party to deliver housing, jobs, and progress, because it is a previously 
disadvantaged area.  (Free State Development Plan: 2002-2005).  According to 
the interviews with community members, they organized the march because there 
was still no running sewerage system, many did not have electricity, and the 
building of houses was behind schedule.   
 
The Local Government Municipal Finance Act of 2003, Chapter 12, Article 121 (1-
3), requires the accounting officer to ensure that the budget is implemented and 
their responsibilities in financial management are carried out, as well as raising 
revenue in a competent way and providing annual reports as a record of activities.  
In addition to the Finance Management Act of 2003, the Municipal Systems Act 32 
of 2000, Chapter 6, Section 42 also obligates the municipality to involve the local 
community to participate in the “implementation and review of the municipality’s 
performance”.  It is therefore unfortunate that on the question of why the 
community marched in Harrismith, the DA councillor of Harrismith, stated; “Dit is 
as gevolg van sisteme wat nie uitgevoer is nie.  Dis is as gevolg van byvoorbeeld  
dinge wat geliasseer is in die Raad en waarop nie teruggerapporteer of 
gekommunikeer is nie.”  (It is because the systems were not applied.  It is because 
feedback was not reported and communicated in the Council).  This section gives 
an opportunity to the community to participate in the setting of appropriate key 
performance indicators and performance targets for the municipalities.  They 
however fail to do so because they are not involved. The theory of the “Crime 
Triangle” is that if the municipal officials had delivered on the legislative 
requirements and involved the community successfully with regard to the 
environmental element of the Crime triangle and there had been no concerns 
about the environment, crime would not have taken place.  
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The second element, the offender element, of the “Crime triangle” was the 
South African Police Service who is charged in accordance with the South African 
Police Service Act, No 68 of 1995, and Chapter 6, Section 17, to maintain national 
public order.  The South African Police Service is required to act within the legal 
framework of the Criminal Procedure Act.  The Act states the conditions for deadly 
force that are intended or are likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a 
suspect; in this case the offending members participating in the march.  The 
Regulation of Gathering Act of 1993, Act No 205 allows for exceptions for the 
SAPS.  When all the requirements of the Act are met, a police official may only 
disperse a gathering, if it has been declared a prohibited gathering or if the legally 
required Inspector has reasonable grounds to believe that danger to person or 
property cannot be prevented by other means prescribed in the Act.   
 
The Police Service is also challenged to maintain anticipated service levels by 
recruiting and training the required number of officials in relation to the number of 
residents who require their services.   The average police station in the Free State 
serves an average of 1 210 square kilometers.  (Free State Development Plan: 
2002-2005).     According to the Area Crime Combating members of Harrismith, 
the Area Crime Combating Unit members are based in different areas.  When they 
are notified about possible crowd action, they are not always able to respond in 
time.  The station commissioner of Harrismith said that in the case of Harrismith, 
the crime prevention unit was sent to the scene where the public was 
demonstrating.  Not all the members had received training according to the latest 
amended syllabus, involving crowd management.       
 
Dr. Peter Waddington listed insufficient command and control of patrolling officers, 
lack of effective intelligence, and lack of committed community relations as 
previous failings on the part of the police (Waddington Report, 1992:43).  In May 
1992, the Goldstone Commission recommended the police are trained in public 
relations and in the use of non-lethal equipment to control demonstrations (Human 
Rights Developments, 2004:4).   Police officers have since been trained in 
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accordance with human rights principles and public relations.   In the interview with 
the station commissioner of Harrismith, the station commissioner said that the 
greatest problem was the lack of information and that there were no local police 
officials trained to deliver a local response to the demonstrating crowd.  Also a 
number of crime prevention members had to assist the Area Crime Combating 
Unit response unit.  An Area Crime Combating Unit inspector responsible for 
information management said that the notice was received timorously but the 
police did not act on the information in time.  A crime prevention officer of 
Harrismith crime prevention said that the lack of updated training and the 
availability of the correct ammunition resulted in three members firing with the 
wrong ammunition.  It resulted in the youth being killed. 
 
Had the police members received training according to the latest curriculum or had 
they not been deployed, because the Area Crime Combating Unit members were 
insufficient, the offender element of the crime triangle would have been absent 
and a crime would not have been committed. 
 
The third element of the “Crime Triangle” is the victims and in local analysis 
the victims were the marching crowd of Harrismith, who were fired on when they 
threatened their own safety and the safety of the road users of the N3 main road. 
According to the interview with the crime prevention officer, the marchers in 
Warden were also victims of violence in that sewerage was dumped at the 
entrance to the town and the police had to re-direct their march, while they 
attempted to get the mayor or a councillor of Warden to address the marchers.   
 
According to the interview with the Harrismith DA councillor it seems that the 
community was frustrated because the requirements of the Finance Management 
Act of 2003 and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, obliging the municipality to 
involve the local community to participate in the “implementation and review of the 
municipality’s performance,” did not take place.  They were not given the 
opportunity to participate in the setting of appropriate key performance indicators 
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and performance targets for the municipalities.  The repeated complaints of poor 
service delivery in Bethlehem, Memel, Kestell, Warden, Winburg, Vrede, Paul 
Roux Clocolan and Ficksburg, provided a common thread to the problem, (SAPS 
Circular 26/3/5/ 2004).   The similar responses from the (victims) communities to 
request meetings with the local authorities, councillors, and mayors are an 
indication of clustered causes of complaints.  Because their complaints were not 
adequately addressed violent behavior from the community accompanied marches 
and petitions (SAPS Circular 26/3/5/ (2004)).  The question is, if the community 
was given the opportunity to participate in the setting of the appropriate key 
performance indicators and performance targets, would they have marched?  
Would they have marched if the officials had reported to the community as 
legislation requires?  The community also had the option to march, to express 
their grievances, but could they do it in accordance with the Public Gatherings Act, 
which requires them to give notice of their intention?   When demonstrators abide 
by the Act, are they able to express their views freely in public and enjoy the 
protection of the state with due regard to others?  Would the conveners comply 
with agreements relating to the route, time, and the number of marshals?  Would 
the marchers be armed with dangerous weapons or incite hatred or cause 
violence?  Provided there is compliance, there should be no serious disruption to 
traffic, injury to participants or extensive damage to property because these 
actions are largely prevented if they abide by the law.   
 
In this instance the marchers did not agree to the terms in accordance with a 
legislatively required notice.  The result was that they marched illegally and were 
as result not protected by the Regulation of Gathering Act of 1993. There for the 
police acted in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act.  The marchers were in 
violation of the law.  There would not have been victims if the South African Police 
Service had not been obliged to act.  The action of the police was however 
criticized and scrutinized after the Congress of the South African Trade Unions 
called for a high-level investigation into the conduct of police at the protest 
marches (Watch cops at marches, Cosatu (2006)). 
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If the services were of a satisfactory level, the crowd would not have had the need 
to gather and to demonstrate.  It is most important to investigate the interrelation 
between the residents who started out as the offenders, being involved in an 
illegal march, and who were turned into the victims when a boy was killed and a 
number of marchers injured.  The SAPS who were mediating and who were to an 
extent neutral, turned into the offenders when a boy was killed by a SAPS bullet.  
The municipality who started out as the victims against whom a march had been 
launched, then turned into the offenders, when it was established that they were 
responsible for the environmental reasons for the march, and for not meeting the 
conditions as were proposed by the SAPS. 
 
On the occasion in Harrismith, the organiser of the march stated that their actions 
were to disrupt the N3 national road traffic, to draw the attention of the President, 
Mr. Mbeki.  In Warden the community spilled the sewerage in an area close to the 
entrance of the town. This action did not encourage consultation and resulted in a 
health risk and disruption to road users and pedestrians along that road.   
 
The conclusion reached after the analysis process is; 
- The root cause of the violence is the community’s concerns about 
 municipal services;  
- The  contributing factors to the poor level of service delivery are nepotism 
 in the appointment of municipal  officials, lack of training of municipal 
 officials, lack of expertise on service delivery, incorrect application of 
 Affirmative Action effect of corruption and fraud, poor debt collection and 
 poor performance by municipal managers. 
- There was a lack of communication and consultation between the role- 
 players 
- There was a lack of information available to the SAPS to prepare planning 
 and a briefing to the members; 
- There was no contingency plan prepared involving the role-players; and 
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- The councillors did not adhere to the Finance Management Act of 2003 
 and the Municipal systems Act of 2000 which resulted in poor service 
 delivery and poor accountability to the community.   
- The marcher did not adhere to the Regulation of Gathering Act of 1993. 
- The South African Police did not manage the crowd in terms of Standing 
Order (General) 262 Crowd Management during gatherings and 
demonstrations. 
 
5.4 THE RESPONSE PHASE  
 
When the analyses have been completed, the response needs to be formulated.  
The response should be aimed at the root causes of the problem and not at the 
symptom.  If the response is aimed at the symptom, the symptom might be 
addressed to a degree, but if the root cause of the problem remains the same, the 
problem is likely to recur. An effective response needs to be formulated to 
eliminate or reduce the problem or to reduce the harm which was created by the 
problem.  Some law enforcement officers would argue that the response would be 
best handled by the law enforcers, but many of the responses might not be within 
the mandate of the law enforcement agency.   
 
In the Harrismith case, police members were deployed to prevent crime and to 
preserve public order.  During their attempts to prevent the crowd from moving on 
to the N3 national road, someone in the crowd lit a tyre which was tied to a rope 
and was hurled around.  The crowd moved onto the road and subsequently the 
Area Crime Combating Unit commander gave an order to the police members to 
open fire.  Culpable homicide charges brought made against three members of the 
police, after a boy was killed during the march (van Wyk: 2006).   A number of 
youths were also injured.   Prosecution was instituted against the three members 
to decide if the force applied was justified in terms of Section 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, no 51 of 1977.    
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It is unfortunate that police members have to react instantly considering the 
complex legislation regarding justified force, which was argued at length after the 
incident.  According to the analyses, the public’s expectation of the standard of 
municipal service is the underlying reason which caused the crowd’s 
dissatisfaction and gave rise to the launch of a march.  A large number of the 
persons interviewed said that the violence was a result of poor service delivery.  
To the question "What can be done to prevent the violence?”, a greater number 
indicated that they required consultation with the local authorities.  The Local 
Government Municipal Act 69 of 2003, Article 69 ensures that the budget is 
implemented according to a service delivery implementation plan on which they 
are expected to account to the community.   Article 78 provides legislation to 
address the issue of service delivery which is accountable if it is properly applied, 
because it assigns responsibility for "effective, efficient, economical, and 
transparent" application of resources.  Article 97 of the Local Government 
Municipal Act, of 2003, promotes the collection of revenue and the effective 
management and accounting thereof.  This legislation was not adhered to 
according to the interview with the Harrismith Democratic Party political 
representative and councillor.  The lack of payment for services forced the 
Harrismith Municipality to use funding that was required for development, to be 
used for maintenance.   Duvenhage (2006) states that of the 284 municipalities, 
122 are not able to provide basic services such as refuse removal services and 
60% of the residents have to go without electricity.   One hundred and thirty-six of 
the 284 newly established municipalities are considered to be in a crisis.  
 
The communities need to meet, communicate and consult with the municipality, 
because of the poor service delivery.  Since it is not the South African Police 
Service’s core business to facilitate communication between two conflicting 
parties, this issue is a problem.  The consultation and partnership approach to 
crime prevention are in keeping with the Community Police style which the South 
African Police Service has adopted since the 1994 democratic elections and the 
institutionalizing of Community Police Forums. The Community Police style caters 
 
  
  
  
133
for the collective approach to crime prevention and collective accountability.  It 
calls on the police to take a multi-disciplinary approach to the problem.  It is 
evident from an analysis of the violence that a contributing factor to the violence 
was the reactive approach on the part of the SAPS and the lack of participation on 
the part of the involved role players and resources.  The major objective of 
community policing is to establish partnerships between the police and the 
community at local level.  The “community police forum” did not represent the 
broader community, as in the case of the elected mayor and councillors.  These 
partners were not jointly responsible for the contributing factors to crime but were 
jointly responsible for preventing crime.   
 
According to the interviews with members from both Harrismith and Warden, the 
South African Police response was not pro-active.  The SAPS did not promote 
sufficient participation and information sharing.   They did not actively commit to 
the principle of Community Policing.  They did not promote responsibility and 
commitment to all the role-players to prevent crime and they did not call all the 
role-players to accountability.  This approach did not enhance information sharing 
or promote a climate conducive to communication and consultation.  It also did not 
serve as an early warning mechanism of a pending problem, with the result that no 
multi-disciplinary expertise was available to prevent the incident from happening.   
 
According to the interview with the station commissioner of Warden, the area 
commissioner, after consulting with a number of the station commissioners in the 
Eastern Free State and having been advised by intelligence officers, arranged a 
meeting with the Provincial Member of the Executive Council.  A committee was 
established, representing the SAPS and Local Authorities to assess the problems 
and to make the required arrangements to pro-actively address the dissatisfaction 
of the communities and to address the root causes of the marches.  
 
 
The process to pre-empt the violence by the police serves as an attempt to 
address one of the elements of the Crime Triangle.  Another attempt from the 
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police to address an element of the Crime Triangle is to address the police’s 
approach to the public demonstrations.  The police have attempted to ensure that 
the required notice to launch a public gathering or march is accepted according to 
the prescribed legislative procedures and the required agreements to “enjoy the 
protection of the state while doing so and whereas the exercise of such right shall 
take place peacefully and with due regard to the rights to others”.  While the crime 
prevention officers assisted the Area Crime Combating Unit members, an 
inspector from the crime prevention component of Harrismith reported: “die ander 
ding net terwyl Area Crime Combating  Unit bevelvoerder operasionele bevel 
oorgevat het, was daar niemand aangewys wat in bevel is van Harrismith stasie 
nie, so die stasie lede wat daar was, was maar daar en het nie geweet hoe om ‘n 
reaksie te hanteer nie”.(...the other thing is that while the Area Crime Combating  
Unit commander took charge, no one was appointed to take charge of the 
Harrismith station members.  They were there but did not know how to handle the 
reaction.)  The inspector from Harrismith said; „Ek dink ek moes die sigpol lede, 
stasie personeel ontrek het van die toneel af en aangewend het vir ander dienste 
soos patrollies en om die situasie te monitor en die beheerpunte se mense in 
kennis te stel.”  (I think the visible police members, should have redeployed the 
station members from the scene to do other duties, such as patrols, monitoring the 
situation and keeping the persons from the control points informed).   The crime 
prevention commander of Harrismith said; “I was going to hand over all my duties 
to them because, at the crime prevention level, I can’t interfere, because I am not 
actually trained to handle such a situation”. 
 
The ultimate response must address the root cause of the problem.  The problem 
as identified is the service level of the municipality, which the police are not able to 
change.  The symptom of the problem is the accompanying violence during 
protest actions.  The police response therefore will be aimed at the crowd (victim) 
and the police (offender) elements of the Crime Triangle, within the legislative 
mandate of the police.  
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From the assessment, it is evident that no one single response is required to 
address the root cause of the violence in the Eastern Free State.  The South 
African Police Service will be required to formulate a response:  
 
- To a march organized to express concern about poor service delivery;  
- To the lack of joint consultation and participation by all the partners and 
role-players; 
- To the lack of training of crime prevention members in relation to public 
 order duties; 
- With clear command and control guidelines;  
- Within the mandate of the SAPS (who will do what? when?)   
 
5.5 THE ASSESSMENT PHASE 
 
During the assessment phase, the effectiveness of the response is evaluated.  
There are different ways of assessing whether a SARA model has been 
successfully applied.  The absence of a problem can be used as an indication that 
the model has been successfully applied.  A comparison of pre-and-post calls for 
service, or expressed satisfaction of residents can be an indication of a successful 
response to a problem.  When the assessment of a problem shows that the 
problem has not been resolved, the process should again be completed and if the 
outcome is not satisfactory, the phases should be repeated.   
 
The questions to be asked are: Has there been violence since the Warden and 
Harrismith incidents?  There have been marches and public gatherings, but no 
incidents of violence comparable to the incidents in Warden and Harrismith.  Has 
there been any dissatisfaction with service delivery?  Have there been incidents 
reported in the media of ongoing dissatisfaction about service levels?  Have there 
been applications for public gatherings or marches?  Have there been applications 
in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act of 1993? 
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During the interviews with the respondents, they were asked to propose solutions 
to the violence in the Eastern Free State.  The chairperson of the Community 
Police Forum in Harrismith requested the promotion of the Forum to serve as a 
platform for communication and negotiation.  The information officer of the Area 
Crime Combating Unit said that if a notice was given of the intention to host a 
march, violence could be prevented if all the role-players sat down and negotiated 
the terms and conditions for organizing a safe demonstration.   The station 
commissioner of Harrismith and the Crime Prevention Head proposed avoiding the 
deployment of crime prevention members as part of the reactive strategy, stating 
that the crime prevention members’ training was not in accordance with recent 
standards.   The Area Crime Combating Unit’s response time was mentioned as 
taking too long and suggestions were made to train a local response group of 
crime prevention officers instead, so as to improve the response time.  When the 
response to the violence was assessed, the respondents who were interviewed 
said that if they had the opportunity to meet the local authorities or the mayors, 
they would not have had to resort to disruptive actions.   
 
According to the station commissioner of Warden, the South African Police 
Service area commissioner had become aware of the common problems in the 
different towns.  He has since made efforts to consult with the Eastern Free State 
Police station commissioners.  Their reports and his involvement resulted in 
negotiations with the Provincial Member of the Executive Council Government.   
The SAPS used the legal framework to their benefit when they applied the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act of 1993 and assembled with other role players in the 
town hall of Warden: this consultation as part of the response assisted the 
negotiations.  The SAPS according to the interviewed station commissioner of 
Warden, initially responded to information which was part of the scanning process 
and the threat analysis resulted in their being able to make attempts to bring 
together the relevant role-players in keeping with the scanning process and 
applying the community policing principles of involving relevant role- players to 
address a problem in a multi-disciplinary manner.  
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According to the interview with the Warden station commissioner a committee has 
since been established at provincial level, with representatives of the South 
African Police Service Intelligence and Provincial Local Government 
representatives, who, with Area level representatives arranged consultative 
meetings and kept the community informed.  
 
The premier has since been to a number of municipal areas where there have 
been backlogs on housing and services about which communities expressed their 
dissatisfaction.  It bears questioning as to the professionalism, responsibility, 
accountability, and integrity of the municipal authorities.  The applications to 
arrange public gatherings sparked some concern by the authorities; consequently, 
they arranged for a public forum to promote communication and consultation.  
Since the initial violence at Harrismith, more incidents followed at a number of 
towns in the Eastern Free State, providing an opportunity to assess the police 
response.  The assessment highlighted the roles and responsibilities the SAPS 
needs to address:  
- Service delivery concerns, as to ensure public safety and security 
- Communication and consultation issues;  
- training of SAPS members; 
- Human response capacity; 
- Logistical challenges for operational deployment; and  
- Contingency planning 
 
 
5.6 SUMMARY 
 
Having applied the different phases of the Scanning, Analysis, Response and 
Assessment model, it is clear that the South African Police remains obligated and 
challenged to prevent crime.  It was already evident during the scanning phase 
that there was indeed a problem in the Eastern Free State.  The media, local 
residents, sector policing managers, Community Police Forum members, activists 
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and politicians reported violence, injury, death, and damage to private and public 
property. 
 
The collected data and analysis confirmed the reported problems related to the 
community’s concern about poor service delivery.  There were contributing factors 
to the poor levels of service delivery.  There was a lack of communication and 
consultation between the role-players, which was cited by the interviewed 
residents as one of the proposed solutions, apart from improved service delivery.   
There was a lack of information to the police, inhibiting contingency planning and 
briefing of the members.  The operational planning did not involve all the role- 
players to their maximum capacity and in the areas of their responsibility.    The 
role players did not adhere to governing legislation.  The municipality did not 
comply with the Municipal Acts and Regulations.  Mayors did not full fill their duties 
and obligations in terms of the Municipal Acts and Regulations.  Activists did not 
stage their public expression of dissatisfaction in terms of the Public Gatherings 
Act.  The result was that the SAPS were held accountable for the subsequent 
injuries and the death of a youth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
6.1 THE RESEARCH ISSUE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND GOALS OF 
THE STUDY 
 
South Africa’s progressive Constitution and supportive legislation created the 
impression the public that freedom of expression is unlimited.  According to 
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Duvenhage (2006), politicians have created expectations with the general public 
and failing to meet these expectations has sparked discontent. The expression of 
discontent has been accompanied by violence in some instances, (SABC 2 news, 
30 August 2004).  The violence and public disorder have become a major 
challenge to the South African Police Service to become innovative in its approach 
to public order.  The protest marches experienced in the Eastern Free State since 
August 2004 have been experienced in all the provinces in South Africa.  The 
community has regarded this police action as a public order exercise, closely 
related to political oppression and contrary to the police policy of providing a 
service. 
 
It has become evident from the latest number of marches and violence in the 
Eastern Free State, that a pro-active police style is required.  Ten years after 
democracy, questions were asked: “Is the Police Service able to handle public 
expression?  Is the way the police service manages the public violence after 1994 
any different from the way that the police FORCE handled public violence 
previously?   
 
The aim and objective of the research was to establish what preventative steps by 
the SAPS are necessary to prevent a repeat of such an unfortunate event.  The 
value of the study was that it will give some indication of the progress made 
towards democratic policing and service delivery or the lack thereof.  The study is 
exploratory in nature and was conducted in a qualitative paradigm.   Interviews 
were conducted with involved role-players and reports, letters and newspaper 
articles were analysed and a number of interviews were conducted.         
 
6.2 SUMMARY 
 
Since the fundamental right to demonstration has been accepted, marches have 
become indicative of public expression as demonstrated in the Harrismith incident.  
Twenty-four children were hurt and 38 arrested in Harrismith (SABC 2 news, 30 
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August 2004).  A 17-year-old teenager died of internal bleeding after allegedly 
being shot with rubber bullets.  The premier of the Free State visited Harrismith 
and stated that she had received complaints and a memorandum about the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme housing and about employment 
opportunities. Another complaint was that the municipality was losing its focus on 
health, including HIV/AIDS (SABC 2 news 2 September 2004).    
 
In Warden, 26 persons appeared in court (SABC 2 news 7 October 2004) on 
charges of public violence and taking part in an illegal march.  According to the 
SAPS Circular 23/3/5 (2004), the following stations were identified and plans were 
drafted in cases of violence related to Local Government: Bethlehem, Memel, 
Warden, Kestell, Winburg, Vrede, Paul Roux and Clocolan, as well as Ficksburg. 
Where taxi violence was anticipated the community is actively participating in the 
transformation process by expressing their disappointment and executing their 
rights.  Three South African Police Service members from the Crime Prevention 
Unit of Harrismith, were charged and appeared in court on culpable homicide 
charges and a number of the community members were arrested and charged 
with public violence offences in both Warden and Harrismith.    
 
There are a number of policies, acts, and regulations regulating gatherings, 
negotiating conflict and controlling perpetrators and offenders.   The Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, provides a legal framework, 
which establishes the most basic Human Rights, such as freedom of religion and 
opinion and the right to freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, picketing 
and petitioning as well as freedom of association and political rights, human dignity 
and freedom and security of the person.  The Constitution, Chapter 2, Section 12 
(1) guarantees personal safety against any form of violence, regardless of where 
the violence originates.  Freedom of speech is enshrined in the Constitution, 
Chapter 2, Section 16, there for any person who has a concern about service 
delivery may make recourse to the Constitution to establish these rights.  While 
everyone has these rights, they are not extended to the incitement of imminent 
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violence, “for one has the right to peaceful and unarmed assembly to 
demonstrate”.  Although freedom of expression is essential to a democracy, 
people disagree on what kind of expression should be protected and what should 
be allowed or restricted.   
 
According to Mc Quid-Mason, O’ Brien and Greene (1991:23), some people are of 
the opinion that speech should be controlled when it causes violence by inciting 
riots, calling on people to revolt, is racist or bigoted, or undermines the 
government.   The Criminal Procedure Act No. 51, Section 49 provides the legal 
framework for the use of force in effecting an arrest.  The force justified is such 
force as may be reasonable and necessary and proportional in the circumstances 
to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing.  
 
The purpose of Standing Order (General) 262, crowd management during 
gatherings and demonstrations, is to regulate crowd management during 
gatherings and demonstrations in accordance with the democratic principles of the 
Constitution and acceptable international standards.  The Standing Order must be 
read in conjunction with the Criminal Procedure Act No 51. The Order requires the 
Service to devise effective methods to promote public safety by playing a “pro-
active role in communicating with the public through the Community Police Forum 
or other channels.”  Thompson, (2005:1) reported that the crowd expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the delivery of municipal services. The following factors seem 
to contribute to poor service delivery in the Free State: equity policy appointments, 
bribery, corruption, nepotism, lack of training and expertise, affirmative action, 
corruption, fraud and poor debt collection by municipalities.   There were 843 
municipalities during the so called “apartheid years” before 1994.  The 
municipalities were rationalized to 284 after 1994.  According to Duvenhage 
(2006) the community is expecting the municipalities to deliver basic services as 
well as progress on integrated development plans.    
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According to Duvenhage (2006), there seem to be four possible reasons for the 
instability in the Eastern Free State: internal conflict within the governing African 
National Congress, the lack of acquired value and stability; and poor service 
delivery.  The fourth possible reason flagged by Duvenhage is the recorded 
evidence in the literature that strong economic growth has preceded unstable and 
violent governance.   
 
The Eastern Free State is mainly a rural area where formal fruit farming and 
subsistence farming, as well as tourism are the main sources of employment.  The 
poverty profile of the Free State recorded an estimated 66% of people living in 
poverty: ‘the third highest poverty rates in the country’, (World Bank Reports in 
Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa, (1995)).  The area sadly lacks 
infrastructure such as roads, housing, water, working sanitation and electricity.  
There are not enough schools, libraries, clinics, and police stations.  (Free State 
Development Plan: 2002-2005).  There are 32 police stations in the Eastern Free 
State and the majority of the stations are rural police stations.  The average police 
station in the Free State serves an average of 1210 square kilometers.  The 
majority of station commissioners do not have enough vehicles to deliver a quality 
service to a relatively poor rural area, where infrastructure is poor.   
 
As stated in Chapter 2, the South African Police Service has emerged from a 
“force” to a “service” and has subsequently changed policing style to be 
accountable to the community.  The problems in the Eastern Free State need to 
be explored to inform future police response.  The persistent problems in the 
Eastern Free State seem to be a recurring pattern.   
 
The SARA model is a methodical process to establish the root cause of the 
problems.  The model provides a versatile four-component process, namely 
scanning, analysis, response, and assessment, to establish if there is a problem 
and how to respond to it.   
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During the scanning phase an attempt was made to collect information from public 
opinion, newspaper reporting, case reporting, television broadcasts and police 
correspondence and reports.  The scanning phase provided the scope to priorities 
the problems, after it was confirmed that there was a problem.  It served to confirm 
that there were related and recurring incidents that constituted problems of crime 
and disorder.  Similar incidents occurred in Memel, Kestell, Vrede, Paul Roux, 
Clocolan, Ficksburg, and Warden.  The questions were formulated to establish 
what had given rise to the public violence which required police intervention; what 
informed the subsequent police action; who the involved role-players were; how 
the SAPS Crime Combating Unit reacted to the violence and what the views and 
approaches were of those interviewed to the problems and proposed solutions.  
The violence, according to the media and interviews with the respondents, was 
related to the poor performance of the municipalities.  More data was collected 
from police records, interviews, crime patterns, literature searches and grouped to 
be analyzed. 
 
An in-depth analysis along the “Problem Analysis Triangle” was completed to 
separate the environmental, offender and victim related contributing factors to the 
violence in the Eastern Free State.  From the data considered by the researcher, 
four themes emerged.  The first was that violence was indeed experienced; the 
second theme was, the reasons given for the police involvement; the third theme 
involved the different role-players and the last theme considered solutions to the 
problems experienced.  
 
According to an analysis, the root cause of the violence was the poor services of 
municipalities as well as the community’s expectations of services, derived from 
political promises.  There is evidence that little progress has been made with the 
provision of basic services.  According to the data, the provision of services is 
severely hampered by a number of serious factors such as the lack of expertise 
and training, unsuitable appointments of municipal workers, corruption, bribery, 
and nepotism.  Paying customers are not receiving the professional services that 
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they are paying for and they are unable to make any satisfactory enquiries or 
requests to the municipal authorities.  While the communities have made 
numerous attempts to voice their dissatisfaction and to engage the mayors and 
councillors, the lack of communication and consultation resulted in a public display 
of concern.  The march in Harrismith took place in a public area on the N3 national 
road between Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal in violation of sub section (5) of the 
Regulations of Gathering Act of 1993.  According to the crime prevention and Area 
Crime Combating Unit members, the marchers went on the road and lit the grass 
alongside, while one person lit a tyre, tied it to a rope, and swung it around in the 
air.    Members of the Police Service were commanded to fire on the marchers and 
three members were charged with manslaughter. On 12 July 2006, the court found 
the members not guilty, since they were found to have acted in self-defense.  
Thirteen members of the community were charged with public violence related 
charges.  Eleven members were released, while 2 were found not guilty and 
released.   
 
While the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993, states that “every person has the 
right to assemble with other persons and to express his/her views on any matter 
freely in public” while enjoying the protection of the state, the gathering is not 
allowed to seriously disrupt traffic, injure other participants or other persons or 
damage property.  This Act also makes provision for a police officer, an inspector, 
or higher authority to disperse a gathering which has been declared a prohibited 
gathering or because of previously mentioned grounds.  
 
In the case of Harrismith the crime prevention officer said that they were poorly 
informed about the community’s intentions and that they did not prepare a 
contingency plan.  They were merely told to report for duty at six o’clock the next 
morning.  The CIAC Inspector confirmed that they had too little information, too 
late, and that the lack of information resulted in poor planning and poor briefing to 
the members.  According to the station commissioner, he was not present at the 
march.  The crime prevention head and the organiser of the march said that they 
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consulted during the march, when angry members of the community took the 
organiser away from the police and prevented negotiation.  The crime prevention 
head reported that the marchers intentionally recruited under-aged children from 
the schools to participate in the march, because they would not be prosecuted.   
Most of those interviewed stated that the outcome of the march would have been 
different if the mayor had kept his appointment with the organizers of the march 
and had met with them at the agreed time and place.   
 
The Harrismith incident was followed by the Warden March a week later.   
According to the station commissioner of Warden, he was involved with 
negotiations and was previously informed about the community’s intention to 
organize a public demonstration of their concerns relating to poor service delivery.  
The station commissioner said that because there was no councillor to receive 
their memorandum, he had to receive it on the council’s behalf.  According to the 
interviews the area commissioner, the deputy area head of crime prevention, as 
well as the station commissioner were present at the march and the station 
commissioner was able to arrange a meeting with the concerned residents and the 
councillors to discuss the concerns of the community.  On the day of the organized 
march however, the marchers proceeded to unlawfully restrict the use of a public 
road, by placing stones and rocks in the road.  The marchers did not comply with 
the requirements as prescribed in the Regulations of Gathering Act 1993, Section 
205(3), (5).  The crowd’s unlawful behaviour resulted in the Police being obliged to 
deploy Area Crime Combating Units to ensure safety and security.        
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
 
A pattern was established when events in the Eastern Free State were scanned 
according to applied SARA model.  The root causes of the problems were public 
disorder problems.  The public disorder was due to violence accompanying 
marches, organized by the community, because of concerns about poor municipal 
services.     
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Having analyzed the data on the reasons for the violence and the responses from 
the interviewed, involved role-players, and the information that informed the police 
response, it is evident that it is not the South African Police Service’s sole 
responsibility to formulate a response to the violence.  Most of the respondents 
indicated that they were of the opinion that improved quality of service delivery 
from the municipality would address their problems.  It was apparent that the root 
cause of the problem started with the service delivery of the municipality.  Some 
respondents said that communication would solve the problem.  They did not insist 
on the services from the municipality, but they wanted an explanation and the 
opportunity to voice their opinion.  The South African Police Service is not deemed 
to be the main role-player in preventing the public display of violence.  Most of the 
respondents expected the South African Police Service to deliver their core 
function, of preventing crime and providing safety for all. They related the public 
violence problem in the Eastern Free State, not to the police, but to an array of 
role-players.  
 
During the scanning process the lack of coordination, information sharing with 
role-players and poor internal and external communication was identified as 
reasons for the poor response on the part of the police.  There was not enough 
information to inform the consultation meetings between the relevant role-players 
or the preparation of planning and briefing on the part of the SAPS.  The result 
was that the available resources were poorly applied and the community was not 
informed about the challenges faced by the municipality and the SAPS to provide 
a quality service.   
 
The data analysis provided the researcher with an explanation of the contributing 
factors to the root cause of the violence.  The community’s concerns about 
municipal services, is the result of a lack of expertise, inadequate training, 
inappropriate appointments, corruption, bribery and nepotism.  Paying customers 
do not receive the professional services for which they are paying and they are 
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unable to make any satisfactory enquiries or requests to the municipal authorities.  
The lack of information prevented the police from preparing pro-active planning, 
and briefing members from applying the available resources optimally.   
 
The police response was not well-informed and formulated, because the response 
was not directed at the root cause of the violence. Rather, it was directed at the 
violence, which is the symptom of the problem.  It might have been because the 
municipal service provision is not the core business of the police. Moreover, the 
service providers did not make any effort to facilitate communication between the 
community and the municipality after having noted that there were attempts on the 
part of the community to engage the mayor and councillors.  Furthermore, the 
SAPS also did not involve the Community Police Forum to its full capacity.  The 
deployment of crime prevention officers, who were not trained in the recent public 
order curriculum and waiting for the arrival of the Area Crime Combating Unit 
members result of crisis management.  The members of crime prevention fired 
prohibited rounds and caused the death of a youth because of a lack of training 
and no briefing.  The lack of clear command and a controlled handover between 
the crime prevention commanding officer and the Area Crime Combating Unit 
commander resulted in the commanding officer being unaware of the line 
ammunition of the crime prevention officers.  South African Police Service 
members operated within their mandate.  It is not within the South African Police 
Service’s mandate to address municipal services.  The South African Police 
Service is responsible for preventing crime and ensuring public safety, with the 
involvement of relevant role-players, through community policing.  
 
The South African Police Service’s response was not directed at the root cause of 
the problem.  There is, however, no evidence that the station commissioners 
made concerted efforts to bring the different role-players together to facilitate 
consultation in a correct problem-solving and community-policing style.   The lack 
of communication and consultation is not in keeping with the adopted democratic 
style of community policing, where the focus is on transparency and information 
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sharing. Information officers advised the station commissioners of the intentions to 
arrange public demonstrations.  The station commissioners did not apply the 
information to arrange consultative meetings to facilitate the peaceful exchange of 
information.  The South African Police Service did not promote participation and 
information sharing.  They did not actively commit to the principle of partnership 
policing, nor did they promote shared responsibility and commitment with all the 
role-players to prevent crime.  This approach did not enhance information sharing 
and a climate, conducive to communication and consultation.  Moreover, it did not 
serve as an early warning mechanism of a pending problem and no multi-
disciplinary expertise was available to prevent the problem from occurring.   
 
With regard to the consultation in Harrismith, the notice was given in time but the 
police did not act on it and it was used only to inform members to report for duty at 
06:00 on the Monday morning 30 August 2006.  No one prepared a 
comprehensive briefing for the crime prevention and Area Crime Combating Unit 
members according to a written operational plan.   
 
Concerning the planning process, the information did not inform a written 
contingency plan and no external members were at the briefing session to advise 
or to consult, such as a representative of the Community Police Forum, a 
representative of the organizers of the march or the municipal council or traffic 
department.   The response capacity was informed merely by the available 
information.  The crime prevention members were not nearly enough and they 
were not adequately enough equipped with crowd control gear to provide 
protection and the preservation of peace.  The Harrismith crime prevention officer 
and the Warden Station commissioner requested assistance from the area 
commissioner who dispatched the Area Crime Combating Unit members from 
Bethlehem. The distance of the Area Crime Combating Unit members from 
Bethlehem to Warden, was too far to provide emergency response services and it 
was not taken into account.  
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The training of Area Crime Combating Unit members concerning negotiation and 
equipment has been adapted since 1994.  Area Crime Combating Unit members 
are trained to negotiate with the organizers of gatherings in a post-democratic 
society. Contrary to this, the crime prevention members are not trained to an 
adequate level, nor are they equipped to handle public gatherings and as a result 
the numbers of the marchers grew substantially, as marchers went to the schools 
to recruit the children to join them.  The children were also recruited intentionally, 
because the police would find it difficult to prosecute them.  The marchers became 
too numerous to control and their aggressive attitude towards the SAPS, the threat 
to the N3 road users, as well as their own safety left the SAPS with no choice, but 
to authorize their members to open fire.   
 
The handover of command and the control of the gathering between the crime 
prevention commander and the Area Crime Combating Unit commander were, 
according the officers, according to procedure.  There were no questions asked 
about the briefing process and it is not established if the members were reminded 
about the use of force and the authorized ammunition. The Harrismith crime 
prevention officers did not arm themselves during the parade; they went to the 
station during the operation and armed themselves with ammunition that was 
unauthorized.  According to the interviews there was no authorized ammunition 
available.  The Area Crime Combating Unit commander was not informed about 
the unauthorized ammunition, but in the visual data the members can be clearly 
seen carrying firearms and side weapons, which also may not be fired during 
public violence operations.     
 
In the case of Warden, which followed the Harrismith incident, the root cause of 
the violence was also poor service delivery.  The notice given by the community of 
their intention to arrange a public demonstration was submitted in time and 
information managers of Area Crime Combating Unit informed the station 
commissioner about the march.  There were no questions asked about the briefing 
of the members during the parade, but the interviews revealed that the station 
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commissioner involved the area commissioner, who in turn involved relevant 
stakeholders.  Regardless of the poor participation on the part of the mayor and 
the councillors, the organizer of the march was involved and the consultation 
between the role-players relieved some of the tensions and the SAPS were able to 
limit the damage to public property and there was only one injury sustained 
compared to the eleven injuries and one death sustained in Harrismith.     
 
The judgment made in Peterson v the Minister of Safety and Security, 2005 A 624, 
is that police action has to be consistent with the Bill of Rights and they have to 
exercise their powers “strictly within the prescribed bounds.” Their actions must 
“benefit the society as a whole” and must be complementary to the obligations 
which have been imposed by the constitution, while the fundamental rights of 
individual members of the community are also protected.  Public Order Police 
members are constantly challenged to preserve public order while observing the 
rights of individuals.  The judgment also rules there is a decision to be taken as to 
what is more important, “the South African Police constitutional obligations”, or the 
“proper performance of their duties”.  
 
When assessing what is the more important, accountability must serve as a point 
of departure.  The judge admitted that the police have to make a quick decision in 
an emergency situation.  Most important is that Judge Pikis, in the case of 
Andronicon and Another v Cyprus (1998) 25 EHRR 491 at 565 said:  “The state 
has the added duty of planning as well as controlling the operation so as to limit 
the circumstances in which force is used, and if force is unavoidable, to minimize 
its effects.” 
 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A step-by-step service-orientated, preventative policing style is suggested for 
public violence in the Eastern Free State.  Following is a discussion of the steps, 
as well as Diagram 6.1, which is a schematic illustration of the step-by-step 
approach. 
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6.4.1 Step 1:  Training of members in crime information analysis 
 
A station has to have members trained in crime information analysis.  Members 
deployed in the crime intelligence analysis centre, must search for possible crime 
patterns, from crime related data, the literature, informers and members, 
concerning the offender, to the victim and the environmental factors contributing to 
crime.   These procedures will establish a preliminary indication or pattern that 
may constitute a crime related problem.  
 
6.4.2 Step 2:  Involve the relevant role players 
 
The role-players must be involved in terms of the South African Police Service Act 
No. 68, which instructs the South African Police Service to adopt a community 
police orientated crime prevention style and to establish partnerships with the 
community to promote joint problem identifying.  An ideal Community Police Board 
represents all the relevant role-players.  In many cases an extra effort is deemed 
necessary to engage all the relevant role-players, because the Community Police 
Board does not represent the community.   Possible role- players to engage are: 
Local Government Departments, Non-Governmental organisations, Chamber of 
Commerce and business representatives, school children, church, and religious 
role players, security fraternity and the elected community police board.   
 
6.4.3 Step 3: Apply the Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment 
Model in accordance with the philosophy of a community police crime 
prevention style   
 
The SARA Model provides a practical step-by-step approach to the involved 
community to complete a safety audit to identify the problem, to develop and 
manage a strategy and to monitor and evaluate the outcome. 
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There should be a focus on the elements of the Problem Analysis Triangle.  The 
elements of the triangle will serve to group the information along the elements of 
the triangle.  The root cause of the problem must be identified along the elements 
of the triangle.  Since all three of the Crime Triangle elements need to be present 
for a crime to be committed, the challenge is to find at least one element (root 
cause), to be present by addressing it, instead of the symptoms of the problems.  
 
Underpinning legislation must be considered during all the phases of the model.  
The Constitution of South Africa serves as a point of departure.  The South African 
Police Service Act is helpful in assigning roles and responsibilities and serves as a 
mandate for police action.  Standing Orders guide the implementation of the 
response and court cases serve to inform decision-making and instructions. 
 
The four phases of the SARA Model involve the scanning process, whereby the 
South African Police Service with all the identified role-players complete a 
preliminary review to confirm that there is a pattern of related, recurring incidents 
that constitute a problem.   
 
The second phase, the analysis phase, involves the South African Police Service 
and relevant role-players in analysing the events and conditions that preceded or 
accompanied the problem to customize a response to the problem and to 
eliminate an element, by grouping information and using a multi-agency and 
inclusive approach to the crime problem.    
 
The third phase, the response phase, requires that the South African Police 
Service and the relevant role-players, execute an agreed response, which would 
address one, two or all three elements of the Crime Triangle.  The response 
should not be restricted to the South African Police Service.  A response should 
only be directed at the root cause of the problem; not at the symptom of the 
problem.   
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The final phase, the assessment phase, is to assess the effectiveness of the 
executed response.  One indication of effectiveness is the absence or continuation 
of the problem.  A second indication is to compare pre-and post data to a baseline.  
A third is to consider whether the problem was correctly identified during the 
scanning and analysis phase and if the response resulted in an acceptable 
outcome for all the relevant role-players.  
 
6.4.4 Step 4: Address the training issues  
 
The Assessment phase of the SARA model will provide an indication of where the 
role-players failed in their approach to the crime problem.  All the role-players 
must provide the required training and skills development related to their role and 
responsibility and mandate, to contribute in an informed and positive way to 
addressing the root cause that contributes to the crime. 
 
All possible preventative crime prevention measures must be explored and 
implemented, involving all the role-players, using all available skills and resources.  
The objective is to avoid the occurrence of a situation which could require the 
South African Police Service to make an instant decision and to prioritise between 
constitutional obligations and the proper performance of their duties.  
 
Training should counter the perception that “police officials who are described as 
law enforcement officials, sometimes break the law designed to protect human 
rights when enforcing other laws”, (Crawshaw, Devlin and Williamson 1998:23).  It 
is therefore imperative that they act in keeping with current policy and training.  
This training will promote valuable consultation and multi-disciplinary approaches 
to problems.   
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Diagram 6.1 A service orientated, preventative policing style for public  
violence in the towns of Harrismith and Warden in the Eastern Free State  
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Addendum C: A list of questions posed to the respondents 
 
1. Questions in relation to the Harrismith events  
 
1.1 All the possible persons to interview 
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1.1.1 The Mayor of Harrismith 
1.1.2 Council members of Harrismith 
1.1.3 Politically involved role-players  
1.1.4 Private persons present at the march 
1.1.5 SAPS intelligence officer 
1.1.6 The commander of ACCU 
1.1.7 Members of ACCU 
1.1.8 Member of the media who covered the events 
 
1.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. What gave rise 
to the public violence which required police intervention?” the following 
questions are proposed:  
1.2.1 What happened on 30 August 2005, before the police came to Harrismith? 
1.2.2 Where did the people gather together and why? 
1.2.3 What did the people talk about? 
1.2.4 Who was there? 
1.2.5 What happened? 
 
2.1 Possible persons to interview  
2.3.1 The Mayor of Harrismith 
2.3.2 Council members of Harrismith 
 
2.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. “What informed 
the subsequent police action?” the following questions are proposed: 
2.2.1 Who requested the police? 
2.2.2 When did the police respond and to what did they respond? 
2.2.3 Why did the police come to the scene? 
 
 
3.1 Possible persons to interview for this question: 
3.1.1 The Mayor of Harrismith 
3.1.2 Council members of Harrismith 
3.1.3 Politically involved role-players 
3.1.4 Private persons present at the march 
3.1.5 SAPS intelligence officer 
3.1.6 The commander of ACCU 
3.1.7 Members of ACCU 
3.1.8 Members of the media who covered the events 
3.1.9 Politically involved role-players 
3.1.10 Private persons present at the march 
3.1.11 SAPS intelligence officer 
3.1.12 Commander of ACCU 
3.1.13 Members of ACCU Who were the involved role-players who acted on the 
public violence? 
3.1.14 Member of the media who covered the events  
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3.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. “Who were the 
involved role-players who acted on the public violence?” the following 
questions are proposed: 
3.2.1 Who were the involved role-players who acted on the public violence? 
3.2.2 Who was present at the scene?   
3.2.3 Who was reported to have been involved? 
 
4.1 Possible persons to interview for this question: 
4.1.1 The Mayor of Harrismith 
4.1.2 Council members of Harrismith 
4.1.3 Politically involved role-players 
4.1.4 Private persons present at the march 
4.1.5 SAPS intelligence officer 
4.1.6 The commander of ACCU 
4.1.7 Members of ACCU 
4.1.8 Members of the media who covered the events 
 
4.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. How did the 
SAPS Public Order Unit react to the violence?” the following questions are 
posed: 
4.2.1 When did the police arrive? 
4.2.2 What happened after the police arrived? 
4.2.3 What did the police do in response to the actions of the crowd? 
 
5.1 Possible persons to interview for this question: 
5.1.1 The Mayor of Harrismith 
5.1.2 Council members of Harrismith 
5.1.3 Politically involved role-players 
5.1.4 Private persons present at the march 
5.1.5 SAPS intelligence officer 
5.1.6 The commander of ACCU 
5.1.7 Members of ACCU 
5.1.8 Members of the media who covered the events 
 
5.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1.What are the 
views and approach of the interviewed to the problems and proposed 
solutions?” the following questions were posed: 
5.2.1 What do you think could have been done differently by you to prevent the 
manner in which the incidents were handled? 
5.2.2 What do you think could have been done differently by the police, to 
prevent the damage and bloodshed that occurred during the incident? 
5.2.3 How likely is it that similar problems, will occur in future? 
5.2.4 How do you think you would handle the problems that gave rise to the 
violence differently in future?  
 
 
2. Questions in relation to the Warden events  
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1.1 All the possible persons to interview 
1.1.1 The Mayor of Warden 
1.1.2 Council members of Warden 
1.1.3 Politically involved role-players  
1.1.4 Private persons present at the march 
1.1.5 SAPS intelligence officer 
1.1.6 The commander of ACCU 
1.1.7 Members of ACCU 
1.1.8 Member of the media who covered the events 
 
1.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. What gave rise 
to the public violence which required police intervention?” the following 
questions are proposed:  
1.2.1 What happened on 30 August 2005, before the police came to Warden? 
1.2.2 Where did the people gather together and why? 
1.2.3 What did the people talk about? 
1.2.4 Who was there? 
1.2.5 What happened? 
 
2.1 Possible persons to interview  
2.3.1 The Mayor of Warden 
2.3.2 Council members of Warden 
 
2.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. What informed 
the subsequent police action?” the following questions are proposed: 
2.2.1 Who requested the police? 
2.2.2 When did the police respond and to what did they respond? 
2.2.3 Why did the police come to the scene? 
 
 
3.1 Possible persons to interview for this question: 
3.1.1 The Mayor of Warden 
3.1.2 Council members of Warden 
3.1.3 Politically involved role-players 
3.1.4 Private persons present at the march 
3.1.5 SAPS intelligence officer 
3.1.6 The commander of ACCU 
3.1.7 Members of ACCU 
3.1.8 Members of the media who covered the events 
3.1.9 Politically involved role-players 
3.1.10 Private persons present at the march 
3.1.11 SAPS intelligence officer 
3.1.12 Commander of ACCU 
3.1.13 Members of ACCU Who were the involved role-players who acted on the 
public violence? 
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3.1.14 Member of the media who covered the events  
 
3.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. “Who were the 
involved role-players who acted on the public violence?” the following 
questions are proposed: 
3.2.1 Who were the involved role-players who acted on the public violence? 
3.2.2 Who was present at the scene?   
3.2.3 Who was reported to have been involved? 
 
4.1 Possible persons to interview for this question: 
4.1.1 The Mayor of Warden 
4.1.2 Council members of Warden 
4.1.3 Politically involved role-players 
4.1.4 Private persons present at the march 
4.1.5 SAPS intelligence officer 
4.1.6 The commander of ACCU 
4.1.7 Members of ACCU 
4.1.8 Members of the media who covered the events 
 
4.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. How did the 
SAPS Public Order Unit react to the violence?” the following questions are 
posed: 
4.2.1 When did the police arrive? 
4.2.2 What happened after the police arrived? 
4.2.3 What did the police do in response to the actions of the crowd? 
 
5.1 Possible persons to interview for this question: 
5.1.1 The Mayor of Warden 
5.1.2 Council members of Warden 
5.1.3 Politically involved role-players 
5.1.4 Private persons present at the march 
5.1.5 SAPS intelligence officer 
5.1.6 The commander of ACCU 
5.1.7 Members of ACCU 
5.1.8 Members of the media who covered the events 
 
5.2 To answer the following question in the dissertation: “1.3.1. What are the 
views and approach of the interviewed to the problems and proposed 
solutions?” the following questions were posed: 
5.2.1 What do you think could have been done differently by you to prevent the 
manner in which the incidents were handled? 
5.2.2 What do you think could have been done differently by the police, to 
prevent the damage and bloodshed that occurred during the incident? 
5.2.3 How likely is it that similar problems, will occur in future? 
5.2.4 How do you think you would handle the problems that gave rise to the 
violence differently in future?  
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Addendum D: Interview schedules 
Not 
numeric 
(numbers  
of 
interviews 
Date of 
interview 
in 2006  
Harrismith 
or Warden 
Respondent 
representatives 
Name and 
surname 
Contact 
number 
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1. 17 
January 
H ACCU Inspector P E Kumbane 082 3818453 
2. 17 
January 
H ACCU Inspector RM Faba 084 4281244 
3. 17 
January 
H ACCU Inspector N I Mamagwe 051 409 
5700 
4. 17 
January 
H ACCU Inspector B T Rakate 082 5385723 
5. 17 
January 
H ACCU Inspector N Lepele 082 7383987 
6. 17 
January 
H ACCU Captain S J Henning 082 5116656 
7. 17 
January 
H ACCU Captain D J Victor 082 8563099 
8. 17 
January 
H ACCU Inspector J A Diggiden  076 7410710 
9. 31 
January 
H Station 
Commissioner , 
Snr Supt 
F Marais 082 4556133 
10. 31 
January 
H CIAC Inspector  J H Beyers 084 4325611 
11. 31 
January 
H Crime 
Prevention Head 
Supt 
Mpembe 082 4668961 
12. 31 
January 
H Human 
Resource 
Management 
Captain 
S Mokanyane 082 9780216 
13. 1 
February 
H CPF 
Chairperson 
J Mosili 072 8144042 
14. 2 
February 
W Crime 
Prevention Head 
Inspector 
J Hilario 082 7744987 
15. 2 
February 
W Private person 
present at the 
march  
Evilina 
Tshabalala 
058 
643004212  
16. 2 
February 
W Private person 
present at the 
march  
Pelina Meduna 058 6430042 
17. 2 
February 
W Private person 
present at the 
march  
Miriam Lekele 058 6430042 
18. 2 
February 
W Private person 
present at the 
march  
Francina 
Hatebe 
058 6430042 
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19. 2 
February 
W Private person 
present at the 
march  
Izak Motaung 058 6430042 
20. 2 
February 
W Private person 
present at the 
march  
C Stemmet 058 6430042 
21. 2 
February 
W Intelligence 
officer of SAPS  
Willa Wessels 058 6430042 
22. 2 
February 
W Detectives 
Inspector 
Investigate the 
docket 
C Swart 082 4115717 
23. 2 
February 
W DA party 
member and 
political activist 
Doreen 
Wessels 
084 2451921 
24. 2 
February 
H ANC Youth 
League 
George 
Mohala 
Pinkie’s 
Trade Shop 
25. 3 
February 
H ANC Youth 
League and 
member of ANC 
Executive 
Committee 
(Arranged the 
march) 
Neo Motaung 073 7218106 
26. 6 
February 
H CPF Coordinator 
Inspector  
M Swart 058 6221050 
27. 7 
February 
H DA Councillor Henk 
Badenhorst 
082 9269923 
28. 7 
February 
H ACCU, Inspector V Smith 076 1717657 
29. 7 
February 
H ACCU, Sergeant K S Masiteng 073 6740650 
30. 7 
February 
H ACCU, Captain NVH Mokoena 083 3928945 
31. 7 
February 
H ACCU, Inspector M L Mabe 083 7599253 
32.  
7 
February 
H ACCU, Inspector F S Mofokeng 083 7546278 
33. 7 
February 
H ANC Councillor 
of the Malutie A 
Phofung 
Municipality 
N E Msibi 082 5647507 
34. 9 
February 
H Crime 
Prevention 
Officer 
Supt C Heroldt 083 7847734 
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35. 9 
February 
W Concerned 
resident 
Wilna van 
Schalkwyk 
082 4336252 
36. 9 
February 
W Chairperson of 
the Concerned 
Residents 
Association 
Abie Mahlaba 072 4240329 
37. 10 
February 
H ACCU 
Commander, 
Captain HWJ 
Labuschagne 
HWJ 
Labuschagne 
084 5811890 
38. 10 
February 
W ACCU 
Commander, 
Captain HWJ 
Labuschagne 
HWJ 
Labuschagne 
084 5811890 
39  10 
February  
H Former Captain 
and charged with 
murder 
Visser 082 445 
4358 
40 24 
February  
W Station 
Commissioner 
Supt Tsotetsi 051 507 
6000 
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Addendum E: Letter of approval from the Head Strategic Research of 
the SAPS, approving the Research Proposal 
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Addendum F: A letter of approval from the SAPS Free State Provincial 
Commissioner 
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